Moneda euro digitală
Eurosistemul se pregătește pentru posibila emitere a unei monede euro digitale, care va veni în completarea numerarului.
ASUMAREA RESPONSABILITĂȚII
4 mai 2026
Sinteza reacțiilor
Am publicat cea mai recentă sinteză a reacțiilor noastre, care oferă răspunsuri la aspectele evidențiate și solicitările formulate de Parlamentul European în cadrul rezoluției sale referitoare la Raportul anual 2024. Temele abordate variază de la politica monetară a BCE la stabilitatea financiară și infrastructura pieței.
Citește sinteza reacțiilor
DISCURS
4 mai 2026
Inovația digitală transformă domeniul financiar
Inovația digitală transformă plățile și domeniul financiar, afirmă Piero Cipollone, membru al Comitetului executiv. Prin alegerile corecte în materie de politici, activele digitale pot spori eficiența, prezervând totodată eficacitatea politicii monetare, stabilitatea financiară și suveranitatea monetară a Europei.
Citește discursul
PODCAST
30 aprilie 2026
Ascultă cele mai recente decizii ale noastre
Consiliul guvernatorilor BCE a decis cu privire la politica monetară, stabilind măsurile care trebuie adoptate pentru menținerea stabilității prețurilor în zona euro. Ascultă episodul în care președinta Christine Lagarde prezintă deciziile în cadrul conferinței noastre de presă.
Ascultă episodul podcastului- 4 May 2026
- GOVERNING COUNCIL DECISIONS - OTHER DECISIONSEnglishOTHER LANGUAGES (19) +
- 4 May 2026
- PRESS RELEASERelated
- 4 May 2026
- SURVEY OF PROFESSIONAL FORECASTERS
- 30 April 2026
- MONETARY POLICY DECISIONEnglishOTHER LANGUAGES (23) +Related
- 30 April 2026
- COMBINED MONETARY POLICY DECISIONS AND STATEMENT
- 29 April 2026
- MONETARY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EURO AREAAnnexes
- 29 April 2026
- MONETARY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EURO AREA
- 28 April 2026
- WEEKLY FINANCIAL STATEMENTEnglishOTHER LANGUAGES (22) +Annexes
- 28 April 2026
- WEEKLY FINANCIAL STATEMENT - COMMENTARY
- 4 May 2026
- Introductory remarks by Luis de Guindos, Vice-President of the ECB, at the ECON Committee of the European ParliamentRelated
- 4 May 2026
- Speech by Piero Cipollone, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at a workshop on digital assets and monetary policy transmission organised by the European Central Bank, Banca d’Italia, the Euro Area Business Cycle Network and the Centre for Economic Policy Research
- 30 April 2026
- Christine Lagarde, President of the ECB, Luis de Guindos, Vice-President of the ECB, Frankfurt am Main, 30 April 2026EnglishOTHER LANGUAGES (23) +Related
- 30 April 2026
- 22 April 2026
- Keynote speech by Philip R. Lane, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the joint workshop of the European Systemic Risk Board Advisory Technical Committee and Advisory Scientific Committee on “A European Safe Asset and Financial Stability”
- 20 April 2026
- Keynote speech by Christine Lagarde, President of the ECB, at the annual reception of the Association of German Banks on the occasion of their 75th anniversary
- 3 May 2026
- Interview with Luis de Guindos, Vice-President of the ECB, conducted by Amanda Mars on 30 April 2026
- 22 April 2026
- Interview with Frank Elderson, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB and Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board of the ECB, conducted by Eva Smal on 15 April 2026
- 23 March 2026
- Interview with Luis de Guindos, Vice-President of the ECB, conducted by Carlos Segovia on 20 March 2026
- 8 March 2026
- Interview with Christine Lagarde, President of the ECB, conducted by Benedetta Poletti on 12 February 2026
- 3 March 2026
- Interview with Philip R. Lane, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, conducted by Olaf Storbeck on 26 February 2026
- 21 April 2026
- Artificial intelligence (AI) can help track inflation risks in real time. A new ECB model based on machine learning informs experts how likely it is that inflation will be much higher or much lower than they expect.Details
- JEL Code
- E31 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Price Level, Inflation, Deflation
E37 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
- 13 April 2026
- During the latest tightening episode, interest rate hikes were especially effective. This ECB Blog finds a strong policy transmission to inflation during 2022 and 2023, a forceful response to supply-driven shocks and a low “sacrifice ratio”.Details
