Beatrice Scheubel
Macro Prud Policy&Financial Stability
- Division
-
Financial Regulation and Policy
- Current Position
-
Team Lead - Financial Stability
- Fields of interest
-
Financial Economics,International Economics,Public Economics
- Education
- 2007-2011
PhD in Public Economics - University of Munich (Germany)
- 2002-2007
Master & Bachelor in Economics (Diplom) - University of Munich (Germany) and University of Warwick (UK)
- Professional experience
- 2021-
Team Lead - ECB Directorate Macroprudential Policy and Financial Stability, Frankfurt (Germany)
- 2020-2021
Lead Economist - ECB Directorate International and European Relations, Frankfurt (Germany)
- 2011-2020
Economist - ECB Directorates Economics and International, Frankfurt (Germany)
- 2010-2011
Programme Director - CESifo GmbH, Munich (Germany)
- 2007-2011
Teaching and Research Fellow - Center for Economic Studies, University of Munich (Germany)
- Teaching experience
- 2012-
Guest lecturer - Goethe University Frankfurt (Germany)
- 2007-2011
Teaching and Research Fellow - Center for Economic Studies, University of Munich (Germany)
- 4 December 2019
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2337Details
- Abstract
- We add to the literature on the influence of the global financial cycle (GFC) and gyrations in capital flows. First, we build a new measure of the GFC based on a structural factor approach, which incorporates theoretical priors in its definition. This measure can also be decomposed in a price-based and quantity-based version of the GFC, which is novel in the literature. Second, we compare our measure to other common existing indicators of the GFC. Third, we estimate the influence of the fluctuations in the GFC on capital flow episodes (sudden stops, flights, retrenchments, surges) and currency crises, also testing for its stability and linearity. We find that the nexus between the GFC and capital flow episodes is generally consistent and not very wobbly. In line with theoretical priors, we find some evidence that the GFC is more important for sudden stops when it is more negative, i.e. the relationship is (mildly) convex, in keeping with a role for occasionally binding constraints, but the evidence for this feature is not strong.
- JEL Code
- F32 : International Economics→International Finance→Current Account Adjustment, Short-Term Capital Movements
F33 : International Economics→International Finance→International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
F36 : International Economics→International Finance→Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
F42 : International Economics→Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance→International Policy Coordination and Transmission
F44 : International Economics→Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance→International Business Cycles
- 12 April 2019
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2262Details
- Abstract
- While the consequences and effectiveness of IMF conditionality have long been the focus of research, the possible negative impact of IMF conditionality on countries’ willingness to ask for an IMF programme – often termed ‘IMF stigma’ – has recently received attention particularly from policy circles. In this paper we investigate how countries' past experience with the IMF and their peers’ experience with the IMF affect their likelihood of entering a subsequent IMF arrangement. Our results indicate that, even when controlling for the success of past programmes, a country is less likely to approach the IMF for help if in the past it experienced an above-average number of disbursement-relevant conditions. We find hardly any impact of peers’ experience, except for Asian countries.
- JEL Code
- F33 : International Economics→International Finance→International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
F53 : International Economics→International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy→International Agreements and Observance, International Organizations
F55 : International Economics→International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy→International Institutional Arrangements
H87 : Public Economics→Miscellaneous Issues→International Fiscal Issues, International Public Goods
- 15 November 2018
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2198Details
- Abstract
- In the policy debate on the effectiveness of the Global Financial Safety Net, concerns have been raised that expectations of adverse effects of IMF programmes may deter countries from asking for an IMF programme when they need one, a form of ‘IMF stigma’. We explore the existence of IMF financial market stigma using monthly data by estimating how and to which extent adverse market reactions to a programme materialise and how past experience with adverse market reactions affects subsequent IMF programme participation. Our results, derived with event history techniques and propensity score matching, indicate no role for ‘IMF stigma’ stemming from the fear of adverse market movements. Instead, we find evidence of ‘IMF recidivism’ driven by adverse selection and IMF conditionality.
