- 22 September 2016
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 11Details
- Policy is only as good as the information at the disposal of policymakers. Few moments illustrate this better than the uncertainty before and after the default of Lehman Brothers and the subsequent decision to stand behind AIG. Authorities were forced to make critical policy decisions, despite being uncertain about counterparties’ exposures and the protection sold against their default. Opacity has been a defining characteristic of over-the-counter derivatives markets – to the extent that they have been labelled “dark markets” (Duffie, 2012). Motivated by the concern that opacity exercerbates crises, the G20 leaders made a decisive push in 2009 for greater transparency in derivatives markets. In Europe, this initiative was formalised in 2012 in the European Markets Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), which requires EU entities engaging in derivatives transactions to report them to trade repositories authorised by the European Securities Markets Authority (ESMA). Derivatives markets are thus in the process of becoming one of the most transparent markets for regulators. This paper represents a first analysis of the EU-wide data collected under EMIR. We start by describing the structure of the dataset, drawing comparisons with existing survey-based evidence on derivatives markets. The rest of the paper is divided into three sections, focusing on the three largest derivatives markets (interest rates, foreign exchange and credit).
- JEL Code
- G15 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→International Financial Markets
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
- 15 March 2017
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 40Details
- This paper provides a unique snapshot of the exposures of EU banks to shadow banking entities within the global financial system. Drawing on a rich and novel dataset, the paper documents the cross-sector and cross-border linkages and considers which are the most relevant for systemic risk monitoring. From a macroprudential perspective, the identification of potential feedback and contagion channels arising from the linkages of banks and shadow banking entities is particularly challenging when shadow banking entities are domiciled in different jurisdictions. The analysis shows that many of the EU banks’ exposures are towards non-EU entities, particularly US-domiciled shadow banking entities. At the individual level, banks’ exposures are diversified although this diversification leads to high overlap across different types of shadow banking entities.
- JEL Code
- F65 : International Economics→Economic Impacts of Globalization→Finance
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
- 17 July 2017
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 12Details
- This occasional paper has been prepared to complement the mandate of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) Task Force on the Financial Stability Implications of the Introduction of IFRS 9. It develops a recursive model to assess how different approaches to measuring credit impairment losses affect the average levels and dynamics of the impairment allowances associated with a bank’s loan portfolio. The application of this model to a portfolio of European corporate loans suggests that IFRS 9 would tend to concentrate the impact of credit losses on profits and losses (P/L) and Common Equity Tier 1(CET1) capital at the very beginning of deteriorating phases of the economic cycle, which raises concerns about the procyclical effects of IFRS 9.