Christoffer Kok
Horizontal Line Supervision
- Division
-
Stress Test Experts
- Current Position
-
Head of Division
- Fields of interest
-
Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics,Mathematical and Quantitative Methods,Financial Economics
- Education
- 1999
MSc (econ) Aarhus University, MSc (finance) Copenhagen Business School
- Professional experience
- 1997-
EPRU (Copenhagen University) 1997-99, Danmarks Nationalbank 1999-2002, ECB 2002- , IMF Short-Term Expert 2019-
- 21 September 2021
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 272Details
- Abstract
- Since the European Central Bank’s (ECB’s) 2003 strategy review, the importance of macro-financial amplification channels for monetary policy has increasingly gained recognition. This paper takes stock of this evolution and discusses the desirability of further incremental enhancements in the role of financial stability considerations in the ECB’s monetary policy strategy. The paper starts with the premise that macroprudential policy, along with microprudential supervision, is the first line of defence against the build-up of financial imbalances. It also recognises that the pursuit of price stability through monetary policy, and of financial stability through macroprudential policy, are to a large extent complementary. Nevertheless, macroprudential policy may not be able to ensure financial stability independently of monetary policy, because of spillovers originating from the common transmission channels through which the two policies produce their effects. For example, a low interest rate environment can create incentives to engage in more risk-taking, or can adversely impact the profitability of financial intermediaries and hence their capacity to absorb shocks. The paper argues that the existence of such spillovers creates a conceptual case for monetary policy to take financial stability considerations into account. It then goes on to discuss what this conclusion might imply in practice for the ECB. One option would be to exploit the flexible length of the medium-term horizon over which price stability is to be achieved. Longer deviations from price stability could occasionally be tolerated, if they resulted in materially lower risks for financial stability and, ultimately, for future price stability. ...
- JEL Code
- E3 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 21 September 2021
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 269Details
- Abstract
- The ECB’s price stability mandate has been defined by the Treaty. But the Treaty has not spelled out what price stability precisely means. To make the mandate operational, the Governing Council has provided a quantitative definition in 1998 and a clarification in 2003. The landscape has changed notably compared to the time the strategy review was originally designed. At the time, the main concern of the Governing Council was to anchor inflation at low levels in face of the inflationary history of the previous decades. Over the last decade economic conditions have changed dramatically: the persistent low-inflation environment has created the concrete risk of de-anchoring of longer-term inflation expectations. Addressing low inflation is different from addressing high inflation. The ability of the ECB (and central banks globally) to provide the necessary accommodation to maintain price stability has been tested by the lower bound on nominal interest rates in the context of the secular decline in the equilibrium real interest rate. Against this backdrop, this report analyses: the ECB’s performance as measured against its formulation of price stability; whether it is possible to identify a preferred level of steady-state inflation on the basis of optimality considerations; advantages and disadvantages of formulating the objective in terms of a focal point or a range, or having both; whether the medium-term orientation of the ECB’s policy can serve as a mechanism to cater for other considerations; how to strengthen, in the presence of the lower bound, the ECB’s leverage on private-sector expectations for inflation and the ECB’s future policy actions so that expectations can act as ‘automatic stabilisers’ and work alongside the central bank.
- JEL Code
- E31 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Price Level, Inflation, Deflation
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
- 19 May 2021
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2554Details
- Abstract
- In this paper we present a methodology of model-based calibration of additional capital needed in an interconnected financial system to minimize potential contagion losses. Building on ideas from combinatorial optimization tailored to controlling contagion in case of complete information about an interbank network, we augment the model with three plausible types of fire sale mechanisms. We then demonstrate the power of the methodology on the euro area banking system based on a network of 373 banks. On the basis of an exogenous shock leading to defaults of some banks in the network, we find that the contagion losses and the policy authority's ability to control them depend on the assumed fire sale mechanism and the fiscal budget constraint that may or may not restrain the policy authorities from infusing money to halt the contagion. The modelling framework could be used both as a crisis management tool to help inform decisions on capital/liquidity infusions in the context of resolutions and precautionary recapitalisations or as a crisis prevention tool to help calibrate capital buffer requirements to address systemic risks due to interconnectedness.
- JEL Code
- C61 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Mathematical Methods, Programming Models, Mathematical and Simulation Modeling→Optimization Techniques, Programming Models, Dynamic Analysis
D85 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty→Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
L14 : Industrial Organization→Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance→Transactional Relationships, Contracts and Reputation, Networks
- 14 May 2021
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2551Details
- Abstract
- Using a difference-in-differences approach and relying on confidential supervisory data and an unique proprietary data set available at the European Central Bank related to the 2016 EU-wide stress test, this paper presents novel empirical evidence that supervisory scrutiny associated to stress testing has a disciplining effect on bank risk. We find that banks that participated in the 2016 EU-wide stress test subsequently reduced their credit risk relative to banks that were not part of this exercise. Relying on new metrics for supervisory scrutiny that measure the quantity, potential impact, and duration of interactions between banks and supervisors during the stress test, we find that the disciplining effect is stronger for banks subject to more intrusive supervisory scrutiny during the exercise.
- JEL Code
- G11 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Portfolio Choice, Investment Decisions
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 11 December 2020
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2499Details
- Abstract
- We provide a simple and tractable accounting-based stress-testing framework to assess loss dynamics in the banking sector, in a context of leverage targeting. Contagion can occur through direct interbank exposures, and indirect exposures due to overlapping portfolios with the associated price dynamics via fire sales. We apply the framework to three granular proprietary ECB datasets, including an interbank network of 26 large euro area banks as well as their overlapping portfolios of loans, derivatives and securities. A 5 percent shock to the price of assets held in the trading book leads to an initial loss of 30 percent of system equity and an additional loss of 1.3 percent due to fire sales spillovers. Direct interbank contagion is negligible in our analysis. Our findings underscore the importance of accurately estimating the price effects of fire sales.
