Massimo Libertucci
Horizontal Line Supervision
- Division
Supervisory Policy
- Current Position
-
Senior Team Lead - Banking Supervision
- Fields of interest
-
Financial Economics,Law and Economics,Other Special Topics
- Education
- 2005
MSc in Economics, University of Warwick, United Kingdom
- Professional experience
- 2024-
Senior Team Lead, Supervisory Policy Division, DG Horizontal Line Supervision, European Central Bank (current position)
- 2020-2023
Team Lead, Supervisory Policy Division, DG Horizontal Line Supervision, European Central Bank
- 2019-2020
Principal Supervisor, Supervisory Policies Division, DG MS4, European Central Bank
- 2016-2019
Supervisor, Supervisory Policies Division, DG MS4, European Central Bank
- 2008-2016
Advisor, Regulation and Macroprudential Analysis Department, Banca d’Italia
- 2012
External work experience, Financial Stability Department, Deutsche Bundesbank
- 2007-2008
Expert, CONSOB (National Commission for Securities and Stock Exchange Market)
- 27 April 2026
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 387Details
- Abstract
- This paper describes and evaluates the European Union (EU) banking sector capital framework, focusing on how the international standards set by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision have been implemented within the EU. Using granular supervisory data for significant institutions under the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), we quantify the capital impact of EU-specific regulatory choices, supervisory measures and macroprudential policies. We show that most EU capital requirements stem from Basel standards, which encompass both prescriptive “Pillar 1” components and elements that are expected to be designed and calibrated at the jurisdictional level. The paper describes the evolution of capital ratios and requirements since the inception of the SSM and discusses the relationship between changes in capital levels and indicators of banking sector performance. To provide a comparative perspective, a model-based counterfactual exercise compares capital requirements of EU banks with those that would arise if EU banks were subject to the main prudential regulations that currently apply in the United States, which vary depending on the size of the bank. The results show that for the largest EU banks, the current US rules would entail stricter requirements, whereas mid-sized EU banks would be subject to less stringent requirements. Our findings show that EU capital requirements are broadly comparable to those in other jurisdictions and are largely in line with international standards. When assessing broader indicators of bank performance, we highlight the importance of considering not only private costs and benefits, but also intended effects and broader societal objectives. [...]
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
F36 : International Economics→International Finance→Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
- 2 May 2024
- THE ECB BLOGDetails
- JEL Code
- G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 3 March 2020
- FINANCIAL INTEGRATION AND STRUCTURE ARTICLEFinancial Integration and Structure in the Euro Area 2020Details
- Abstract
- Brexit will result in a substantial structural change to the EU’s financial architecture over the coming years. It could be particularly significant for derivatives clearing, investment banking activities and securities and derivatives trading as the reliance on service provision by UK financial firms is more pronounced in these areas and the provision of such services is currently linked to the EU passporting regime. At the same time, the precise overall impact of Brexit on the EU’s future financial architecture in general – and on these specific areas in particular – is difficult to predict at this stage, and may change over time. This special feature makes a first attempt at analysing some of the factors that may affect the EU’s financial architecture post-Brexit. It focuses on areas which currently show strong reliance on the UK and are of particular relevance for the ECB under its various mandates.
- 2024
- Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Working Papers
- 2015
- Rivista Bancaria
- 2012
- Bank of Italy Working Papers
- 2011
- Basel III and Beyond: a Guide to Banking Regulation after the CrisisThe changing use of contingent capital under the Basel III framework
- 2010
- Matching stability and performance: the impact of new regulations on financial intermediary management and performanceCountercyclical contingent capital (CCC): possible use and ideal design
- 2010
- VoxEU
- 2010
- VoxEU
- 2010
- Bank of Italy Occasional Papers
- 2010
- Bank of Italy Occasional Papers