Cyril Couaillier
Monetary Policy
- Division
Monetary Analysis
- Current Position
-
Economist
- Fields of interest
-
Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics,Financial Economics,Microeconomics
- Education
- 2021
PhD in Economics, SciencesPo Paris
- 2015
Master in Economics, Paris School of Economics
- 2015
Master in Economics and Statistics, ENSAE Paris
- 2015
Master in Management, HEC Paris
- Professional experience
- 2022-
Economist, European Central Bank
- 2020-2022
Financial Stability Expert, European Central Bank
- 2015-2020
Economist, Banque de France
- 26 September 2023
- ECONOMIC BULLETIN - BOXEconomic Bulletin Issue 6, 2023Details
- Abstract
- Banks distribute capital to equity investors either by paying dividends or by buying back shares. Such distributions of capital have ambiguous implications for monetary policy, since these lower banks’ cost of equity by signalling their soundness to investors but also reduce banks’ capital ratios and thus potentially their intermediation capacity. Since the end of the pandemic and the end of ECB Banking Supervision’s recommendation to refrain from or limit payouts, banks in the euro area have distributed capital at a rapid pace. Such distributions have been spearheaded by ambitious buyback programmes, catching up on forgone distributions in previous years, while a further increase in dividends is also likely. Payouts vary greatly across banks in terms of both overall size and composition. Individual banks tend to distribute more capital when they are more profitable and have better asset quality, capital ratios above their announced targets and more liquidity. They also tend to spread distributions over several years. We find that recent payouts have had a positive signalling effect on financial markets. Higher payout commitments have also been associated with lower bank credit supply and higher lending rates, therefore possibly contributing to the transmission of the ECB’s monetary policy tightening impulse so far.
- JEL Code
- E51 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Money Supply, Credit, Money Multipliers
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G35 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Payout Policy
- 18 August 2023
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2841Details
- Abstract
- We analyse the impact of the adoption of expected credit loss accounting (IFRS 9) on the timeliness and potential procyclicality of banks’ loan loss provisioning. We use granular loan-level data from the euro area’s credit register and investigate both firm-level credit events and macroeconomic shocks (2020 COVID-19 pandemic, 2022 energy price shock). We find that provisions under the new standard are higher before default and more responsive to shocks. However, the majority of provisioning still occurs at the time of default and the dynamics around default events are similar to pre-existing national standards. Additionally, banks with a larger capital headroom provision significantly more, particularly for loans using IFRS 9. This suggests a higher risk of underprovisioning for less capitalized banks.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
G32 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Capital and Ownership Structure, Value of Firms, Goodwill
- 31 May 2023
- FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - BOXFinancial Stability Review Issue 1, 2023Details
- Abstract
- This box uses loan-level data from AnaCredit to examine the impact of IFRS 9 on provisioning dynamics around credit events and the role of accounting discretion. The results indicate that provisions for a performing IFRS 9 loan are higher than those for a comparable loan reported under national accounting standards, while the dynamics of provisioning ratios around credit events are similar under both approaches. Specifically, the bulk of provisioning occurs at the time of, or shortly after, default under both approaches, which suggests that IFRS 9 has not fundamentally changed provisioning patterns. Moreover, provisioning patterns for IFRS 9 loans around default events depend on banks’ capital headroom, with better capitalised banks generally provisioning more. This is consistent with banks with less capital using accounting discretion to provision less to preserve their capital. While it is difficult to arrive at firm conclusions on the overall adequacy of current provisions, banks with less capital headroom may be at greater risk of being under-provisioned, possibly due in part to the discretion offered by IFRS 9.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
G32 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Capital and Ownership Structure, Value of Firms, Goodwill
- 15 September 2022
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2720Details
- Abstract
- This paper investigates the impact of the capital relief package adopted to support euro area banks at the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. By leveraging confidential supervisory and credit register data, we uncover two main findings. First, capital relief measures support banks' capacity to supply credit to firms. Second, not all measures are equally successful. Banks adjust their credit supply only if the capital relief is permanent or implemented through established processes that foresee long release periods. By contrast, discretionary relief measures are met with limited success, possibly owing to the uncertainty surrounding their capital replenishment path. Moreover, requirement releases are more effective for banks with a low capital headroom over requirements and do not trigger additional risk-taking. These findings provide key insights on how to design effective bank capital requirement releases in crisis time.
- JEL Code
- E61 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Policy Objectives, Policy Designs and Consistency, Policy Coordination
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 9 August 2022
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2702Details
- Abstract
- Macroprudential policies should strengthen the banking sector throughout the financial cycle. However, while bank credit growth is used to capture cyclical exuberance and calibrate buffer requirements, it depends on potentially heterogeneous dynamics on the borrower and lender side. By decomposing credit growth into a common component and components capturing heterogeneity in supply and demand à la Amiti and Weinstein, 2018 applied on the euro area credit register ("AnaCredit"), we can inform the policy debates in two ways. Ex ante, we introduce a framework mapping the decomposition to different types of macroprudential instruments, specifically broad vs. targeted measures. Ex post, we also show that the resulting decomposition can be used to assess the effectiveness of adopted measures on credit supply or demand. We find evidence that buffer releases and credit guarantees increased bank credit supply during the COVID-19 pandemic and interacted positively with banks' profitability.
