Niet beschikbaar in het Nederlands
Salvatore Perdichizzi
- 7 January 2026
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 3167Details
- Abstract
- We use a novel data set containing all corporate loans throughout the Eurozone to document a series of novel stylized facts on the relationship between collateral and the probability of default. First, we show that the pervasive empirical finding that riskier borrowers pledge collateral is driven by economists’ informational disadvantage relative to banks. Accounting for time-varying bank- and firm-specific risk factors produces negative correlations consistent with theory. Second, the relationship between pledging collateral and the probability of default is non-linear. Increasing the ex-ante collateral-to-loan ratio initially lowers the default likelihood but increases it as loans become overcollateralized. Third, this is driven by the riskiness of collateral. We estimate that an increase in the ex-ante collateral-to-loan ratio correlates with greater variance in the underlying collateral’s market value after loan origination. We develop a model featuring risk-neutral agents and risky collateral that provides intuition for these empirical patterns. Pledging risky collateral lowers lenders’ expected returns in case of default, leading them to demand more collateral to originate a loan but this diminishes a borrower’s return when a project is successful leading to less effort and a higher probability of default.
- JEL Code
- D82 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty→Asymmetric and Private Information, Mechanism Design
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 13 March 2024
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2916Details
- Abstract
- Using pan-European credit register data, we analyze the sharp increase in public guaranteed lending (PGL) during the COVID-19 loan guarantee programs and show that banks leverage PGL to expand lending to low-emission firms. This behavior is driven by industries less affected by COVID-19, banks with ”browner” portfolios, and younger firms. Notably, compared to high-emission firms, banks’ internal risk assessments in PGL to low-emission firms are less frequently updated and exhibit weaker predictive power for future credit quality deterioration, indicating lax monitoring efforts. These findings highlight the additional information production costs associated with green lending and shed light on why banks may be slow to transition to greener portfolios.
- JEL Code
- G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation