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Irina Andone

12 April 2019
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2262
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Abstract
While the consequences and effectiveness of IMF conditionality have long been the focus of research, the possible negative impact of IMF conditionality on countries’ willingness to ask for an IMF programme – often termed ‘IMF stigma’ – has recently received attention particularly from policy circles. In this paper we investigate how countries' past experience with the IMF and their peers’ experience with the IMF affect their likelihood of entering a subsequent IMF arrangement. Our results indicate that, even when controlling for the success of past programmes, a country is less likely to approach the IMF for help if in the past it experienced an above-average number of disbursement-relevant conditions. We find hardly any impact of peers’ experience, except for Asian countries.
JEL Code
F33 : International Economics→International Finance→International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
F53 : International Economics→International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy→International Agreements and Observance, International Organizations
F55 : International Economics→International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy→International Institutional Arrangements
H87 : Public Economics→Miscellaneous Issues→International Fiscal Issues, International Public Goods