Zoekopties
Home Media Explainers Onderzoek & publicaties Statistieken Monetair beleid De euro Betalingsverkeer & markten Werken bij de ECB
Suggesties
Sorteren op
Niet beschikbaar in het Nederlands

Adriana Grasso

Monetary Policy

Division

Monetary Policy Strategy

Current Position

Economist

Fields of interest

Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics,Mathematical and Quantitative Methods,Financial Economics

Email

adriana.grasso@ecb.europa.eu

Education
2013-2017

PhD in Economics, LUISS Guido Carli University, Italy

2011-2013

MA in Finance, University of Rome Tor Vergata, Italy

2005-2009

BA in Mathematics, University of Florence, Italy

21 September 2021
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 275
Details
Abstract
This report discusses the role of the European Union’s full employment objective in the conduct of the ECB’s monetary policy. It first reviews a range of indicators of full employment, highlights the heterogeneity of labour market outcomes within different groups in the population and across countries, and documents the flatness of the Phillips curve in the euro area. In this context, it is stressed that labour market structures and trend labour market outcomes are primarily determined by national economic policies. The report then recalls that, in many circumstances, inflation and employment move together and pursuing price stability is conducive to supporting employment. However, in response to economic shocks that give rise to a temporary trade-off between employment and inflation stabilisation, the ECB’s medium-term orientation in pursuing price stability is shown to provide flexibility to contribute to the achievement of the EU’s full employment objective. Regarding the conduct of monetary policy in a low interest rate environment, model-based simulations suggest that history-dependent policy approaches − which have been proposed to overcome lasting shortfalls of inflation due to the effective lower bound on nominal interest rates by a more persistent policy response to disinflationary shocks − can help to bring employment closer to full employment, even though their effectiveness depends on the strength of the postulated expectations channels. Finally, the importance of employment income and wealth inequality in the transmission of monetary policy strengthens the case for more persistent or forceful easing policies (in pursuit of price stability) when interest rates are constrained by their lower bound.
JEL Code
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E24 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Consumption, Saving, Production, Investment, Labor Markets, and Informal Economy→Employment, Unemployment, Wages, Intergenerational Income Distribution, Aggregate Human Capital
21 September 2021
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 269
Details
Abstract
The ECB’s price stability mandate has been defined by the Treaty. But the Treaty has not spelled out what price stability precisely means. To make the mandate operational, the Governing Council has provided a quantitative definition in 1998 and a clarification in 2003. The landscape has changed notably compared to the time the strategy review was originally designed. At the time, the main concern of the Governing Council was to anchor inflation at low levels in face of the inflationary history of the previous decades. Over the last decade economic conditions have changed dramatically: the persistent low-inflation environment has created the concrete risk of de-anchoring of longer-term inflation expectations. Addressing low inflation is different from addressing high inflation. The ability of the ECB (and central banks globally) to provide the necessary accommodation to maintain price stability has been tested by the lower bound on nominal interest rates in the context of the secular decline in the equilibrium real interest rate. Against this backdrop, this report analyses: the ECB’s performance as measured against its formulation of price stability; whether it is possible to identify a preferred level of steady-state inflation on the basis of optimality considerations; advantages and disadvantages of formulating the objective in terms of a focal point or a range, or having both; whether the medium-term orientation of the ECB’s policy can serve as a mechanism to cater for other considerations; how to strengthen, in the presence of the lower bound, the ECB’s leverage on private-sector expectations for inflation and the ECB’s future policy actions so that expectations can act as ‘automatic stabilisers’ and work alongside the central bank.
JEL Code
E31 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Price Level, Inflation, Deflation
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
10 April 2018
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2141
Details
Abstract
We propose a consumption-based model that allows for an inverted term structure of real and nominal risk-free rates. In our framework the agent is subject to time-varying macroeconomic risk and interest rates at all maturities depend on her risk perception which shape saving propensities over time. In bad times, when risk is perceived to be higher in the short- than the long-term, the agent would prefer to hedge against low realizations of consumption in the near future by investing in long-term securities. This determines, in equilibrium, the inversion of the yield curve. Pricing time-varying consumption volatility risk is essential for obtaining the inversion of the real curve and allows to price the average level and slope of the nominal one.
JEL Code
G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates
2022
Bank of Italy Working Paper Series
  • Cecchetti, S., Grasso, A. and Pericoli, M.
2021
Bank of Italy Occasional Papers
  • Cecioni, M., Grasso, A., Notarpietro, A. and Pisani, M.
2021
Bank of Italy Working Paper Series
  • Grasso, A. and Traficante, G.
2020
Bank of Italy Working Paper Series
  • Grasso, A., Passadore, J. and Piguillem, F.
2019
Bank of Italy Occasional Papers
  • Grande, G., Grasso, A. and Zinna, G.
2018
Bank of Italy Working Paper Series
  • Grasso, A. and Ropele, T.