- JEL Code
- C63 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Mathematical Methods, Programming Models, Mathematical and Simulation Modeling→Computational Techniques, Simulation Modeling
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 25 November 2020
- FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - BOXFinancial Stability Review Issue 2, 2020Details
- Abstract
- This box explores the potential macroeconomic impact of different capital buffer replenishment paths. Model simulations show that replenishing capital buffers too early or too aggressively could be counterproductive and prolong the economic downturn. While the costs of restoring capital buffers to pre-crisis levels are not excessive if the economy moves along the central projection scenario, a weaker economic environment would increase bank losses and result in a more extensive use of capital buffers. In such a scenario, a later and more gradual restoration of capital buffers would be warranted.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
E17 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→General Aggregative Models→Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
E51 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Money Supply, Credit, Money Multipliers
C68 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Mathematical Methods, Programming Models, Mathematical and Simulation Modeling→Computable General Equilibrium Models
- 24 November 2020
- FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - ARTICLEFinancial Stability Review Issue 2, 2020Details
- Abstract
- Fiscal, prudential and monetary authorities have responded to the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic by providing unprecedented support to the real economy. Importantly, the combination of policy actions has done more to limit the materialisation of risks to households and firms than each policy individually. Exploiting complementarities and ensuring the most effective combination of policies will, however, be equally important when authorities start to phase out the various related relief measures. The fact that in particular the enacted fiscal and labour market measures, as well as their phase-out schedules, differ substantially across the largest euro area economies further complicates the challenge of obtaining the most effective policy combination. Along with the reduction in support to the real economy, the phasing-out of policy measures could adversely affect banks’ balance sheets and capitalisation. Resulting cliff effects in policy support are relevant for prudential authorities in the context of their future decisions on the replenishment of capital buffers. The results of the analysis suggest there are substantial risks associated with the early withdrawal of policy support, although the analysis does not account for the medium-term risks of protracted policy support.
- JEL Code
- C68 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Mathematical Methods, Programming Models, Mathematical and Simulation Modeling→Computable General Equilibrium Models
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
E62 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Fiscal Policy
E63 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy, Stabilization, Treasury Policy
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
H81 : Public Economics→Miscellaneous Issues→Governmental Loans, Loan Guarantees, Credits, Grants, Bailouts
- 10 November 2020
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2487Details
- Abstract
- Could a monetary policy loosening entail the opposite effect than the intended expansionary impact in a low interest rate environment? We demonstrate that the risk of hitting the rate at which the effect reverses depends on the capitalization of the banking sector by using a non-linear macroeconomic model calibrated to the euro area economy. The framework suggests that the reversal interest rate is located in negative territory of around −1% per annum. The possibility of the reversal interest rate creates a novel motive for macroprudential policy. We show that macroprudential policy in the form of a countercyclical capital buffer, which prescribes the build-up of buffers in good times, can mitigate substantially the probability of encountering the reversal rate, improves welfare and reduces economic fluctuations. This new motive emphasizes also the strategic complementarities between monetary policy and macroprudential policy.
- JEL Code
- E32 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Business Fluctuations, Cycles
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 19 October 2020
- MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 11Details
- Abstract
- Had authorities built up larger countercyclical buffers before the pandemic, it would have been easier to release capital in response to the crisis. The “lower for longer” interest rate environment reinforces the case for building up releasable buffers in good times. The article shows that enhancing countercyclical capacity can improve the policy mix available to achieve macro-financial stabilisation.
- JEL Code
- E32 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Business Fluctuations, Cycles
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 22 June 2020
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 242Details
- Abstract
- Due to the international dimension of the financial sector within the EU and beyond, domestically oriented macroprudential policies have the potential to create material cross-border spillover effects. This occasional paper provides a detailed overview of the academic and empirical literature on cross-border effects of macroprudential policies. It also summarises a stocktaking exercise, conducted by a task force of the ESCB’s Financial Stability Committee (FSC), on existing national approaches within the EU for assessing and monitoring such cross-border spillover effects. The paper accompanies an FSC report presenting a framework to be used by macroprudential authorities when assessing cross-border spillover effects induced by enacted or planned policy measures.
- JEL Code
- E42 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Monetary Systems, Standards, Regimes, Government and the Monetary System, Payment Systems
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
F36 : International Economics→International Finance→Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 26 May 2020
- FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - BOXFinancial Stability Review Issue 1, 2020Details
- Abstract
- As authorities have sought to soften the impact of the coronavirus pandemic, a key concern has been the potential for the banking sector to ration credit and amplify the economic cost. Euro area real GDP could decrease substantially in 2020. For example, it could be 9 percentage points lower than expected before the pandemic shock, with a rebound in 2021 as confinement policies are reversed (see Chart A).
- 20 February 2020
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2376Details
- Abstract
- This paper examines the interactions of macroprudential and monetary policies. We find, using a range of macroeconomic models used at the European Central Bank, that in the long run, a 1% bank capital requirement increase has a small impact on GDP. In the short run, GDP declines by 0.15-0.35%. Under a stronger monetary policy reaction, the impact falls to 0.05-0.25%. The paper also examines how capital requirements and the conduct of macroprudential policy affect the monetary transmission mechanism. Higher bank leverage increases the economy's vulnerability to shocks but also monetary policy's ability to offset them. Macroprudential policy diminishes the frequency and severity of financial crises thus eliminating the need for extremely low interest rates. Countercyclical capital measures reduce the neutral real interest rate in normal times.
- JEL Code
- E4 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates
E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
E5 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 21 November 2019
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 237Details
- Abstract
- The prolonged crisis exposed the vulnerability of a monetary union without a banking union. The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), which started operating in November 2014, is an essential step towards restoring banks to health and rebuilding trust in the banking system. The ECB is today responsible for setting a single monetary policy applicable throughout the euro area and for supervising all euro area banks in order to ensure their safety and soundness, some directly and some indirectly. Its role in the area of financial stability has also expanded through the conferral of macroprudential tasks and tools that include tightening national measures when necessary. It thus carries out these complementary functions, while its primary objective of pursuing price stability remains unchanged. What are the working arrangements of this enlarged ECB, and what are the similarities and existing synergies among these functions? In the following pages, focusing on the organisational implications of the “new” ECB, we show the relative degrees of centralisation and decentralisation that exist in discharging these functions, the cycles of policy preparation and the rules governing interaction between them.