- JEL Code
- E50 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→General
E31 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Price Level, Inflation, Deflation
- 9 April 2026
- Many Bulgarians feared large price increases when the euro replaced the lev. However, preliminary evidence shows that the changeover in Bulgaria has so far had a limited impact on consumer prices and on perceptions of inflation.Details
- JEL Code
- E31 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Price Level, Inflation, Deflation
E42 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Monetary Systems, Standards, Regimes, Government and the Monetary System, Payment Systems
Related - 7 April 2026
- Europe’s energy dependence increasingly complicates the task of maintaining price stability. Meeting the continent’s clean‑energy targets would weaken the link between volatile global markets and domestic prices. Crucially, the tools to make this transition are already within reach.Details
- JEL Code
- E50 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→General
Q40 : Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics, Environmental and Ecological Economics→Energy→General
Q50 : Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics, Environmental and Ecological Economics→Environmental Economics→General
- 2 April 2026
- As the Eurosystem normalises its balance sheet, central bank reserves – banks’ most liquid asset – keep declining. This post examines how banks adapt to lower levels of reserves and explains why take-up in the Eurosystem’s standard refinancing operations is expected to increase.Details
- JEL Code
- E50 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→General
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 4 May 2026
- ANNUAL REPORTEnglishOTHER LANGUAGES (22) +Related
- 4 May 2026
- FEEDBACK ON THE INPUT PROVIDED BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AS PART OF ITS RESOLUTION ON THE ECB’S ANNUAL REPORTEnglishOTHER LANGUAGES (21) +Related
- 4 May 2026
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 3221Details
- Abstract
- This paper provides novel evidence on how income inequality shapes the heterogeneity of US monetary policy spillovers to GDP across foreign economies. Using state-dependent local projections and exploiting variation in disposable income inequality across 87 countries over 1966-2020, we show that household heterogeneity influences how foreign GDP responds to a US monetary tightening. GDP contracts up to one and a half times more when inequality is above average. However, while higher inequality amplifies negative spillovers in advanced economies, it mitigates them in emerging markets. To rationalise this finding, we use a three-country open economy Two-Agent New Keynesian (TANK) model, which suggests this divergence is driven by differences in participation in international financial markets. Households in emerging markets face greater barriers to international investment, limiting their ability to re-balance portfolios towards higher-return foreign bonds after the shock.
- JEL Code
- D31 : Microeconomics→Distribution→Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
E21 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Consumption, Saving, Production, Investment, Labor Markets, and Informal Economy→Consumption, Saving, Wealth
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
F42 : International Economics→Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance→International Policy Coordination and Transmission
- 4 May 2026
- ECONOMIC BULLETIN - BOXEconomic Bulletin Issue 3, 2026Details
- Abstract
- This box summarises the main findings from recent contacts between ECB staff and representatives of 67 leading non-financial companies operating in the euro area. According to these exchanges, which mainly took place between 23 March and 1 April 2026, there had been good business momentum in the first quarter, with few signs as yet of demand reacting to the latest war in the Middle East. The war was, however, already pushing some costs and prices higher, particularly for fuel, logistics, chemicals, plastics, paper and packaging. Concerns centred on the impact that the conflict was having on consumer confidence and the risk that a protracted conflict could induce global supply chain disruption due to shortages of oil and oil-based products, pushing prices higher and dampening activity later in the year.