- JEL Code
- E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 16 February 2022
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2644Details
- Abstract
- While regulatory capital buffers are expected to be drawn to absorb losses and meet credit demand during crises, this paper shows that banks were unwilling to do so during the pandemic. To the contrary, banks engaged in forms of pro-cyclical behaviour to preserve capital ratios. By employing granular data from the credit register of the European System of Central Banks, we isolate credit supply effects and find that banks with little headroom above regulatory buffers reduced their lending relative to other banks, also when controlling for a broad range of pandemic support measures. Firms’ inability to reallocate their credit needs to less constrained banks had real economic effects, as their headcount went down, although state guarantee schemes acted as partial mitigants. These findings point to some unintended effects of the capital framework which may create incentives for pro-cyclical behaviour by banks during downturns. They also shed light on the interactions between fiscal and prudential policies which took place during the pandemic.
- JEL Code
- E61 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Policy Objectives, Policy Designs and Consistency, Policy Coordination
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 1 December 2021
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2618Details
- Abstract
- How do banks set their target capital ratio? How do they adjust to reach it? This paper answers these questions using an original dataset of capital ratio targets directly announced to investors by European banks, materially improving data quality compared to usual estimated implicit target. It provides the following key lessons. First, targets are affected by capital requirements and a procyclical behavior consistent with market pressure. Second, banks do not distinguish between the different types of capital requirements for setting their targets, suggesting weak usability of the regulatory buffers. Third, the distance between actual CET1 ratio and the target is a valuable predictor of future balance-sheet adjustment, suggesting that banks actively drive their capital ratios toward their announced targets, through capital accumulation and portfolio rebalancing. Fourth, this adjustment occurs both above and below targets, but banks below target adjust faster, suggesting stronger pressure. These results provide important lessons for policymakers regarding the design of the prudential framework and the effectiveness of countercyclical policies.
- JEL Code
- E51 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Money Supply, Credit, Money Multipliers
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 17 November 2021
- FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - ARTICLEFinancial Stability Review Issue 2, 2021Details
- Abstract
- Bank capital buffers are supposed to help banks to absorb losses while maintaining the provision of key financial services to the real economy in times of stress. Capital buffers that are usable along these lines should lessen the damaging effects that can arise from credit supply shortages. Making use of buffers entails using the capital space above regulatory buffers and minimum requirements and, in case of need, also using regulatory buffers. This special feature analyses bank lending behaviour during the pandemic to gain insights into banks’ propensity to use capital buffers and the impact of the regulatory capital relief measures implemented by the authorities. From a macro perspective, the euro area banking system was able to meet credit demand and withstand stress. However, this aggregate view reflects several factors, including the impact of extraordinary policy measures. A micro perspective thus can help to comprehend how the capital buffer framework and capital releases affected banks’ behaviour during the pandemic. A microeconometric analysis shows that the banks with limited capital space above regulatory buffers adjusted their balance sheets by reducing lending, which could be interpreted as an attempt to defend capital ratios, suggesting unwillingness to use capital buffers. The results also show that the regulatory capital relief measures adopted during in the pandemic, which added to banks’ existing capital space, were associated with higher credit supply. while more research is desirable, this suggests that more releasable capital could enhance macroprudential authorities’ ability to act countercyclically when a crisis occurs.
- JEL Code
- E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E41 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Demand for Money
- 19 October 2020
- MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 11Details
- Abstract
- This article discusses how market pressure can impede the usability of regulatory buffers. The capital relief measures in the euro area since the outbreak of the COVID-19 crisis had so far mixed effects on banks’ target CET1 ratio, suggesting an impeded pass-through. Market pressure can be a key explanatory factor, with pressure from credit and, critically, equity investors.
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
C58 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric Modeling→Financial Econometrics
- 4 October 2018
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 214Details
- Abstract
- This study provides a conceptual and monitoring framework for systemic liquidity, as well as a legal assessment of the possible use of macroprudential liquidity tools in the European Union. It complements previous work on liquidity and focuses on the development of liquidity risk at the system-wide level. A dashboard with a total of 20 indicators is developed for the financial system, including banks and non-banks, to assess the build-up of systemic liquidity risk over time. In addition to examining liquidity risks, this study sheds light on the legal basis for additional macroprudential liquidity tools under existing regulation (Article 458 of the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR), Articles 105 and 103 of the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV) and national law), which is a key condition for the implementation of macroprudential liquidity tools.
- 2023
- Journal of Banking & Finance
- 2020
- Banque de France Eco Notepad
- 2020
- Banque de France Working Paper
- 2019
- Banque de France Bulletin
- 2019
- Banque de France Working Paper
- 2018
- Banque de France Quarterly Selection of Articles
- 2017
- Banque de France Quarterly Selection of Articles
- 2017
- Banque de France Working Paper