- JEL Code
- E42 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Monetary Systems, Standards, Regimes, Government and the Monetary System, Payment Systems
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
F36 : International Economics→International Finance→Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 20 November 2019
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2331Details
- Abstract
- We study the interplay between two channels of interconnectedness in the banking system. The first one is a direct interconnectedness, via a network of interbank loans, banks' loans to other corporate and retail clients, and securities holdings. The second channel is an indirect interconnectedness, via exposures to common asset classes. To this end, we analyze a unique supervisory data set collected by the European Central Bank that covers 26 large banks in the euro area. To assess the impact of contagion, we apply a structural valuation model NEVA (Barucca et al., 2016a), in which common shocks to banks' external assets are reflected in a consistent way in the market value of banks' mutual liabilities through the network of obligations. We identify a strongly non-linear relationship between diversification of exposures, shock size, and losses due to interbank contagion. Moreover, the most systemically important sectors tend to be the households and the financial sectors of larger countries because of their size and position in the financial network. Finally, we provide policy insights into the potential impact of more diversified versus more domestic portfolio allocation strategies on the propagation of contagion, which are relevant to the policy discussion on the European Capital Market Union.
- JEL Code
- C45 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics→Neural Networks and Related Topics
C63 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Mathematical Methods, Programming Models, Mathematical and Simulation Modeling→Computational Techniques, Simulation Modeling
D85 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty→Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 29 October 2019
- MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 9Details
- Abstract
- This article aims to contribute to the ongoing discussion about the long-term strategy for stress testing in the euro area. In particular, it highlights some of the strengths and weaknesses of the constrained bottom-up approach, which is currently used in the EU‑wide stress-testing exercise. Under this approach, banks use their own models to generate stress test projections on the basis of a common macroeconomic scenario and under the constraints imposed by the European Banking Authority methodology. This set-up provides banks with some scope to underestimate their vulnerabilities in order to appear more resilient than their peers. This article confirms previous empirical evidence showing that such behaviour may indeed be practised by banks. This, in turn, requires a robust quality assurance of banks’ stress test projections by the competent authorities (including the European Central Bank), to enforce more realistic results. Against this background, the article presents a novel empirical analysis providing indicative evidence that the “supervisory scrutiny” relating to the quality assurance may be having a disciplining effect on banks’ risk-taking.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 29 May 2019
- FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - ARTICLEFinancial Stability Review Issue 1, 2019Details
- Abstract
- The countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) is one of the centrepieces of the post-crisis reforms that introduced macroprudential policy instruments and aims to protect the resilience of the financial system. As only a few euro area countries have activated the CCyB, macroprudential authorities currently have limited policy space to release buffer requirements in adverse circumstances. This special feature provides insights into the relevant macroprudential policy response under different macroeconomic conditions and a gradual build-up of cyclically adjustable buffers could be considered to help create the necessary macroprudential space and to reduce the procyclicality of the financial system in an economic and financial downturn.
- JEL Code
- E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
G28. : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 26 April 2019
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2273Details
- Abstract
- We present new evidence on the structure of euro area securities markets using a multilayer network approach. Layers are broken down by key instruments and maturities as well as the secured nature of the transaction. This paper utilizes a unique dataset of banking sector crossholdings of securities to map these exposures among banks and economic and financial sectors. We can compare and contrast funding and exposure networks among banks themselves and of banks, non-banks and the wider economy. The analytical approach presented here is highly relevant for the design of appropriate prudential measures, since it supports the identification of counterparty risk, concentration risk and funding risk within the interbank network and the wider macro-financial network.
- JEL Code
- D85 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty→Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
L14 : Industrial Organization→Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance→Transactional Relationships, Contracts and Reputation, Networks
- 29 March 2019
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2260Details
- Abstract
- We analyse the interaction between monetary and macroprudential policies in the euro area by means of a two-country DSGE model with financial frictions and cross-border spillover effects. We calibrate the model for the four largest euro area countries (i.e. Germany, France, Italy, and Spain), with particular attention to the calibration of cross-country financial and trade linkages and country specific banking sector characteristics. We find that countercyclical macroprudential interventions are supportive of mon-etary policy conduct through the cycle. This complementarity is significantly reinforced when there are asymmetric financial cycles across the monetary union, which provides a case for targeted country-specific macroprudential policies to help alleviate the burden on monetary policy. At the same time, our findings point to the importance of taking into account cross-border spillover effects of macroprudential measures within the Monetary Union.
- JEL Code
- E32 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Business Fluctuations, Cycles
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
F36 : International Economics→International Finance→Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
F41 : International Economics→Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance→Open Economy Macroeconomics - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 16 January 2019
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2224Details
- Abstract
- This paper presents a novel approach to investigate and model the network of euro area banks’ large exposures within the global banking system. Drawing on a unique dataset, the paper documents the degree of interconnectedness and systemic risk of the euro area banking system based on bilateral linkages. We then develop a Contagion Mapping (CoMap) methodology to study contagion potential of an exogenous default shock via counterparty credit and funding risks. We construct contagion and vulnerability indices measuring respectively the systemic importance of banks and their degree of fragility. Decomposing the results into the respective contributions of credit and funding shocks provides insights to the nature of contagion which can be used to calibrate bank-specific capital and liquidity requirements and large exposures limits. We find that tipping points shifting the euro area banking system from a less vulnerable state to a highly vulnerable state are a non-linear function of the combination of network structures and bank-specific characteristics.
- JEL Code
- D85 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty→Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
G17 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Financial Forecasting and Simulation
G33 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Bankruptcy, Liquidation
L14 : Industrial Organization→Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance→Transactional Relationships, Contracts and Reputation, Networks
- 16 January 2019
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2223Details
- Abstract
- Should monetary policy lean against financial stability risks? This has been a subject of fierce debate over the last decades. We contribute to the debate about “leaning against the wind” (LAW) along three lines. First, we evaluate the cost and benefits of LAW using the Svensson (2017) framework for the euro area and find that the costs outweigh the benefits. Second, we extend the framework to address a critique that Svensson does not consider the lower frequency financial cycle. Third, we use this extended framework to assess the costs and benefits of monetary and macroprudential policy. We find that macroprudential policy has net marginal benefits in addressing risks to financial stability in the euro area, whereas monetary policy has net marginal costs. This would suggest that an active use of macroprudential policies targeting financial stability risks would alleviate the burden on monetary policy to “lean against the wind”.
- JEL Code
- E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
- 29 November 2018
- FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - ARTICLEFinancial Stability Review Issue 2, 2018Details
- Abstract
- On aggregate, bank profitability in the euro area has improved in recent quarters along with the cyclical recovery. However, the level of earnings for many banks is still below that required by investors and bank profitability is still vulnerable to a possible turnaround in the business cycle. This special feature looks at possible avenues for banks to reach more sustainable levels of profitability in the future. It highlights the need to overcome structural challenges in the form of low cost-efficiency, limited revenue diversification and high stocks of legacy assets (in some jurisdictions).
