European Central Bank - eurosystem
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Kezdőlap Média Kisokos Kutatás és publikációk Statisztika Monetáris politika Az €uro Fizetésforgalom és piacok Karrier
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Melina Papoutsi

Research

Division

Financial Research

Current Position

Senior Economist

Fields of interest

Financial Economics

Email

Melina.Papoutsi@ecb.europa.eu

Education
2013-2018

PhD in Finance and Economics, Columbia University, New York, United States

2010-2011

MA in International and Development Economics, Yale University, New Haven, United States

2005-2009

BSc in Economics, Athens University of Economics and Business, Athens, Greece

Professional experience
2018-2020

Economist - Monetary Policy Research Division, Directorate General Research, European Central Bank

2011-2013

Associate - Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, The World Bank, Washington D.C., United States

Awards
2017

Outstanding PhD Student Paper, Fordham Gabelli School of Business

2017

Doctoral Fellowship, Arora - Naldi

2017

Best PhD Paper Award, Columbia Business School, Finance Division

2017

Best Finance PhD Paper Award, Washington University in St.Louis WFA-CFAR

2016

Doctoral Fellowship, Deming Center

2013

Doctoral Fellowship, Alexander S. Onassis Foundation

2010

Fellowship, Fulbright Foundation

16 June 2023
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2826
Details
Abstract
We document the structure of firm-bank relationships across eleven euro area coun-tries and present new stylised facts using data from the Eurosystem credit registry -AnaCredit. We look at the number of banking relationships, reliance on the main bank, credit instruments, loan maturity, and interest rates. Firms in Southern Europe borrow from more banks and obtain a lower share of credit from the main bank than those in Northern Europe. They also tend to borrow more on short term, more expensive instru-ments and to obtain loans with shorter maturity. This is consistent with the hypothesis that firms in Southern Europe rely less on relationship banking and obtain credit less conducive to firm growth, in line with their smaller average size. Relationship lending does not translate in lower rates, possibly because banks appropriate part of the surplus generated by relationship lending through higher rates.
JEL Code
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G3 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance
G32 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Capital and Ownership Structure, Value of Firms, Goodwill
15 June 2022
RESEARCH BULLETIN - No. 96
Details
Abstract
While historically only very large firms issued in the European corporate bond market, recent years have seen the entry of many new players: small, private, and unrated issuers. Firm-level data show these new players face different game dynamics. They are disconnected from aggregate market movements and still depend heavily on banks. This means hey could potentially affect financial stability and be less responsive to policy interventions.
JEL Code
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G32 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Capital and Ownership Structure, Value of Firms, Goodwill
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
19 May 2022
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2663
Details
Abstract
Using newly available micro-data on public and private firms, this paper documents five facts about the rise of bond financing in the euro area through the lens of new and small issuers. (1) Recent new issuers are typically small, private, and unrated; (2) bond spreads of unrated issuers are around the investment-grade threshold; (3) holdings of traditional ‘buy-and-hold’ bond investors are small for unrated and smaller issuers, while financial intermediaries and households are large investors; (4) these investors were as flighty as mutual funds during the March 2020 turmoil; (5) the subsequent bond issuance wave was restricted to large rated firms, with other issuers returning to the loan market. These facts imply that these issuers are largely disconnected from the aggregate bond market and still significantly dependent on intermediaries.
JEL Code
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G32 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Capital and Ownership Structure, Value of Firms, Goodwill
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
18 May 2021
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2553
Details
Abstract
This paper presents evidence that personal relationships between corporate borrowers and bank loan officers improve the outcomes of loan renegotiation. Analysing a bank reorganization in Greece in the mid-2010s, I find that firms that experience an exogenous interruption in their loan officer relationship confront three consequences: one, the firms are less likely to renegotiate their loans; two, conditional on renegotiation, the firms are given tougher loan terms; and three, the firms are more likely to alter their capital structure. These results point to the importance of lending relationships in mitigating the cost of distress for borrowers in loan renegotiations.
JEL Code
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
L14 : Industrial Organization→Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance→Transactional Relationships, Contracts and Reputation, Networks
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
O16 : Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth→Economic Development→Financial Markets, Saving and Capital Investment, Corporate Finance and Governance
Network
Research Task Force (RTF)
25 February 2021
RESEARCH BULLETIN - No. 81
Details
Abstract
Loan renegotiations are expected to surge following the coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak and the subsequent crisis, as more loans default during recessions. At such times, managing lending relationships effectively becomes even more important for bank governance, risk, and credit supply. My study presents evidence that continuous lending relationships between bank loan officers and corporate borrowers improve the outcomes of loan renegotiations. The analysis draws on a novel dataset on corporate loans during a bank reorganisation in Greece in the mid-2010s. This dataset allows us to empirically identify the causal effect of interrupted relationships. My main findings are that firms that experience an exogenous interruption in their loan officer relationship are faced with three consequences. First, the firms are less likely to renegotiate a loan compared to firms with continuous relationships. Second, when loans are renegotiated, firms with interrupted loan officer relationships receive tougher loan terms. Third, these firms raise more equity, reduce their overall borrowing, and partially substitute borrowing from other banks. These results point to the importance of lending relationships in mitigating the cost of distress for borrowers renegotiating loans. It therefore suggests that bank managers, supervisors, and resolution authorities need to be mindful of the potential costs of changing loan officers.
JEL Code
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
L14 : Industrial Organization→Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance→Transactional Relationships, Contracts and Reputation, Networks
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
O16 : Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth→Economic Development→Financial Markets, Saving and Capital Investment, Corporate Finance and Governance
Network
Research Task Force (RTF)