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Marco Committeri

14 September 2021
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 262
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Abstract
The global recession caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting deterioration in many countries’ public finances have increased the risk of sovereign debt crises. Although crisis prevention remains paramount, these developments have made it imperative to re-examine the adequacy of the current toolkit for crisis management and resolution, in a context where changes in the creditor base and in the composition of public debt instruments have brought about new challenges in terms of reduced transparency and additional barriers to achieving inter-creditor equity. This report focuses on the international architecture for sovereign debt restructurings (SODRs), as seen through the lenses of the International Monetary Fund (IMF or “the Fund”) and with a special attention to the role that the Fund can play in facilitating orderly restructuring processes. It provides a set of findings and recommendations in relation to certain key elements of the Fund’s lending framework that have important ramifications on SODR processes, namely debt sustainability assessments (DSAs), the exceptional access policy (EAP) for financing above normal access limits, and the criteria for lending to countries with payments arrears to private creditors (LIA) or official bilateral creditors (LIOA). It also considers other indirect channels through which the Fund can affect SODRs, including its support for enhancing the transparency and public disclosure of sovereign debt information, its collaboration with the Paris Club and the G20 debt-related initiatives, the promotion of contractual standards for sovereign debt, and the monitoring of relevant legislative developments.
JEL Code
F34 : International Economics→International Finance→International Lending and Debt Problems
F55 : International Economics→International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy→International Institutional Arrangements
H63 : Public Economics→National Budget, Deficit, and Debt→Debt, Debt Management, Sovereign Debt
16 October 2019
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 235
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Abstract
Conditionality is at the very heart of IMF lending and has been the subject of intense debates ever since the Fund’s inception. Its success is of crucial importance not only for countries’ chances of achieving the goals of IMF lending programmes, but also for the credibility of the Fund as a trusted adviser. This report provides information and a set of facts on the IMF arrangements approved after the global financial crisis, with a focus on ex post conditionality and on arrangements primarily financed through the General Resources Account (GRA). The analysis shows that between 2008 and 2018, the characteristics of IMF programmes evolved with the macroeconomic context; in particular, a tendency towards more structural conditionality and longer programme implementation horizons has emerged. In the aftermath of an IMF programme, all relevant macroeconomic variables tend to improve compared with the pre-programme period; in particular, external and fiscal positions improve considerably and growth typically rebounds, inflation declines and net private capital inflows stabilise or recover slightly. However, the improvement has generally fallen short of expectations, especially in terms of GDP growth and debt reduction. One area in which the effectiveness of IMF programmes has proven less than satisfactory is with serial borrowers, i.e. countries that fail to graduate from IMF financial assistance in due course. This highlights the importance of further analysing the factors behind the success of IMF programmes and points, inter alia, to the need to design and sequence the structural conditions attached to Fund loans more effectively
JEL Code
F3 : International Economics→International Finance
F5 : International Economics→International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy
1 July 2005
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 32
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Abstract
Financial crises in emerging market economies are often accompanied by difficulties of the sovereign to honour its contractual obligations. The official sector may reduce the likelihood of a disorderly outcome by extending financial assistance but there are limits to official sector involvement, not least because the potential volume of IMF lending is small compared to private capital flows and because a large "bail out" by the official sector would lead to moral hazard. For both these reasons - limited official funds and moral hazard - private sector creditors need to share some of the financial burden and thereby actively get involved in the management of financial crises in emerging market economies. The purpose of this report is to review the instruments that may promote such private creditor involvement as well as to provide a stock-taking of past experience and identify areas of possible improvement to the framework for crisis resolution.
JEL Code
F33 : International Economics→International Finance→International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
F34 : International Economics→International Finance→International Lending and Debt Problems