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G24 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Investment Banking, Venture Capital, Brokerage, Ratings and Ratings Agencies
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
- 4 October 2018
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 214Details
- Abstract
- This study provides a conceptual and monitoring framework for systemic liquidity, as well as a legal assessment of the possible use of macroprudential liquidity tools in the European Union. It complements previous work on liquidity and focuses on the development of liquidity risk at the system-wide level. A dashboard with a total of 20 indicators is developed for the financial system, including banks and non-banks, to assess the build-up of systemic liquidity risk over time. In addition to examining liquidity risks, this study sheds light on the legal basis for additional macroprudential liquidity tools under existing regulation (Article 458 of the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR), Articles 105 and 103 of the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV) and national law), which is a key condition for the implementation of macroprudential liquidity tools.
- 30 April 2018
- MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 5Details
- Abstract
- This article presents stylised facts from the euro area network of large exposures and derives model-based interconnectedness measures of SSM significant institutions. The article has three main findings. First, the interbank network is relatively sparse and suggests a core-periphery network structure. Second, the more complex network measures on average correlate highly with the more simple size-based interconnectedness indicators, constructed following the EBA guidelines on the calibration of O-SII buffers. Third, there is nevertheless value for policymakers to take into account network-based measures in addition to the size-based interconnectedness indicators, as for some individual banks those measures can deviate considerably.
- JEL Code
- C63 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Mathematical Methods, Programming Models, Mathematical and Simulation Modeling→Computational Techniques, Simulation Modeling
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 5 May 2017
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2054Details
- Abstract
- Stress tests have been increasingly used in recent years by regulators to foster confidence in the banking sector by not only increasing its resilience via mandatory capital increases but also by enhancing transparency to allow investors to better discriminate between banks. In this study, using an event study approach, we explore how market participants reacted to the 2014 Comprehensive Assessment and the 2016 EBA EU-wide stress test. The results show that stress test disclosures revealed new information that was priced by the markets. We also provide evidence that the publication of stress test results enhanced price discrimination as the impact on bank CDS spreads and equity prices tended to be stronger for the weaker performing banks in the stress test. Finally, we provide some evidence that also sovereign funding costs were affected in the aftermath of the stress test publications. The results provide insights into the effects and usefulness of stress test-related disclosures.
- JEL Code
- G14 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Information and Market Efficiency, Event Studies, Insider Trading
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 27 February 2017
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2029Details
- Abstract
- This paper uses panel econometric techniques to estimate a macro- nancial model for fee and commission income over total assets for a broad sample of euro area banks. Using the estimated parameters, it conducts a scenario analysis projecting the fee and commission income ratio over a three years horizon conditional on the baseline and adverse macro-economic scenarios used in the 2016 EU-wide stress test.The results indicate that the fee and commission income ratio is varying in particular with changes in its own lag, the short-term interest rate, stock market returns and real GDP growth. They also show that the fee and commission income ratio projections are more conservative under the adverse scenario than under the baseline scenario. These findings suggest that stress tests assuming scenario-independent fee and commission income projections are likely to be flawed.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G17 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Financial Forecasting and Simulation
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
- 27 February 2017
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2028Details
- Abstract
- In this paper, we develop an analytical framework for conducting forward-looking assessments of profitability and solvency of the main euro area insurance sectors. We model the balance sheet of an insurance company encompassing both life and non-life business and we calibrate it using country level data to make it representative of the major euro area insurance markets. Then, we project this representative balance sheet forward under stochastic capital markets, stochastic mortality developments and stochastic claims. The model highlights the potential threats to insurers solvency and profitability stemming from a sustained period of low interest rates particularly in those markets which are largely exposed to reinvestment risks due to the relatively high guarantees and generous profit participation schemes. The model also proves how the resilience of insurers to adverse financial developments heavily depends on the diversification of their business mix. Finally, the model identifies potential negative spillovers between life and non-life business through the redistribution of capital within groups.
- JEL Code
- G22 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Insurance, Insurance Companies, Actuarial Studies
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
- 2 February 2017
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2010Details
- Abstract
- We present a tractable framework to assess the systemic implications of bail-in. To this end, we construct a multi-layered network model where each layer represents the securities cross holdings of a specific seniority among the largest euro area banking groups. On this basis, the bail-in of a bank can be simulated to identify the direct contagion risk to the other banks in the network. We find that there is no direct contagion to creditor banks. Spill-overs also tend to be small due to low levels of securities cross-holdings in the interbank network. We also quantify the impact of a bail-in on the different liability holders. In the baseline scenario, shareholders and subordinated creditors are always affected by the bail-in, senior unsecured creditors in 75% of the cases. Finally, we compute the effect of the bail-in on the network topology in each layer. We find that a bail-in significantly reshapes interbank linkages within specific seniority layers.
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
C63 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Mathematical Methods, Programming Models, Mathematical and Simulation Modeling→Computational Techniques, Simulation Modeling
- 24 November 2016
- FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - ARTICLEFinancial Stability Review Issue 2, 2016Details
- Abstract
- The euro area banking sector is faced with cyclical and structural challenges, which are hampering many banks’ ability to generate sustainable profits. In particular, the prolonged period of low nominal growth and low yields compresses net interest income, which traditionally has been (and still is) euro area banks’ main source of income. One way for banks to compensate for compressed net interest margins could be to adapt their business models, moving towards more fee and commission-generating activities. This article discusses the challenges involved in boosting fee and commission income and highlights some of the potential financial stability implications related to a greater reliance on these income sources.
