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Gabriel Glöckler

Communications

Division

Current Position

Principal Adviser

Fields of interest

Public Economics,Other Special Topics

Email

gabriel.glockler@ecb.europa.eu

Other current responsibilities
2020-

Co-lead of the Research and Policy Network on central bank communications of the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

2013-

Visiting Professor, College of Europe, Bruges, Belgium

Education
1996-1997

M.A. European Studies, College of Europe, Bruges, Belgium

1993-1996

M.A. (Oxon) Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, St Edmund Hall, University of Oxford, United Kingdom

Professional experience
2016-

Senior Manager (Principal Adviser), Directorate General Communications, European Central Bank

2013-2016

Head of Division, Directorate General Secretariat, European Central Bank, Assistant Secretary to the ECB's Executive Board and Governing Council

2009-2013

Deputy Head of Division, EU Institutions Division, Directorate General International and European Relations, European Central Bank

2011-2013

Member of the Economic Policy Committee of the EU

2003-2009

Counsellor to the Vice-President, Counsel to the Executive Board, European Central Bank

1999-2003

(Senior) Economist, European Relations Division, Directorate General International and European Relations, European Central Bank

1997-1998

Academic Assistant, College of Europe, Bruges, Belgium

Teaching experience
2013-

EMU and Euro Area Governance, Department of European Political and Governance Studies, College of Europe, Bruges, Belgium

2017

Oxford University Business Economics Programme

2003

University of of Applied Sciences of Deutsche Bundesbank

21 September 2021
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 274
Details
Abstract
This paper examines the importance of central bank communication in ensuring the effectiveness of monetary policy and in underpinning the credibility, accountability and legitimacy of independent central banks. It documents how communication has become a monetary policy tool in itself; one example of this being forward guidance, given its impact on inflation expectations, economic behaviour and inflation. The paper explains why and how consistent, clear and effective communication to expert and non-expert audiences is essential in an environment of an ever-increasing need by central banks to reach these audiences. Central banks must also meet the demand for more understandable information about policies and tools, while at the same time overcoming the challenge posed by the wider public’s rational inattention. Since the European Central Bank was established, the communications landscape has changed dramatically and continues to evolve. This paper outlines how better communication, including greater engagement with the wider public, could help boost people’s understanding of and trust in the Eurosystem.
JEL Code
E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
4 July 2013
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 150
Details
Abstract
Taking a cue from the assertion that "loose lips sink markets" (Carmassi and Micossi, 2010), this paper investigates to what extent and why political communication has had an impact on the sovereign bond spreads of selected euro area countries over the German Bund. Drawing on 25,000 news media releases between January 2009 and October 2011, it empirically compares political communication across various political actors at the supranational and national levels in the euro area. It finds empirical evidence that, in the short term, certain types of political communication have a quantifiable effect on sovereign bond spreads. This effect can be positive or negative depending on the type of communication, possibly fuelling self-reinforcing feedback loops between markets and policy actions. Subsequently, this paper explores possible reasons for this observed phenomenon. It analyses the specific economic, political and institutional context in which political communication works in Europe and finds that the potential for miscommunication is structurally higher in the euro area than in other nation-based currency areas. Finally, the paper identifies avenues to make communication policy more effective and puts forward possible measures to mitigate the risks of miscommunication.
JEL Code
C22 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Single Equation Models, Single Variables→Time-Series Models, Dynamic Quantile Regressions, Dynamic Treatment Effect Models &bull Diffusion Processes
D70 : Microeconomics→Analysis of Collective Decision-Making→General
E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E61 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Policy Objectives, Policy Designs and Consistency, Policy Coordination
E62 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Fiscal Policy
G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates
G14 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Information and Market Efficiency, Event Studies, Insider Trading
F50 : International Economics→International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy→General
22 September 2011
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 127
Details
Abstract
This Occasional Paper examines how and why the institutional framework governing EMU has evolved since the creation of the euro. Building on theories of institutionalism, the paper in particular investigates to what extent functional spillovers from the single currency into other policy domains, like macroeconomic policies or financial regulation, met with an adequate institutional response, and to what extent the existing institutional framework conditioned the response to the financial crisis. The interaction between policy requirements and institutional capabilities is examined both in
JEL Code
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E31 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Price Level, Inflation, Deflation
D84 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty→Expectations, Speculations
2016
Journal of European Public Policy
  • Glöckler, G., Lindner, J. & Salines, M.
2013
Journal of European Integration
  • Glöckler, G., Yiangou, J. & O’Keeffe, M.
2012
Journal of European Public Policy
  • Glöckler, G., Salines, M. & Truchlewski, Z.
2001
Problèmes d'Amérique latine, No. 41
  • Glöckler, G. & Garcia Herrero, A.
1998
Current Politics and Economics of Europe
A ‘Single Voice’ for Europe’s Single Currency?
  • Glöckler, G.
1998
Blackstone Press Limited, London
Guide to EU Policies
  • Glöckler, G., Junius, L., Scappucci, G., Usherwood, S. & Vassallo, J.
2020
Handbuch Europäische Union
  • Glöckler, G. & Graeff, C.
2019
Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 2019
  • Glöckler, G.
2018
Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 2018
  • Glöckler, G.
2015
Europäisches Unionsrecht
  • Glöckler, G.
2011
Griechenland und die Lehren für die Euro-Zone
  • Glöckler, G.
2011
The EU in International Fora – Lessons for the Union’s External Representation after Lisbon
  • Glöckler, G. & Truchlewski, Z.
2009
After the Crisis: A new socio-economic settlement for the EU
  • Glöckler, G.
2007
Management Reforms in International Organizations
  • Glöckler, G.
2005
Institutionalization of international negotiation systems
  • Glöckler, G.
2005
Governance and Legitimacy in EMU
  • Glöckler, G.
2002
The Polish Way to the Euro
  • Glöckler, G.
2019
paper presented at the 16th Biennial Conference of the EU Studies Association, Denver, 2019
Beyond expert circles: Measuring central banks’ engagement with the wider public
  • Glöckler, G.; Bitterlich, M.T., Gardt , M.
2017
Graduation speech for the Frankfurt School of Finance and Management
  • Glöckler, G.
2017
paper presented at the 15th Biennial EU Studies Association Conference, Miami, May 2017
Communicating Europe: lessons from the Brexit campaign
  • Glöckler, G.
2016
Bologna Institute for Policy Research, Johns Hopkins University
  • Glöckler, G.
2015
paper presented at the conference "The ECB in the Institutional, Political, and Economic Framework of the Post-crisis EU"
"Engage, explain and convince" - Recent trends in communication and transparency of the European Central Bank
  • Glöckler, G.
2012
University of Edinburgh
  • Glöckler, G.
2012
TEDx event "Everything Communicates" Frankfurt am Main
  • Glöckler, G.
1998
EU Focus
ECB External Policy - Evolution or Revolution?
  • Glöckler, G.
1998
Manchester University Working Paper No. 2/98
The euro and the politics of international monetary relations
  • Glöckler, G.