Možnosti vyhľadávania
Home Médiá ECB vysvetľuje Výskum a publikácie Štatistika Menová politika €uro Platobný styk a trhy Kariéra
Návrhy
Zoradiť podľa
Nie je k dispozícii v slovenčine.

Guillaume Vuillemey

29 August 2013
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1583
Details
Abstract
This paper analyses the network structure of the credit default swap (CDS) market, using a unique sample of counterparties’ bilateral notional exposures to CDS on 642 sovereign and financial reference entities. We study the network structure, similarly to the literature on interbank and payment systems, by computing a variety of network metrics at the aggregated level and for several subnetworks. At a reference entity level, we analyse the determinants of some key network properties for large reference entities. Our main results, obtained on a sub-sample of 191 reference entities, are the following. First, the CDS network shows topological similarities with the interbank network, as we document a “small world” structure and a scale-free degree distribution for the CDS market. Second, there is considerable heterogeneity in the network structures across reference entities. In particular, the outstanding debt volume and its structure (maturity, collateralization), the riskiness, the type (sovereign/financial) and the location (European/non-European) of reference entities significantly influence the size, the activity and the concentration of the CDS exposure network. For instance, the network on a high-volatility reference entity is typically more active, larger in size and less concentrated.
JEL Code
G15 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→International Financial Markets
16 September 2013
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 3
Details
Abstract
Financial institutions are connected to each other by a series of bilateral transactions. In normal times, institutions’ connections may result in efficient risk transfer. But in crises, connections can facilitate contagion – as initial problems lead to chains of defaults and liquidity shortages – sparked by shocks which might arise within the financial system or from the real economy. Institutions are also interconnected in indirect ways, since they are exposed to common risk factors that can result in concurrent losses. For example, most banks extend loans secured by real estate: they are thus collectively exposed to falls in house prices. Resulting bank distress can then exacerbate initial problems: banks might simultaneously sell collateral (houses), thus worsening downward price spirals. Less tangibly, institutions can also be connected through perceptions of counterparties’ creditworthiness. Given uncertainty, financial institutions may in general become reluctant to lend to each other and hoard liquidity. Potential for contagion due to interconnectedness is a key component of systemic risk. As a first step towards understanding the mechanisms of contagion, this paper abstracts from complex indirect connections between banks, and rather focuses on direct linkages between 53 large EU banks, based on unique data on interbank exposures collected by national regulators as of the end of 2011.
JEL Code
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
17 September 2013
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 4
Details
Abstract
Over the past few years the CDS market’s role has evolved from mostly providing default protection towards credit risk trading. The first-ever credit event in a developed country’s sovereign CDS has further highlighted the importance of the CDS market from a macro-prudential perspective. Developments in the European sovereign CDS market are a part of the major structural shift in euro sovereign debt: in the market’s view, there has been a significant shift from sovereign debt as a (default-free) risk-free benchmark (i.e. bearing interest rate risk only) to sovereign debt as a credit risk asset. Therefore, a significant repricing of the entire asset category has taken place, with major implications ranging from asset allocation to risk management. This implies that some policy issues are not necessarily and exclusively related to the CDS market, but are part of broader developments in the EU financial system. This Occasional Paper aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of the CDS market from a macroprudential perspective. In order to so, a wide range of analytical approaches is applied: Structural analysis of the EU CDS market: description of the market structure, key segments, concentration and evolution over time. Network analysis of bilateral CDS exposures: description of the structure and resilience of the network at an aggregate level as well as of sub-samples. In particular, analysis is conducted on: (i) the aggregated CDS network; (ii) various sub-networks, such as the sovereign CDS network; and (iii) networks for particular CDS reference entities. In order to carry out this analysis, we applied the established literature on interbank and payment systems networks to the CDS exposures network. “Super-spreader” analysis: identification of key “too interconnected to fail” market participants, their activities in the CDS market and their risk-bearing capacity. Scenario analysis of sovereign credit risk: the impact of sovereign credit events on the EU banking system and their potential spillovers. Domino effects in the CDS market: estimation of default chain scenarios for major participants in the CDS market; again, following the literature on interbank networks, we analysed the network impact of the collapse of a major market participant. Comparison of market- and exposure-based assessments of contagion: systemic risk rankings based on market price estimates (e.g. CoVaR) are compared with the rankings obtained using confidential DTCC exposure data in order to understand to what extent market participants are aware of who is a systemically relevant trader in the CDS market and whether these measures of systemic risk are consistent.
JEL Code
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
G33 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Bankruptcy, Liquidation
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
16 October 2013
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1599
Details
Abstract
This paper presents a stress test model for the CDS market, with a focus on the interplay between banks' bond and CDS holdings. The model enables the analysis of credit risk transfer mechanisms, includes features of market and liquidity risk, and allows for contagious propagation of counterparty failures. As an illustration, we calibrate the model using sovereign bond and CDS data for 65 major European banks. The model simulation shows that, in case of a sovereign credit event, banks' losses due to direct and correlated bond exposures are significantly higher than losses due to CDS exposures. The main risk for CDS sellers is found to be sudden increases in collateral requirements on multiple correlated CDS exposures. Close-out netting considerably reduces the extent to which contagion may occur.
JEL Code
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
H63 : Public Economics→National Budget, Deficit, and Debt→Debt, Debt Management, Sovereign Debt
G15 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→International Financial Markets
Network
Macroprudential Research Network
20 February 2014
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1638
Details
Abstract
We use an extensive data set of bilateral exposures on credit default swap (CDS) to estimate the impact on collateral demand of new margin and clearing practices and regulations. We decompose collateral demand for both customers and dealers into several key components, including the
JEL Code
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
G15 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→International Financial Markets
30 June 2017
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 49
Details
Abstract
We empirically explore the fragility of wholesale funding of banks, using transaction level data on short-term, unsecured certificates of deposits in the European market. We do not observe any market-wide freeze during the 2008-2014 period. Yet, many banks suddenly experience funding dry-ups. Dry-ups predict, but do not cause, future deterioration of bank performance. Furthermore, in periods of market stress, banks with high future performance tend to increase reliance on wholesale funding. Thus, we fail to find evidence consistent with classical adverse selection models of funding market freezes. Our evidence is in line with theories highlighting heterogeneity between informed and uninformed lenders.
JEL Code
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
24 September 2018
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2176
Details
Abstract
We study the allocation of interest rate risk within the European banking sector using novel data. Banks’ exposure to interest rate risk is small on aggregate, but heterogeneous in the cross-section. In contrast to conventional wisdom, net worth is increasing in interest rates for approximately half of the institutions in our sample. Cross-sectional variation in banks’ exposures is driven by cross-country differences in loan-rate fixation conventions for mortgages. Banks use derivatives to partially hedge on-balance sheet exposures. Residual exposures imply that changes in interest rates have redistributive effects within the banking sector.
JEL Code
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy