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Alberto Grassi

16 November 2022
FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - ARTICLE
Financial Stability Review Issue 2, 2022
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Abstract
Energy sector firms use energy derivatives under different strategies depending on their main area of activity, business model and exposure to risk in physical markets. The significant volatility and skyrocketing prices seen in energy markets since March 2022 have resulted in large margin calls, generating liquidity risks for derivatives users. Strategies employed by companies to alleviate liquidity stress may lead to an accumulation of credit risk for their lenders or their counterparties in less collateralised segments of the derivatives market. Further price increases would accentuate nascent vulnerabilities, creating additional stress in a concentrated market. These issues underline the need to review margining practices and enhance the liquidity preparedness of all market participants to deal with large margin calls.
JEL Code
Q02 : Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics, Environmental and Ecological Economics→General→Global Commodity Markets
G13 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Contingent Pricing, Futures Pricing
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
16 November 2022
FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - BOX
Financial Stability Review Issue 2, 2022
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Abstract
Interest rate swaps account for the largest share of the euro area derivatives market. Outstanding contracts on EURIBOR swaps have risen sharply since 2021, possibly reflecting expectations of monetary policy normalisation. Using trade repository data on individual EURIBOR swap trades between 2019 and 2022, this box identifies how the risk is being shared across sectors in the interest rate swaps market and who would pay margins to whom should rates change. Empirical findings show that euro area banks are among the most active counterparties in EURIBOR swaps, due to either their role as market-makers or their need to hedge interest rate risk. Investment funds, insurance companies and pension funds would need to make margin payments in the event of rising interest rates.
JEL Code
G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates
G13 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Contingent Pricing, Futures Pricing
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G22 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Insurance, Insurance Companies, Actuarial Studies
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G24 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Investment Banking, Venture Capital, Brokerage, Ratings and Ratings Agencies
E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
6 August 2021
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2581
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Abstract
This paper shows how the combined endogenous reaction of banks and investment funds to an exogenous shock can amplify or dampen losses to the financial system compared to results from single-sector stress testing models. We build a new model of contagion propagation using a very large and granular data set for the euro area. Based on the economic shock caused by the Covid-19 outbreak, we model three sources of exogenous shocks: a default shock, a market shock and a redemption shock. Our contagion mechanism operates through a dual channel of liquidity and solvency risk. The joint modelling of banks and funds provides new insights for the assessment of financial stability risks. Our analysis reveals that adding the fund sector to our model for banks leads to additional losses through fire sales and a further depletion of banks’ capital ratios by around one percentage point.
JEL Code
D85 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty→Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
L14 : Industrial Organization→Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance→Transactional Relationships, Contracts and Reputation, Networks
25 November 2020
FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - ARTICLE
Financial Stability Review Issue 2, 2020
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Abstract
We examine some aspects of how the low-for-even-longer interest rate environment may affect bank lending margins and overall financial stability. We find evidence that margins fall more in response to declines in nominal short-term rates when these are low to begin with. The compression of margins reflects the sluggish response to further policy rate cuts of deposit rates as these approach the zero lower bound. Moreover, the analysis indicates that bank margins and overall profitability are influenced by both the level of real rates and, more materially, the level of inflation expectations embedded in nominal rates, which reflects the fact that bank profits are partly akin to seigniorage.
JEL Code
G2 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services
E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
26 May 2020
FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - BOX
Financial Stability Review Issue 1, 2020
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Abstract
Recent events have shown that stress in non-banks can affect other parts of the financial system, for example through forced asset sales and reduced short-term funding. This box examines the interconnections between banks and non-banks through direct exposures, overlapping portfolios and ownership links, and considers how these can increase the risk of systemic contagion.