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Η ΕΚΤ Ενημέρωση Επεξηγήσεις Έρευνα & Εκδόσεις Στατιστικές Νομισματική πολιτική Το ευρώ Πληρωμές & Αγορές Θέσεις εργασίας
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Clemens Jobst

24 February 2017
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2027
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Abstract
This paper shows that a central bank can more efficiently mitigate economic crises when it broadens eligibility for its discount facility to any safe asset or solvent agent. We use difference-in-differences panel regressions and emulate crises by studying how defaults of banks and non-agricultural firms were affected by the arrival of an agricultural disease. We exploit the specificities of the implementation of the discount window to deal with the endogeneity of the access to the central bank to the arrival of the crisis and local default rates. We find that broad eligibility reduced significantly the increase in the default rate when the shock hit the local economy. A counterfactual exercise shows that defaults would have been 10% to 15% higher if the central bank would have implemented the strictest eligibility rule. This effect is identified independently of changes in policy interest rates and the fiscal deficit.
JEL Code
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E51 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Money Supply, Credit, Money Multipliers
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
N14 : Economic History→Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics, Industrial Structure, Growth, Fluctuations→Europe: 1913?
N54 : Economic History→Agriculture, Natural Resources, Environment, and Extractive Industries→Europe: 1913?
19 December 2014
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1756
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Abstract
Money market structures shape monetary policy design, but the way central banks perform their operations also has an impact on the evolution of money markets. This is important, because microeconomic differences in the way the same macroeconomic policy is implemented may be non-neutral. In this paper, we take a panel approach in order to investigate both directions of causality. Thanks to three newly-collected datasets covering ten countries over two centuries, we ask (1) where, (2) how, and (3) with what results interaction between money markets and central banks has taken place. Our findings allow establishing a periodization singling out phases of convergence and divergence. They also suggest that exogenous factors
JEL Code
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
G15 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→International Financial Markets
N20 : Economic History→Financial Markets and Institutions→General, International, or Comparative
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