- JEL Code
- E2 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Consumption, Saving, Production, Investment, Labor Markets, and Informal Economy
E3 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles
L2 : Industrial Organization→Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
- 4 May 2026
- SURVEY OF PROFESSIONAL FORECASTERSAnnexes
- 4 May 2026
- SURVEY OF PROFESSIONAL FORECASTERS
Related- 4 May 2026
- PRESS RELEASE
- 4 May 2026
- SURVEY OF MONETARY ANALYSTS - AGGREGATE RESULTS
- 28 April 2026
- OTHER PUBLICATIONAnnexes
- 28 April 2026
- OTHER PUBLICATION
- 28 April 2026
- OTHER PUBLICATIONLast updated on 28 April 2026
- 28 April 2026
- EURO AREA BANK LENDING SURVEYAnnexes
- 28 April 2026
- EURO AREA BANK LENDING SURVEY - ANNEX
- 27 April 2026
- SURVEY ON THE ACCESS TO FINANCE OF ENTERPRISES IN THE EURO AREAAnnexes
- 27 April 2026
- SAFE QUESTIONNAIRE
- 27 April 2026
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 387Details
- Abstract
- This paper describes and evaluates the European Union (EU) banking sector capital framework, focusing on how the international standards set by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision have been implemented within the EU. Using granular supervisory data for significant institutions under the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), we quantify the capital impact of EU-specific regulatory choices, supervisory measures and macroprudential policies. We show that most EU capital requirements stem from Basel standards, which encompass both prescriptive “Pillar 1” components and elements that are expected to be designed and calibrated at the jurisdictional level. The paper describes the evolution of capital ratios and requirements since the inception of the SSM and discusses the relationship between changes in capital levels and indicators of banking sector performance. To provide a comparative perspective, a model-based counterfactual exercise compares capital requirements of EU banks with those that would arise if EU banks were subject to the main prudential regulations that currently apply in the United States, which vary depending on the size of the bank. The results show that for the largest EU banks, the current US rules would entail stricter requirements, whereas mid-sized EU banks would be subject to less stringent requirements. Our findings show that EU capital requirements are broadly comparable to those in other jurisdictions and are largely in line with international standards. When assessing broader indicators of bank performance, we highlight the importance of considering not only private costs and benefits, but also intended effects and broader societal objectives. [...]
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
F36 : International Economics→International Finance→Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
- 22 April 2026
- RESEARCH BULLETIN - No. 142Details
- Abstract
- We model central bank communication when there is disagreement between the markets and the central bank about the central bank’s confidence surrounding its point forecast. We show that such a disagreement leads the markets to misunderstand a given announcement, so that the markets either over- or underreact to the bank’s announcement. Communicating only a part of the central bank’s information set is a way to correct the markets’ over- or underreaction. The model also produces predictions for how the central bank’s statement drafting process can take the disagreement about uncertainty into account, which we find support for in data on Federal Reserve System communication.
- JEL Code
- E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
C49 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics→Other
- 21 April 2026
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 386Details
- Abstract
- This paper studies the effectiveness of risk management, one of the two channels identified by the Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS, 2024) as those through which the financial system contributes to physical risk adaptation in the European Union (EU). We assess the efficacy of Level 3 prudential regulations in encouraging banks to include physical risk adaptation in their risk management and client engagement strategies. Our analysis adopts a broad perspective, encompassing not only prudential risk management but also, and in our view more importantly, prudential transparency regulation, given the positive leverage that stakeholders can exert to incentivise adaptation efforts. Our findings suggest that banks should consistently integrate physical risk adaptation into their stress tests, transition plans and Pillar III disclosures. Transition plans must address physical hazards, exposure and vulnerability and must set adaptation targets. Adaptation measures should be treated as risk mitigants reflected in losses given default (LGDs), with the severity and consistency of those losses being reflected in transition plans and stress tests.
