- 26 November 2004
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 21Details
- In the context of securities clearing and settlement systems, the nature of governance arrangements acquires a dimension that goes beyond their traditional function in corporate law. They constitute a tool for regulators and central banks to achieve their respective policy goals relating to market operation, market integrity, and systemic stability. In the light of the analysis of this paper, and pending a further evolution in the regulation of securities clearing and settlement in the Community, the following conclusions can be drawn. Whatever the model of corporate governance used in a jurisdiction, securities clearing and settlement systems should adopt and ensure effective implementation of the highest corporate governance standards or best practices adopted or recommended for companies in the jurisdiction in which it operates as such standards or practices evolve over time. Generally, this would imply that securities clearing and settlement systems at minimum should adopt and implement the best practices recommended for listed companies.
- JEL Code
- G29 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Other
G34 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Mergers, Acquisitions, Restructuring, Corporate Governance
L49 : Industrial Organization→Antitrust Issues and Policies→Other
K2 : Law and Economics→Regulation and Business Law
- 18 December 2007
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 76Details
- This paper analyses the current national and international regulatory regimes relevant for European banks, CSDs and ICSDs, and compares them with the requirements in order to answer the following questions: Is there any overlap between the provisions of the CPSS-IOSCO Recommendations and the existing international and national requirements to which European SSSs and banks are subject? Are current provisions equivalent or more restrictive ("super-equivalent") for banks and CSDs? In what respect? Does the overlap between the CPSS-IOSCO Recommendations and existing regulation result in double requirements? This paper presents the results of this comparative analysis and attempts to answer such questions.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation