European Central Bank - eurosystem
Επιλογές αναζήτησης
Η ΕΚΤ Ενημέρωση Επεξηγήσεις Έρευνα & Εκδόσεις Στατιστικές Νομισματική πολιτική Το ευρώ Πληρωμές & Αγορές Θέσεις εργασίας
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Δεν διατίθεται στα ελληνικά.

Leonardo Del Vecchio

21 September 2022
One important source of systemic risk can arise from asset commonality among financial institutions. This indirect interconnection may occur when financial institutions invest in similar or correlated assets and is also described as overlapping portfolios. In this work, we propose a methodology to quantify systemic risk derived from asset commonality and we apply it to assess the degree of indirect interconnection of banks due to their financial holdings. Based on granular information of asset holdings of European significant banks, we compute the sensitivity based ∆ CoVaR which captures the potential sources of systemic risk originating from asset commonality. The novel indicator proves to be consistent with other indicators of systemic importance, yet it has a more transparent foundation in terms of the source of systemic risk, which can contribute to effective macroprudential supervision.
JEL Code
C58 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric Modeling→Financial Econometrics
E32 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Business Fluctuations, Cycles
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G32 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Capital and Ownership Structure, Value of Firms, Goodwill
6 August 2021
This paper shows how the combined endogenous reaction of banks and investment funds to an exogenous shock can amplify or dampen losses to the financial system compared to results from single-sector stress testing models. We build a new model of contagion propagation using a very large and granular data set for the euro area. Based on the economic shock caused by the Covid-19 outbreak, we model three sources of exogenous shocks: a default shock, a market shock and a redemption shock. Our contagion mechanism operates through a dual channel of liquidity and solvency risk. The joint modelling of banks and funds provides new insights for the assessment of financial stability risks. Our analysis reveals that adding the fund sector to our model for banks leads to additional losses through fire sales and a further depletion of banks’ capital ratios by around one percentage point.
JEL Code
D85 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty→Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
L14 : Industrial Organization→Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance→Transactional Relationships, Contracts and Reputation, Networks