- JEL Code
- K23 : Law and Economics→Regulation and Business Law→Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
O52 : Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth→Economywide Country Studies→Europe
Q54 : Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics, Environmental and Ecological Economics→Environmental Economics→Climate, Natural Disasters, Global Warming
Q58 : Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics, Environmental and Ecological Economics→Environmental Economics→Government Policy
- 16 April 2026
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 3220Details
- Abstract
- We analyze how bank lending to non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) affects credit supply to the real economy. Using granular supervisory and loan-level data, we document rapid growth in bank lending to NBFIs relative to lending to non-financial firms. This growth is driven primarily by reverse repos to NBFIs that invest in securities, e.g., investment funds, rather than by loans to NBFIs that extend credit to firms, e.g., private credit funds. We show that the expansion in bank–NBFI lending reflects rising NBFI borrowing demand to fund government securities, which stems in part from the tapering of QE and the expansion of government bond supply in the Euro area, US, UK, and Japan. Importantly, loans to NBFIs disproportionately crowd out loans to non-financial firms rather than securities on bank balance sheets, which ultimately contracts credit supply to the real economy. A model rationalizes our empirical findings and quantifies the aggregate crowding-out effect. Taken together, our results imply that the rise of bank lending to NBFIs represents a narrowing of bank business models and a contraction in bank credit intermediation.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G24 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Investment Banking, Venture Capital, Brokerage, Ratings and Ratings Agencies
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
- 14 April 2026
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 3219Details
- Abstract
- We propose a new approach to estimate selection-corrected quantiles of the gender wage gap. Our method employs instrumental variables that explain variation in the latent variable but, conditional on the latent process, do not directly affect selection. We provide semiparametric identification of the quantile parameters without imposing parametric restrictions on the selection probability, derive the asymptotic distribution of the proposed estimator based on constrained selection probability weighting, and demonstrate how the approach applies to the Roy model of labor supply. Using German administrative data, we analyze the distribution of the gender gap in full-time earnings. We find pronounced positive selection among women at the lower end, especially those with less education, which widens the gender gap in this segment, and strong positive selection among highly educated men at the top, which narrows the gender wage gap at upper quantiles.
- JEL Code
- C14 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General→Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General
C21 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Single Equation Models, Single Variables→Cross-Sectional Models, Spatial Models, Treatment Effect Models, Quantile Regressions
J16 : Labor and Demographic Economics→Demographic Economics→Economics of Gender, Non-labor Discrimination
J21 : Labor and Demographic Economics→Demand and Supply of Labor→Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure
J31 : Labor and Demographic Economics→Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs→Wage Level and Structure, Wage Differentials
- 14 April 2026
- CONSULTATION RESPONSE
- 13 April 2026
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 3218Details
- Abstract
- Policymakers often cite the risk that inflation expectations might “de-anchor” as a key reason for responding forcefully to inflationary shocks. We develop a model to analyze this trade-off and to quantify the benefits of stable long-run inflation expectations. In our framework, households and firms are imperfectly informed about the central bank’s objective and learn from its policy choices. Recognizing this interaction, the central bank raises interest rates more aggressively after adverse supply shocks and accepts short-run output costs to secure more stable inflation expectations. The strength of this reputation channel depends on how sensitive long-run inflation expectations are to surprises in interest rates. Using high-frequency identification, we estimate these elasticities for emerging and advanced economies and find large negative values for Brazil. We fit our model to these findings and use it to quantify how reputation building motives affect monetary policy decisions, and the role of central bank’s credibility in promoting macroeconomic stability.