- JEL Code
- G00 : Financial Economics→General→General
- 25 August 2016
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1944Details
- Abstract
- In this paper, we develop an agent-based multi-layered interbank network model based on a sample of large EU banks. The model allows for taking a more holistic approach to interbank contagion than is standard in the literature. A key finding of the paper is that there are material non-linearities in the propagation of shocks to individual banks when taking into account that banks are related to each other in various market segments. The contagion effects when considering the shock propagation simultaneously across multiple layers of interbank networks can be substantially larger than the sum of the contagion-induced losses when considering the network layers individually. In addition, a bank
- JEL Code
- C45 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics→Neural Networks and Related Topics
C63 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Mathematical Methods, Programming Models, Mathematical and Simulation Modeling→Computational Techniques, Simulation Modeling
D85 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty→Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages - Network
- Macroprudential Research Network
- 25 August 2016
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1943Details
- Abstract
- Why did the shadow banking sectors in the US and the euro area expand in the decade before the financial crisis and what are the implications for systemic risk and macro-prudential policy? This paper examines these issues with a model of the financial sector where the size of the shadow banking sector is endogenous. In the model, shadow banking is an alternative banking strategy which involves greater risk-taking at the expense of being exposed to "fundamental runs" on the funding side. When such runs occur, shadow banks liquidate their assets in a secondary market. Entry into shadow banking is profitable when traditional banks provide sufficient secondary market demand to prevent these liquidations from causing a fire-sale. During periods of stability, the shadow banking sector expands to an excessively large size that ferments systemic risk. Its collapse then triggers a fire-sale that renders traditional banks vulnerable to "liquidity runs". The prospect of liquidity runs undermines market discipline and increases the risk-taking incentives of traditional banks. Policy interventions aimed at alleviating the fire-sale fuel further expansion of the shadow banking sector. Financial stability is achieved with a Pigouvian tax on shadow bank profits.
- JEL Code
- E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G11 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Portfolio Choice, Investment Decisions
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 7 June 2016
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1916Details
- Abstract
- With the aim of reigniting inflation in the euro area, in early 2015 the ECB embarked on a large-scale asset purchase programme. We analyse the macroeconomic effects of the Asset Purchase Programme via the banking system, exploiting the cross-section of individual bank portfolio decisions. For this purpose, an augmented version of the DSGE model of Gertler and Karadi (2013), featuring a segmented banking sector, is estimated for the euro area and combined with a bank portfolio optimisation approach using granular bank level data. An important feature of our modelling approach is that it captures the heterogeneity of banks
- JEL Code
- C61 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Mathematical Methods, Programming Models, Mathematical and Simulation Modeling→Optimization Techniques, Programming Models, Dynamic Analysis
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
G11 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Portfolio Choice, Investment Decisions
- 24 May 2016
- FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - ARTICLEFinancial Stability Review Issue 1, 2016Details
- Abstract
- The new bail-in tool in the EU bank resolution toolkit is an important step forward to safeguard financial stability in Europe, notably in relation to mitigating moral hazard and other problems inherent in a strong reliance on bailouts. At the same time, it is important to understand the potential contagion channels in the financial system following a bail-in and prior to resolution in order to assess potential systemic implications of the use of the bail-in tool. This special feature outlines salient features of the new requirements and then presents a multi-layered network model of banks’ bail-inable securities that could help in gauging potential contagion risk and, prior to a resolution, identifying mitigating measures to avoid systemic implications.
- JEL Code
- G00 : Financial Economics→General→General
- 24 May 2016
- FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - ARTICLEFinancial Stability Review Issue 1, 2016Details
- Abstract
- This special feature reviews recent trends in business model characteristics, discusses their relationship with bank stability and performance, and looks at how this relationship has changed over time, comparing the period before the crisis with the crisis years and the current situation.
- JEL Code
- G00 : Financial Economics→General→General
- 8 March 2016
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1888Details
- Abstract
- We develop a Mixed-Cross-Section Global Vector Autoregressive (MCS-GVAR) model for the 28 EU economies and a sample of individual banking groups to study the propagation of bank capital shocks to the economy. We conduct various simulations with the model to assess how capital ratio shocks influence bank credit supply and aggregate demand. We distinguish between contractionary and expansionary deleveraging scenarios and confirm the intuitive result that only when banks choose to achieve higher capital ratios by shrinking their balance sheets would economic activity be at risk to contract. The model can be used to establish ranges of impact estimates for capital-related macroprudential policy measures, including counter-cyclical capital buffers, systemic risk buffers, G-SIB buffers, etc., also with a view to assessing the cross-country spillover effects of such policy measures. We highlight the importance for macroprudential policy makers to give clear guidance to banks as to how certain macroprudential policy measures should be implemented
- JEL Code
- C33 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models, Multiple Variables→Panel Data Models, Spatio-temporal Models
E51 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Money Supply, Credit, Money Multipliers
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
- 25 November 2015
- FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - ARTICLEFinancial Stability Review Issue 2, 2015Details
- Abstract
- The current environment of protracted low interest rates poses major challenges to euro area insurance companies. This special feature discusses how a prolonged low-yield period might affect the profitability and the solvency of euro area insurers. In the article, it is argued that if interest rates were to stay low for a long time, this could have material implications for the profitability and the solvency of many insurers. However, it is also shown that the impact of low interest rates is likely to differ markedly across insurance companies depending on their business model and balance sheet structure. In particular, the impact is expected to be highest for small and medium-sized life insurers with large government bond portfolios and high guarantees to policyholders that reside in countries where these guarantees are rigid and where contracts embed a long time to maturity.
- JEL Code
- G00 : Financial Economics→General→General
- 25 November 2015
- FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - ARTICLEFinancial Stability Review Issue 2, 2015Details
- Abstract
- In a monetary union, targeted national macroprudential policies can be necessary to address asymmetric financial developments that are outside the scope of the single monetary policy. This special feature discusses and, using a two-country structural model, provides some model-based illustrations of the strategic interactions between a single monetary policy and jurisdiction-specific macro-prudential policies. Counter-cyclical macro-prudential interventions are found to be supportive to monetary policy conduct through the cycle. This complementarity is significantly reinforced when there are asymmetric financial cycles across the monetary union.
- JEL Code
- G00 : Financial Economics→General→General
- 28 May 2015
- FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - ARTICLEFinancial Stability Review Issue 1, 2015Details
- Abstract
- Weak profitability among euro area banks is one key risk to financial stability. This special feature examines the main drivers influencing banks’ profitability, including bank-specific, macroeconomic and structural factors. The empirical part of the special feature finds that challenges appear to be mainly of a cyclical nature, although there may also be material structural impediments to reigniting bank profitability.
