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Benjamin Vonessen

30 September 2016
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 180
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Abstract
The last decade has been characterised by the pronounced volatility of capital flows. While cross-border capital flows can have many benefits for both advanced and emerging market economies, they may also carry risks, which require appropriate policy responses. Disentangling the push from the pull factors driving capital flows is key to designing appropriate policies to deal with them. Strong institutions, sound fundamentals and a large domestic investor base tend to shield economies from adverse global conditions and attract less volatile types of capital. However, when the policy space for using traditional macroeconomic policies is limited, countries may also turn to macroprudential and capital flow management policies in a pragmatic manner. The IMF can play an important role in helping countries to deal with capital flows, through its surveillance and lending policy and through international cooperation.
JEL Code
F3 : International Economics→International Finance
F32 : International Economics→International Finance→Current Account Adjustment, Short-Term Capital Movements
F38 : International Economics→International Finance→International Financial Policy: Financial Transactions Tax; Capital Controls
F42 : International Economics→Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance→International Policy Coordination and Transmission
F65 : International Economics→Economic Impacts of Globalization→Finance
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
2 October 2018
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 213
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Abstract
In this report, three methodological approaches are applied to assess the size of the International Monetary Fund: benchmarking Fund resources against a number of relevant global economic and financial indicators; an extrapolation of past and current IMF programme characteristics; and a shock scenario analysis. Overall, while the results of the different approaches depend on the assumptions and the timeframe considered, the quantitative analysis indicates that a prudent approach would call for maintaining Fund total resources at their current levels. Yet, the quantitative analysis of the size of the Fund made in this report should be seen only as one element to assess the adequacy of Fund resources. It does not take into account qualitative considerations, such as the increased resilience of the global economy and the efforts made to strengthen regulation and supervision since the financial crisis, which should complement the quantitative analysis to complete the analytical basis for decision makers. Moreover, the final decision on the appropriate size of Fund resources will need to include political judgement. Therefore, this report does not provide recommendations on the appropriate level of IMF resources after the expiration of borrowed resources.
JEL Code
F3 : International Economics→International Finance
F32 : International Economics→International Finance→Current Account Adjustment, Short-Term Capital Movements
F38 : International Economics→International Finance→International Financial Policy: Financial Transactions Tax; Capital Controls
F42 : International Economics→Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance→International Policy Coordination and Transmission
F65 : International Economics→Economic Impacts of Globalization→Finance
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
15 November 2018
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2198
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Abstract
In the policy debate on the effectiveness of the Global Financial Safety Net, concerns have been raised that expectations of adverse effects of IMF programmes may deter countries from asking for an IMF programme when they need one, a form of ‘IMF stigma’. We explore the existence of IMF financial market stigma using monthly data by estimating how and to which extent adverse market reactions to a programme materialise and how past experience with adverse market reactions affects subsequent IMF programme participation. Our results, derived with event history techniques and propensity score matching, indicate no role for ‘IMF stigma’ stemming from the fear of adverse market movements. Instead, we find evidence of ‘IMF recidivism’ driven by adverse selection and IMF conditionality.
JEL Code
E02 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→General→Institutions and the Macroeconomy
F32 : International Economics→International Finance→Current Account Adjustment, Short-Term Capital Movements
F33 : International Economics→International Finance→International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
F34 : International Economics→International Finance→International Lending and Debt Problems
16 October 2019
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 235
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Abstract
Conditionality is at the very heart of IMF lending and has been the subject of intense debates ever since the Fund’s inception. Its success is of crucial importance not only for countries’ chances of achieving the goals of IMF lending programmes, but also for the credibility of the Fund as a trusted adviser. This report provides information and a set of facts on the IMF arrangements approved after the global financial crisis, with a focus on ex post conditionality and on arrangements primarily financed through the General Resources Account (GRA). The analysis shows that between 2008 and 2018, the characteristics of IMF programmes evolved with the macroeconomic context; in particular, a tendency towards more structural conditionality and longer programme implementation horizons has emerged. In the aftermath of an IMF programme, all relevant macroeconomic variables tend to improve compared with the pre-programme period; in particular, external and fiscal positions improve considerably and growth typically rebounds, inflation declines and net private capital inflows stabilise or recover slightly. However, the improvement has generally fallen short of expectations, especially in terms of GDP growth and debt reduction. One area in which the effectiveness of IMF programmes has proven less than satisfactory is with serial borrowers, i.e. countries that fail to graduate from IMF financial assistance in due course. This highlights the importance of further analysing the factors behind the success of IMF programmes and points, inter alia, to the need to design and sequence the structural conditions attached to Fund loans more effectively
JEL Code
F3 : International Economics→International Finance
F5 : International Economics→International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy
6 October 2020
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 248
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Abstract
This Occasional Paper analyses how significant expansions in central banks’ mandates, roles and instruments can result in challenges to the independence of monetary policy. The paper reviews, in particular, some of the key challenges to central bank independence brought about by the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007 and assesses their impact on the de jure and de facto independence of selected central banks around the world in the past few years. It finds that although the level of de jure (legal) central bank independence did not deteriorate, the level of de facto (actual) independence of the central banks of some of the largest economies in the world may have weakened. The paper presents counterarguments to the key critiques raised against central banks due to their policy response during the GFC, and concludes that the case for central bank independence is as strong as ever.
JEL Code
B1 : History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches→History of Economic Thought through 1925
B2 : History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches→History of Economic Thought since 1925
C4 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics
E3 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles
E4 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates
E5 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
E6 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
K3 : Law and Economics→Other Substantive Areas of Law
N1 : Economic History→Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics, Industrial Structure, Growth, Fluctuations
N2 : Economic History→Financial Markets and Institutions