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Massimo Libertucci

Horizontal Line Supervision

Division

Supervisory Policy

Current Position

Senior Team Lead - Banking Supervision

Fields of interest

Financial Economics,Law and Economics,Other Special Topics

Email

massimo.libertucci@ecb.europa.eu

Education
2005

MSc in Economics, University of Warwick, United Kingdom

Professional experience
2024-

Senior Team Lead, Supervisory Policy Division, DG Horizontal Line Supervision, European Central Bank (current position)

2020-2023

Team Lead, Supervisory Policy Division, DG Horizontal Line Supervision, European Central Bank

2019-2020

Principal Supervisor, Supervisory Policies Division, DG MS4, European Central Bank

2016-2019

Supervisor, Supervisory Policies Division, DG MS4, European Central Bank

2008-2016

Advisor, Regulation and Macroprudential Analysis Department, Banca d’Italia

2012

External work experience, Financial Stability Department, Deutsche Bundesbank

2007-2008

Expert, CONSOB (National Commission for Securities and Stock Exchange Market)

27 April 2026
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 387
Details
Abstract
This paper describes and evaluates the European Union (EU) banking sector capital framework, focusing on how the international standards set by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision have been implemented within the EU. Using granular supervisory data for significant institutions under the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), we quantify the capital impact of EU-specific regulatory choices, supervisory measures and macroprudential policies. We show that most EU capital requirements stem from Basel standards, which encompass both prescriptive “Pillar 1” components and elements that are expected to be designed and calibrated at the jurisdictional level. The paper describes the evolution of capital ratios and requirements since the inception of the SSM and discusses the relationship between changes in capital levels and indicators of banking sector performance. To provide a comparative perspective, a model-based counterfactual exercise compares capital requirements of EU banks with those that would arise if EU banks were subject to the main prudential regulations that currently apply in the United States, which vary depending on the size of the bank. The results show that for the largest EU banks, the current US rules would entail stricter requirements, whereas mid-sized EU banks would be subject to less stringent requirements. Our findings show that EU capital requirements are broadly comparable to those in other jurisdictions and are largely in line with international standards. When assessing broader indicators of bank performance, we highlight the importance of considering not only private costs and benefits, but also intended effects and broader societal objectives. [...]
JEL Code
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
F36 : International Economics→International Finance→Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
2 May 2024
THE ECB BLOG
Details
JEL Code
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
3 March 2020
FINANCIAL INTEGRATION AND STRUCTURE ARTICLE
Financial Integration and Structure in the Euro Area 2020
Details
Abstract
Brexit will result in a substantial structural change to the EU’s financial architecture over the coming years. It could be particularly significant for derivatives clearing, investment banking activities and securities and derivatives trading as the reliance on service provision by UK financial firms is more pronounced in these areas and the provision of such services is currently linked to the EU passporting regime. At the same time, the precise overall impact of Brexit on the EU’s future financial architecture in general – and on these specific areas in particular – is difficult to predict at this stage, and may change over time. This special feature makes a first attempt at analysing some of the factors that may affect the EU’s financial architecture post-Brexit. It focuses on areas which currently show strong reliance on the UK and are of particular relevance for the ECB under its various mandates.
2024
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Working Papers
  • Libertucci, M., Araujo, A., Farkas, B., Petrarca, I., Jiron, A., Naunheim, F., Ottolini, R., and Welz, P.
2015
Rivista Bancaria
  • Cannata, F., Casellina, S. and Libertucci, M.
2012
Bank of Italy Working Papers
  • Libertucci, M. and Piersante, F.
2011
Basel III and Beyond: a Guide to Banking Regulation after the Crisis
The changing use of contingent capital under the Basel III framework
  • Libertucci, M.
2010
Matching stability and performance: the impact of new regulations on financial intermediary management and performance
Countercyclical contingent capital (CCC): possible use and ideal design
  • De Martino, G., Libertucci, M., Marangoni, M. and Quagliariello, M.
2010
VoxEU
  • Libertucci, M., and Quagliariello, M.
2010
VoxEU
  • De Martino, G., Libertucci, M., Marangoni, M. and Quagliariello, M.
2010
Bank of Italy Occasional Papers
  • Cannata, F., Libertucci, M., Piersante, F. and Quagliariello, M.
2010
Bank of Italy Occasional Papers
  • De Martino, G., Libertucci, M., Marangoni, M. and Quagliariello, M.