- JEL Code
- G00 : Financial Economics→General→General
- 28 July 2014
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 154Details
- Abstract
- This study examines the European Commission
- JEL Code
- G11 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Portfolio Choice, Investment Decisions
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
C13 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General→Estimation: General
C23 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Single Equation Models, Single Variables→Panel Data Models, Spatio-temporal Models
- 28 May 2014
- FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - ARTICLEFinancial Stability Review Issue 1, 2014Details
- Abstract
- The global financial crisis revealed a need for macro-prudential policy tools to mitigate the build-up of systemic risk in the financial system and to enhance the resilience of financial institutions against such risks once they have materialised. In the EU, macro-prudential policy is an area that is in an early stage of development. This is also true as regards the use of instruments to address systemic risk for which there is so far only limited experience to draw on. Hence, there is general uncertainty about the effectiveness of such instruments in practice. Nevertheless, country-level experience can serve as a useful yardstick for formulating macro-prudential policy in the EU. This special feature considers the experience of European countries with macro-prudential policy implementation. Overall, the evidence surveyed here indicates that macro-prudential policies can be effective in targeting excessive credit growth and rapidly rising asset prices, although other policies can be a useful complement to reduce the build-up of imbalances. At the same time, the appropriate timing of macro-prudential policy measures remains a challenging task.
- JEL Code
- G00 : Financial Economics→General→General
- 7 March 2014
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1646Details
- Abstract
- Interbank contagion has become a buzzword in the aftermath of the financial crisis that led to a series of shocks to the interbank market and to periods of pronounced market disruptions. However, little is known about how interbank networks are formed and about their sensitivity to changes in key bank parameters (for example, induced by common exogenous shocks or by regulatory initiatives). This paper aims to shed light on these issues by modelling endogenously the formation of interbank networks, which in turn allows for checking the sensitivity of interbank network structures and hence their underlying contagion risk to changes in market-driven parameters as well as to changes in regulatory measures such as large exposures limits. The sequential network formation mechanism presented in the paper is based on a portfolio optimisation model whereby banks allocate their interbank exposures while balancing the return and risk of counterparty default risk and the placements are accepted taking into account funding diversification benefits. The model offers some interesting insights into how key parameters may affect interbank network structures and can be a valuable tool for analysing the impact of various regulatory policy measures relating to banks' incentives to operate in the interbank market.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
C63 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Mathematical Methods, Programming Models, Mathematical and Simulation Modeling→Computational Techniques, Simulation Modeling
C78 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Game Theory and Bargaining Theory→Bargaining Theory, Matching Theory - Network
- Macroprudential Research Network
- 27 November 2013
- FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - ARTICLEFinancial Stability Review Issue 2, 2013Details
- Abstract
- This special feature examines various macro-prudential tools through the lens of recent advances in the study of interbank contagion. The specific set of tools analysed are those designed to contain the “cross-sectional” dimension of systemic risk – that is, those designed to limit the systemic risk stemming from factors such as correlations and common exposures across financial institutions. These include tools such as large exposure limits and other regulatory requirements designed to limit the spread of systemic risk between banks. The analysis rests on the basic notion that interbank network structures, and hence the risk of contagion across the banking system in response to shocks, are influenced by banks’ optimising behaviour subject to regulatory (and other) constraints. Changes in macro-prudential policy parameters, such as large exposure limits, capital charges on counterparty exposures and capital and liquidity requirements more generally, will affect the contagion risk because of their impact on banks’ asset allocation and interbank funding decisions. This in turn implies that well-tailored macro-prudential policy can help reduce interbank contagion risk by making network structures more resilient. The analysis shows that to capture the full extent of potential interbank contagion, all of the different layers of bank interaction should be taken into account. Hence, if the regulator only focuses on one segment of interbank relationships (e.g. direct bilateral exposures), the true contagion risks are likely to be grossly underestimated. This finding has clear policy implications and flags the importance of micro- and macro-prudential regulators having access to sufficiently detailed data so as to be able to map the many interactions between banks.
- JEL Code
- G00 : Financial Economics→General→General
- 14 November 2013
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1611Details
- Abstract
- This paper investigates whether European banks have capital targets and how deviations from the target impact their equity composition and activity mix. Using quarterly data for a sample of large European banks between 2004 and 2011, we show that there are notable asymmetries in banks' reactions to deviations from optimal capital levels. Banks prefer to reshuffle risk-weighted assets or increase asset holdings when being above their optimal Tier 1 ratio, whereas they rather try to increase equity levels or reshuffle risk-weighted assets without changing asset holdings when being below target. At the same time, focusing instead on a unweighted equity ratio target, we find evidence of deleveraging and lower loan growth for undercapitalized banks during the recent financial crisis, whereas in the pre-crisis periods banks primarily reacted to deviations from their optimal target by adjusting equity levels.
- JEL Code
- D22 : Microeconomics→Production and Organizations→Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 11 October 2013
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 152Details
- Abstract
- The use of macro stress tests to assess bank solvency has developed rapidly over the past few years. This development was reinforced by the financial crisis, which resulted in substantial losses for banks and created general uncertainty about the banking sector's loss-bearing capacity. Macro stress testing has proved a useful instrument to help identify potential vulnerabilities within the banking sector and to gauge its resilience to adverse developments. To support its contribution to safeguarding financial stability and its financial sector-related work in the context of EU/IMF Financial Assistance Programmes, and looking ahead to the establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), the ECB has developed a top-down macro stress testing framework that is used regularly for forward-looking bank solvency assessments. This paper comprehensively presents the main features of this framework and illustrates how it can be employed for various policy analysis purposes.
- JEL Code
- C53 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric Modeling→Forecasting and Prediction Methods, Simulation Methods
D85 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty→Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
E37 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E47 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 2 August 2013
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1570Details
- Abstract
- This paper aims to illustrate how a Mixed-Cross-Section Global Vector Autoregressive (MCS-GVAR) model can be set up and solved for the purpose of forecasting and scenario simulation. The application involves two cross-sections: sovereigns and banks for which we model their credit default swap spreads. Our MCS-GVAR comprises 23 sovereigns and 41 international banks from Europe, the US and Japan. The model is used to conduct systematic shock simulations and thereby compute a measure of spill-over potential for within and across the group of sovereigns and banks. The results point to a number of salient facts: i) Spill-over potential in the CDS market was particularly pronounced in 2008 and more recently in 2011-12; ii) while in 2008 contagion primarily went from banks to sovereigns, the direction reversed in 2011-12 in the course of the sovereign debt crisis; iii) the index of spill-over potential suggests that the system of banks and sovereigns has become more densely connected over time. Should large shocks of size similar to those experienced in the early phase of the crisis hit the system in 2011/2012, considerably more pronounced and more synchronized adverse responses across banks and sovereigns would have to be expected.
