Demosthenes Ioannou
International & European Relations
- Division
- Current Position
-
Senior Lead Economist
- Fields of interest
-
Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics,Economic Growth,Other Special Topics
- Education
- 1996-2000
PhD, University of Cambridge
- 1995-1996
MPhil, University of Cambridge
- 1992-1995
BA, University of York
- Professional experience
- 2021-
Senior Lead Economist, Directorate General International and European Relations, European Central Bank
- 2020-2021
Senior Lead Economist, Monetary Policy Strategy Division, Directorate General Monetary Policy, European Central Bank
- 2019-2020
Senior Lead Economist, Directorate General International and European Relations, European Central Bank
- 2016-2019
ECB member, Economic Policy Committee (EU)
- 2016-2019
Principal Economist, Governance team, EU Institutions and Fora Division, Directorate General International and European Relations, ECB
- 2013-2016
Principal Economist, Banking Union team, EU Institutions and Fora Division, Directorate General International and European Relations, ECB
- 2012-2013
Head of the ECB Brussels Office, European Central Bank, Brussels, Belgium
- 2011-2012
Adviser to the Greek Prime Minister, Athens, Greece
- 2009-2011
Principal Economist, EU Institutions and Fora Division, Directorate General International and European Relations, ECB
- 2008-2009
Senior Economist, Directorate General Economics, Directorate Economic Developments, ECB
- 2001-2007
ECB observer, Macroeconomic Dialogue of the EU (MED)
- 2001-2007
ECB observer, Council of EU ministers/ECOFIN
- 2001-2007
ECB alternate member, Economic Policy Committee (EU)
- 2000-2007
Senior Economist, Directorate General International and European Relations (DG-I), European Relations, ECB
- 1997-1997
Traineeship, European Commission, Brussels, Belgium
- Teaching experience
- 2000-2021
Visiting lectures, Universities of Frankfurt, Mainz, Cambridge, Athens, Salzburg, Ottawa, other
- 2005-2007
Lehrbeauftragter der Fachhochschule der Deutschen Bundesbank, Hachenburg, Germany
- 1996-1997
Economics tutor, Fitzwilliam College, University of Cambridge, UK
- 13 June 2022
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 295Details
- Abstract
- Well-functioning risk-sharing arrangements are essential for the shock absorbing capacity and resilience of an economy, even more so for countries in a monetary union where the single monetary policy is unable to address asymmetric shocks. The common shocks that euro area member states have been facing over the past years are just that: common. Yet their impacts are far from equal across countries, implying that risk sharing remains an important issue. This paper discusses the different forms and channels of risk sharing and reviews the main arguments in favour and against the development of different forms of public and private risk sharing in the euro area, focusing in particular on whether they act as complements or substitutes. It proposes a stylised theoretical model of a monetary union to test the complementarity or substitutability between public and private risk sharing. While the model calibration finds that substitutability prevails, the model also contains an interesting complementarity whereby a central fiscal capacity makes private risk sharing more efficient, especially in crisis times. Our findings are relevant for the ongoing policy discussion on EMU deepening as the provision of public risk sharing as well as the overall degree of risk sharing are still comparatively low in the euro area.
- JEL Code
- C23 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Single Equation Models, Single Variables→Panel Data Models, Spatio-temporal Models
E62 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Fiscal Policy
G11 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Portfolio Choice, Investment Decisions
G15 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→International Financial Markets
- 21 September 2021
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 274Details
- Abstract
- This paper examines the importance of central bank communication in ensuring the effectiveness of monetary policy and in underpinning the credibility, accountability and legitimacy of independent central banks. It documents how communication has become a monetary policy tool in itself; one example of this being forward guidance, given its impact on inflation expectations, economic behaviour and inflation. The paper explains why and how consistent, clear and effective communication to expert and non-expert audiences is essential in an environment of an ever-increasing need by central banks to reach these audiences. Central banks must also meet the demand for more understandable information about policies and tools, while at the same time overcoming the challenge posed by the wider public’s rational inattention. Since the European Central Bank was established, the communications landscape has changed dramatically and continues to evolve. This paper outlines how better communication, including greater engagement with the wider public, could help boost people’s understanding of and trust in the Eurosystem.
- JEL Code
- E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
- 25 August 2020
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2459Details
- Abstract
- This paper quantifies the economic influence that shocks to EMU cohesion, which in turn reflect the incomplete nature of the monetary union, have on the rest of the world. Disentangling euro area stress shocks and global risk aversion shocks based on a combination of sign, magnitude and narrative restrictions in a daily Structural Vector Autoregression (VAR) model with financial variables. We find that the effects of euro area stress shocks are significant not only for the euro area but also for the rest of the world. Notably, an increase in euro area stress entails a slowdown of economic activity in the rest of the world, as well as a fall in imports/exports of both the euro area and the rest of the world. A decrease in euro area stress has somewhat more widespread beneficial effects on both economic performance and global trade activity.
