Meklēšanas opcijas
Sākums Medijiem Noderīga informācija Pētījumi un publikācijas Statistika Monetārā politika Euro Maksājumi un tirgi Karjera
Šķirošanas kritērijs
Latviešu valodas versija nav pieejama

Andrea Tafuro

15 November 2018
In the policy debate on the effectiveness of the Global Financial Safety Net, concerns have been raised that expectations of adverse effects of IMF programmes may deter countries from asking for an IMF programme when they need one, a form of ‘IMF stigma’. We explore the existence of IMF financial market stigma using monthly data by estimating how and to which extent adverse market reactions to a programme materialise and how past experience with adverse market reactions affects subsequent IMF programme participation. Our results, derived with event history techniques and propensity score matching, indicate no role for ‘IMF stigma’ stemming from the fear of adverse market movements. Instead, we find evidence of ‘IMF recidivism’ driven by adverse selection and IMF conditionality.
JEL Code
E02 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→General→Institutions and the Macroeconomy
F32 : International Economics→International Finance→Current Account Adjustment, Short-Term Capital Movements
F33 : International Economics→International Finance→International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
F34 : International Economics→International Finance→International Lending and Debt Problems