- JEL Code
- C33 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models, Multiple Variables→Panel Data Models, Spatio-temporal Models
C53 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric Modeling→Forecasting and Prediction Methods, Simulation Methods
C61 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Mathematical Methods, Programming Models, Mathematical and Simulation Modeling→Optimization Techniques, Programming Models, Dynamic Analysis
E17 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→General Aggregative Models→Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
- 29 May 2013
- FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - ARTICLEFinancial Stability Review Issue 1, 2013Details
- Abstract
- The financial crisis highlighted the importance of systemic risks and of policies that can be employed to prevent and mitigate them. Several recent initiatives aim at establishing institutional frameworks for macro-prudential policy. As this process advances further, substantial uncertainties remain regarding the transmission channels of macro-prudential instruments as well as the interactions with other policy functions, and monetary policy in particular. This special feature provides an overview and some illustrative model simulations of the macroeconomic interdependence between macro-prudential instruments and monetary policy.
- JEL Code
- G00 : Financial Economics→General→General
- 24 January 2013
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1506Details
- Abstract
- This paper presents a new approach to randomly generate interbank networks while overcoming shortcomings in the availability of bank-by-bank bilateral exposures. Our model can be used to simulate and assess interbank contagion effects on banking sector soundness and resilience. We find a strongly non-linear pattern across the distribution of simulated networks, whereby only for a small percentage of networks the impact of interbank contagion will substantially reduce average solvency of the system. In the vast majority of the simulated networks the system-wide contagion effects are largely negligible. The approach furthermore enables to form a view about the most systemic banks in the system in terms of the banks whose failure would have the most detrimental contagion effects on the system as a whole. Finally, as the simulation of the network structures is computationally very costly, we also propose a simplified measure - a so-called Systemic Probability Index (SPI) - that also captures the likelihood of contagion from the failure of a given bank to honour its interbank payment obligations but at the same time is less costly to compute. We find that the SPI is broadly consistent with the results from the simulated network structures.
- JEL Code
- E6 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
- Network
- Macroprudential Research Network
- 2 November 2010
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1262Details
- Abstract
- Aggregate loan development typically hinges on a combination of factors that impact simultaneously on the demand and the supply side of bank lending. The financial turmoil starting in mid-2007 had detrimental consequences for banks’ balance-sheets, cost of funds and profitability, thus weighing negatively on their ability to supply new loans. This paper examines the impact of supply constraints on bank lending in the euro area with a special focus on this turmoil period. The empirical evidence presented suggests that banks’ ability and willingness to supply loans affects overall bank lending activity in general and has done so particularly during the financial crisis. Applying a cross-country panel-econometric approach using a unique confidential data set on results from the Eurosystem’s bank lending survey allows us to disentangle loan supply and demand effects. We find that even when controlling for the effects coming from the demand side loan growth is negatively affected by supply-side constraints. This applies both for loans to households for house purchase and for loans to non-financial corporations. We furthermore provide evidence that the impact of supply-side constraints, especially related to disruptions of banks’ access to wholesale funding and their liquidity positions, was reinforced since the eruption of the financial crisis and corresponding adjustments in banks’ loan portfolios seem to have been geared primarily via prices rather than outright quantity restrictions.
- JEL Code
- C23 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Single Equation Models, Single Variables→Panel Data Models, Spatio-temporal Models
E51 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Money Supply, Credit, Money Multipliers
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 1 October 2010
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1251Details
- Abstract
- The financial crisis clearly illuminated the potential amplifying role of financial factors on macroeconomic developments. Indeed, the heavy impairments of banks’ balance sheets brought to the fore the banking sector’s ability to provide a smooth flow of credit to the real economy. However, most existing structural macroeconomic models fail to take into account the crucial role of banks’ balance sheet adjustment in the propagation of shocks to the economy. This paper contributes to fill this gap, analyzing the role of credit market frictions in business cycle fluctuations and in the transmission of monetary policy. We estimate a closed-economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model for the euro area with financially-constrained households and firms and embedding an oligopolistic banking sector facing capital constraints. Using this setup we examine the macroeconomic implications of various financial frictions on the supply and demand of credit, and in particular we assess the effects of introducing risk-sensitive and more stringent capital requirements. Finally, we explore the scope for counter-cyclical bank capital rules and the strategic complementarities between macro-prudential tools and monetary policy.
- JEL Code
- E4 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates
E5 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
F4 : International Economics→Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance
- 29 January 2010
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1150Details
- Abstract
- Applying the identification strategy employed by Driscoll (2004) for the United States, this paper provides empirical evidence for the existence of a bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission in the euro area. In addition, and in contrast to recent findings for the US, we find that in the euro area changes in the supply of credit, both in terms of volumes and in terms of credit standards applied on loans to enterprises, have significant effects on real economic activity. This highlights the importance of the monitoring of credit developments in the toolkit of monetary policy and underpins the reasoning behind giving monetary and credit analysis a prominent role in the monetary policy strategy of the ECB. It also points to the potential negative repercussions on real economic growth of bank balance sheet impairments arising in the context of the financial crisis erupting in mid-2007 which led to the need for banks to delever their balance sheets and possibly to reduce their loan supply.
- JEL Code
- C23 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Single Equation Models, Single Variables→Panel Data Models, Spatio-temporal Models
E51 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Money Supply, Credit, Money Multipliers
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 31 March 2009
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 101Details
- Abstract
- This report analyses the main developments in housing finance in the euro area in the decade, covering the period from 1999 to 2007. It looks at mortgage indebtedness, various characteristics of loans for house purchase, the funding of such loans and the spreads between the interest rates on loans granted by banks and the interest rates banks had to pay on their funding, or the return they made on alternative investments. In addition, the report contains a comparison of key aspects of housing finance in the euro area with those in the United Kingdom and the United States. At the end, the report briefly discusses aspects of the transmission of monetary policy to the economy.
- JEL Code
- D14 : Microeconomics→Household Behavior and Family Economics→Household Saving; Personal Finance
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E5 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
R21 : Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics→Household Analysis→Housing Demand - Network
- Eurosystem Monetary Transmission Network
- 7 January 2009
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 989Details
- Abstract
- We model the determinants of loans to non-financial corporations in the euro area. Using the Johansen (1992) methodology, we identify three cointegrating relationships. These relationships are interpreted as the long-run loan demand, investment and loan supply equations. The short-run dynamics of loan demand for the euro area are subsequently modelled by means of a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM). We perform a number of specification tests, which suggest that developments in loans to non-financial corporations in the euro area can be reasonably explained by the model. We then use the estimated model to analyse the impact of permanent and temporary shocks to the policy rate on bank lending to nonfinancial corporations.