- JEL Code
- C23 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Single Equation Models, Single Variables→Panel Data Models, Spatio-temporal Models
C32 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models, Multiple Variables→Time-Series Models, Dynamic Quantile Regressions, Dynamic Treatment Effect Models, Diffusion Processes
F02 : International Economics→General→International Economic Order
F33 : International Economics→International Finance→International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
- 19 June 2015
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1815Details
- Abstract
- During the crisis, support for the EU has declined noticeably in many European Union member states. While previous research on European public opinion has mainly focused on the impact of domestic country- and individual-level factors on public attitudes towards the EU, this paper argues that developments in other EU member states can also have a significant impact on domestic euroscepticism. Specifically, deteriorating economic and fiscal conditions in other member states can lead to concerns in domestic publics about possible negative spillovers on the domestic economy and the ability of the EU to deliver positive economic outcomes. This in turn may lead to rising euroscepticism at the domestic level. The analysis of a panel data set for the EU as a whole and the euro area countries lends support to these arguments by showing that higher unemployment rates and government debt levels in other European countries are systematically related to lower levels of trust in the EU domestically.
- JEL Code
- D72 : Microeconomics→Analysis of Collective Decision-Making→Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
E02 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→General→Institutions and the Macroeconomy
F15 : International Economics→Trade→Economic Integration
H63 : Public Economics→National Budget, Deficit, and Debt→Debt, Debt Management, Sovereign Debt
J64 : Labor and Demographic Economics→Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers→Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
- 6 February 2015
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 160Details
- Abstract
- This paper presents a European Index of Regional Institutional Integration (EURII), which maps developments in European integration from 1958 to 2014 on the basis of a monthly dataset. EURII captures what we call: (i) the “Common Market Era”, which lasted from 1958 until 1993; and (ii) the first twenty years of the “Union Era” that started in 1994, but gained new impetus in response to the euro area crisis. The paper complements the economic narratives of the crisis with an institutional approach highlighting the remedies to the flaws in the initial design of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). In fact, since 2010, EMU’s institutional framework has been substantially reformed. While work on EMU’s new governance is still in progress, the broad contours of a “genuine union” have been outlined in the Four Presidents’ Report of December 2012. The report envisages a more effective economic union, a fiscal union, a financial union, and a commensurate political union. The aim of the EURII index is threefold: (i) to provide a tool to synthesise and monitor the process of European institutional integration since 1958 and, in particular, track institutional reforms since 2010; (ii) to expand a previous integration index by showing that monetary unification – which was initially understood as “the cherry on the Internal Market pie” – implied a major discontinuity in the process and nature of European integration, that is, a new “pie on the cherry”; and (iii) to offer a tool for further research, policy analysis and communication.
- JEL Code
- F33 : International Economics→International Finance→International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
F42 : International Economics→Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance→International Policy Coordination and Transmission
N24 : Economic History→Financial Markets and Institutions→Europe: 1913?
Annexes- 6 February 2015
- ANNEX
- 27 May 2011
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1344Details
- Abstract
- We test whether two key elements of the EU and euro area economic governance framework, the Stability and Growth Pact and the Lisbon Strategy, have had any impact on macroeconomic outcomes. We test this proposition using a difference-in-difference approach on a panel of over 30 countries, some of which are non-EU (control group). Hence, the impact of the EU economic governance pillars is evaluated based on both the performance before and after their application as well as against the control group. We find strong and robust evidence that neither the Stability and Growth Pact nor the Lisbon Strategy have had a significant beneficial impact on fiscal and economic performance outcomes. We conclude that a profound reform of these pillars is needed to make them work in the next decade.
- JEL Code
- E62 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Fiscal Policy
E63 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy, Stabilization, Treasury Policy
H63 : Public Economics→National Budget, Deficit, and Debt→Debt, Debt Management, Sovereign Debt
O43 : Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth→Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity→Institutions and Growth
- 25 June 2008
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 85Details
- Abstract
- This paper reviews the governance framework of the Lisbon Strategy and discusses the specific option of increasing the role of benchmarking as a means of improving the implementation record of structural reforms in the European Union. Against this background, the paper puts forward a possible avenue for developing a strong form of quantitative benchmarking, namely ranking. The ranking methodology relies on the construction of a synthetic indicator using the "benefit of the doubt" approach, which acknowledges differences in emphasis among Member States with regard to structural reform priorities. The methodology is applied by using the structural indicators that have been commonly agreed by the governments of the Member States, but could also be used for ranking exercises on the basis of other indicators.
- JEL Code
- D02 : Microeconomics→General→Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
P11 : Economic Systems→Capitalist Systems→Planning, Coordination, and Reform
P16 : Economic Systems→Capitalist Systems→Political Economy
C43 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics→Index Numbers and Aggregation
C61 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Mathematical Methods, Programming Models, Mathematical and Simulation Modeling→Optimization Techniques, Programming Models, Dynamic Analysis
- 2017
- SUERF Policy Note
- 2016
- Journal of European Public Policy
- 2015
- Journal of European integration
- 2015
- Journal of European Public Policy
- 2015
- Journal of European Public Policy
- 2014
- European Journal of Political Economy
- 2013
- Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen
- 2011
- The economic crisis and European integration
- 2020
- VoxEU