- JEL Code
- E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
- 13 April 2026
- MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 33Details
- Abstract
- Stablecoins denominated in US dollars have attracted considerable attention in the context of their growing influence in US Treasury markets. However, the potential effects of euro-denominated stablecoins on euro area sovereign debt markets have been less explored, partly owing to their currently limited market presence. This article explores how the growth of euro-denominated stablecoins could affect demand for euro area sovereign bonds. By determining the pass-through rate of stablecoin demand to sovereign bond holdings by way of several illustrative examples, we demonstrate how the effect varies based on whether stablecoins are issued by banks or e-money institutions (EMIs), on the composition of stablecoin reserve assets, and on the liquidity management preferences of banks and EMIs. Moreover, the net effect hinges on the sectoral origins of stablecoin inflows, which vary according to what stablecoins are, and will be, used for. We also argue that on the one hand, the deposit requirement for EMIs set out in the European Union’s Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCAR) can act as a liquidity buffer during periods of stress, reducing the likelihood of immediate sales of other reserve assets, on the other hand it could also transmit stress arising from a stablecoin run to the banking system.
- JEL Code
- E42 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Monetary Systems, Standards, Regimes, Government and the Monetary System, Payment Systems
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 13 April 2026
- MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 33Details
- Abstract
- The market for tokenised money market funds (TMMFs) – money market funds (MMFs) whose shares are issued as tokens on distributed ledgers – remains small but is expanding rapidly. This article explores the specific design features of TMMFs, including the tokenisation of their underlying assets, liabilities and operational processes. It analyses key economic differences between TMMFs and traditional MMFs, with a particular focus on their implications for financial stability. Tokenisation has the potential to enhance efficiency by enabling faster settlement together with near-24/7 availability and programmability, while unlocking new use cases, such as employing TMMF tokens as collateral. However, TMMFs could also amplify risks related to liquidity mismatches and operational fragilities. A dedicated box in this article compares TMMFs with stablecoins, assessing their financial stability implications and interlinkages. Ultimately, the net financial stability impact of TMMFs will depend on how the market evolves, how it will affect prevailing business models and how it will integrate and interact with traditional financial markets.
- JEL Code
- G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
G32 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Capital and Ownership Structure, Value of Firms, Goodwill
O33 : Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth→Technological Change, Research and Development, Intellectual Property Rights→Technological Change: Choices and Consequences, Diffusion Processes
- 13 April 2026
- MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 33Details
- Abstract
- This article describes the current landscape of tokenised assets, illustrating the potential benefits across the entire asset value chain – from issuance to distribution and sales. As the Eurosystem is working towards enabling the settlement of distributed ledger technology (DLT) transactions using central bank money with a pilot by the end of the third quarter of 2026, we examine key enablers and barriers to unlocking the benefits of tokenisation for a digital capital market in Europe while safeguarding financial stability. These include the need for on-chain secondary market liquidity to enable scaling, as well as adaptations and harmonisation of the regulatory framework. Based on these findings, this article highlights how tokenisation, if it scales more widely, could contribute to the savings and investments union (SIU) agenda in two major ways. First, it offers an opportunity to create a European digital asset ecosystem from the early stages, in contrast to the fragmented market for traditional financial instruments, which developed from national markets. Second, it has the potential to improve market liquidity and efficiency, which can ultimately increase the scalability and development of capital markets in Europe. In turn, this could facilitate a more efficient allocation of capital within the economy. Lastly, developing a DLT ecosystem relying on European governance and based on assets denominated in euro is essential to maintaining monetary sovereignty and strategic autonomy. Finally, this article discusses the role of public authorities – including central banks, in providing the conditions for innovation to develop in a safe and resilient manner.
- JEL Code
- F36 : International Economics→International Finance→Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
G10 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→General
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
O33 : Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth→Technological Change, Research and Development, Intellectual Property Rights→Technological Change: Choices and Consequences, Diffusion Processes
Ratele dobânzilor
| Facilitatea de depozit | 2,00 % |
| Operațiuni principale de refinanțare (rată fixă) | 2,15 % |
| Facilitatea de creditare marginală | 2,40 % |
Rata inflației
Mai mult despre inflațieCursuri de schimb
| USD | US dollar | 1.1700 | |
| JPY | Japanese yen | 183.83 | |
| GBP | Pound sterling | 0.86358 | |
| CHF | Swiss franc | 0.9173 |
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