- JEL Code
- C32 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models, Multiple Variables→Time-Series Models, Dynamic Quantile Regressions, Dynamic Treatment Effect Models, Diffusion Processes
C51 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric Modeling→Model Construction and Estimation
- 31 March 2008
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 885Details
- Abstract
- This paper analyses the impact of loan market competition on the interest rates applied by euro area banks to loans and deposits during the 1994-2004 period, using a novel measure of competition called the Boone indicator. We find evidence that stronger competition implies significantly lower spreads between bank and market interest rates for most loan market products. Using an error correction model (ECM) approach to measure the effect of competition on the pass-through of market rates to bank interest rates, we likewise find that banks tend to price their loans more in accordance with the market in countries where competitive pressures are stronger. Further, where loan market competition is stronger, we observe larger bank spreads (implying lower bank interest rates) on current account and time deposits. This would suggest that the competitive pressure is heavier in the loan market than in the deposit markets, so that banks compensate for their reduction in loan market income by lowering their deposit rates. We observe also that bank interest rates in more competitive markets respond more strongly to changes in market interest rates. These findings have important monetary policy implications, as they suggest that measures to enhance competition in the European banking sector will tend to render the monetary policy transmission mechanism more effective.
- JEL Code
- C23 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Single Equation Models, Single Variables→Panel Data Models, Spatio-temporal Models
D4 : Microeconomics→Market Structure and Pricing
E50 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→General
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
L10 : Industrial Organization→Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance→General
- 28 June 2007
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 768Details
- Abstract
- This paper is the first that applies a new measure of competition, the Boone indicator, to the banking industry. This approach is able to measure competition of bank market segments, such as the loan market, whereas many well-known measures of competition can consider the entire banking market only. A caveat of the Boone-indicator may be that it assumes that banks generally pass on at least part of their efficiency gains to their clients. Like most other model-based measures, this approach ignores differences in bank product quality and design, as well as the attractiveness of innovations. We measure competition on the lending markets in the five major EU countries as well as, for comparison, the UK, the US and Japan. Bearing the mentioned caveats in mind, our findings indicate that over the period 1994-2004 the US had the most competitive loan market, whereas overall loan markets in Germany and Spain were among the best competitive in the EU. The Netherlands occupied a more intermediate position, whereas in Italy competition declined significantly over time. The French, Japanese and UK loan markets were generally less competitive. Turning to competition among specific types of banks, commercial banks tend to be more competitive, particularly in Germany and the US, than savings and cooperative banks.
- JEL Code
- D4 : Microeconomics→Market Structure and Pricing
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
L1 : Industrial Organization→Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
- 23 February 2007
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 733Details
- Abstract
- Despite the remarkable economic and financial convergence over the last ten years in the euro area, mortgage interest rates still differ across countries. This note presents some stylised facts on the heterogeneity of mortgage interest rates across euro area countries on the basis of the Eurosystem's harmonised MFI interest rate statistics. We also attempt to provide some insights into the reasons behind these cross-country differences using the methodology recently proposed by Affinito and Farabullini (2006). We differ from Affinito and Farabullini (2006) in that we focus on one particular banking market: the market for mortgage loans. This allows us to identify more clearly the role of specific structural features characterising that market in explaining mortgage rate dispersion. More specifically, we investigate the extent to which various mortgage loan demand and supply determinants help explaining the observed dispersion. It turns out that some of the heterogeneity can be explained by these factors, in particular those that relate to the supply side. However, a substantial part of the dispersion remains unexplained suggesting that much of the heterogeneity also reflects country-specific institutional differences that are likely to be caused by differences in the regulatory and fiscal framework of the mortgage markets. In order to test this, we extend our analysis to also include institutional factors and indeed find that crosscountry differences in enforcement procedures, tax subsidies and loan-to-value ratios influence the level of mortgage rates.
- JEL Code
- N24 : Economic History→Financial Markets and Institutions→Europe: 1913?
C23 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Single Equation Models, Single Variables→Panel Data Models, Spatio-temporal Models
E4 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates
F36 : International Economics→International Finance→Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 16 January 2007
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 714Details
- Abstract
- This paper investigates the dynamics of the pass-through between market interest rates and bank interest rates in the euro area as a function of cyclical and structural differences in the financial system. We find that overall the speed of adjustment for loans is significantly faster than for deposits, and that the pass-through is especially sluggish for demand deposits and savings deposits. Bank soundness, credit risk and interest rate risk are found to exert a significant influence on the speed of pass through. We also find evidence of faster (slower) pass-through for loans (deposits) if the change in monetary policy was up (down). Overall, we find that competition among banks and competition from financial markets result in a faster bank interest rate pass-through. Finally, we find some evidence that financial innovation speeds up the pass-through for those market segments that are most directly affected by these innovations.
- JEL Code
- E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 26 May 2006
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 627Details
- Abstract
- In this study we apply cluster analysis techniques, including a novel smoothing method, to detect some basic patterns and trends in the euro area banking sector in terms of the degree of homogeneity of countries. We find that in the period 1998-2004 the banking sectors in the euro area countries seem to have become somewhat more homogeneous, although the results are not unequivocal and considerable differences remain, leaving scope for further integration. In terms of clustering, the Western and Central European countries (like Germany, France, Belgium, and to some extent also the Netherlands, Austria and Italy) tend to cluster together, while Spain and Portugal and more recently also Greece usually are in the same distinct cluster. Ireland and Finland form separate clusters, but overall tend to be closer to the Western and Central European cluster.
- JEL Code
- C49 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics→Other
F36 : International Economics→International Finance→Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 16 January 2006
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 580Details
- Abstract
- The present paper investigates the pass-through between market interest rates and bank interest rates in the euro area. Compared to the large interest rate pass-through literature the paper mainly improves upon two points. First, a novel data set, partially based on new harmonised ECB bank interest rate statistics is used. Moreover, the market rates are selected in a way to match the maturities of bank and market rates using information provided by the new statistics. Secondly, new panel-econometric methods are applied to test for heterogeneity in the pass-through process. The paper shows a large heterogeneity in the pass-through of market rates to bank rates between euro area countries and finally possible explanations of the heterogeneity are discussed.
- JEL Code
- E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
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