- JEL Code
- E02 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→General→Institutions and the Macroeconomy
F32 : International Economics→International Finance→Current Account Adjustment, Short-Term Capital Movements
F33 : International Economics→International Finance→International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
F34 : International Economics→International Finance→International Lending and Debt Problems
- 15 September 2016
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 177Details
- Abstract
- This paper critically reviews the theoretical basis for the provision of the global financial safety net (GFSN) and provides a comprehensive database covering four elements of the GFSN (foreign exchange reserves, IMF financing, central bank swap lines and regional financing arrangements) for over 150 countries in the sample period 1960-2015. This paper also presents some key stylised facts regarding the provision of GFSN financing and compares macroeconomic outcomes in capital flow reversal episodes depending on how much GFSN financing was available to countries. Finally, this paper concludes with some avenues for further research on the possible evolution of the GFSN.
- JEL Code
- F32 : International Economics→International Finance→Current Account Adjustment, Short-Term Capital Movements
F33 : International Economics→International Finance→International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
F34 : International Economics→International Finance→International Lending and Debt Problems
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
H87 : Public Economics→Miscellaneous Issues→International Fiscal Issues, International Public Goods
Annexes - 18 September 2014
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1734Details
- Abstract
- Fertility has long been declining in industrialised countries and the existence of public pension systems is considered as one of the causes. This paper provides detailed evidence based on historical data on the mechanism by which a public pension system depresses fertility. Our theoretical framework highlights that the effect of a public pension system on fertility works via the impact of contributions in such a system on disposable income as well as via the impact on future disposable income that is related to the internal rate of return of the pension system. Drawing on a unique historical data set which allows us to measure these variables at a jurisdictional level for a time when comprehensive social security was introduced, we estimate the effects predicted by the model. We find that beyond the traditional determinants of the first demographic transition, a lower internal rate of return of the pension system is associated with a higher birth rate. This result is robust to including the traditional determinants of the first demographic transition as controls as well as to other policy changes at the time.
- JEL Code
- C21 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Single Equation Models, Single Variables→Cross-Sectional Models, Spatial Models, Treatment Effect Models, Quantile Regressions
H31 : Public Economics→Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents→Household
H53 : Public Economics→National Government Expenditures and Related Policies→Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
H55 : Public Economics→National Government Expenditures and Related Policies→Social Security and Public Pensions
J13 : Labor and Demographic Economics→Demographic Economics→Fertility, Family Planning, Child Care, Children, Youth
J18 : Labor and Demographic Economics→Demographic Economics→Public Policy
J26 : Labor and Demographic Economics→Demand and Supply of Labor→Retirement, Retirement Policies
N33 : Economic History→Labor and Consumers, Demography, Education, Health, Welfare, Income, Wealth, Religion, and Philanthropy→Europe: Pre-1913
- 18 June 2013
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1556Details
- Abstract
- While there are many methods to measure the competitiveness of an economy, most of these concepts ignore the fact that competitiveness can change because of market processes like wage negotiation but also because of political decision-making. Governments that compete with others for factors of production face the incentive to adjust key policy variables to improve their competitive position. Disentangling market-induced and politics-induced changes in competitiveness is not easy, but strongly warranted given current discussions that some EMU Member States should improve their competitive position within the euro area by adjusting policy variables. Increasing country competitiveness is one of the key objectives currently discussed by policy makers in the context of creating an economic union in the euro area, to complement monetary union. We propose a new competitiveness index that captures the dimensions in which politics can influence competitiveness beyond factor price adjustments. Our index shows that the individual components of institutional competitiveness have developed heterogeneously among EMU Member States. To explain these divergent developments, the uneven integration within the EU Single Market may play a role.
- JEL Code
- E02 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→General→Institutions and the Macroeconomy
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
F15 : International Economics→Trade→Economic Integration
H11 : Public Economics→Structure and Scope of Government→Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
N44 : Economic History→Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation→Europe: 1913? - Network
- Competitiveness Research Network
- 2019
- Journal of International Money and Finance
- 2019
- Journal of International Money and Finance, 2019, in press
- 2017
- Journal of Population Economics, 2017, Vol. 30, 93-139
- 2013
- Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2013, Vol. 115, 549-574
- 2013
- CESifo Economic Studies, 2013, Vol. 59, 576-608
- 2013
- Mohr-Siebeck, 2013Bismarck's Institutions - A Historical Perspective on the Social Security Hypothesis
- 2018
- DNB Working Paper No. 596
- 2016
- published with ECB Occasional Paper 177