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Domov Mediji Pojasnjujemo Raziskave in publikacije Statistika Denarna politika Euro Plačila in trgi Zaposlitve
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Werner Studener

14 May 2010
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 111
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Abstract
This paper analyses the main drivers of the ECB
JEL Code
D21 : Microeconomics→Production and Organizations→Firm Behavior: Theory
D92 : Microeconomics→Intertemporal Choice→Intertemporal Firm Choice, Investment, Capacity, and Financing
E22 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Consumption, Saving, Production, Investment, Labor Markets, and Informal Economy→Capital, Investment, Capacity
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
Network
Eurosystem Monetary Transmission Network
27 May 2014
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 153
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Abstract
This paper analyses how accounting frameworks can affect three important areas of responsibility of many central banks, namely monetary policy, financial stability and banking supervision. The identified effects of accounting rules and accounting information on the activities of a central bank are manifold. First, the effectiveness of monetary policy crucially hinges on the financial independence of a central bank, which can be evidenced, inter alia, by its financial strength. Using a new simulation of the financial results of the European Central Bank (ECB), this paper shows that the reported annual profit and financial buffers of a central bank can be significantly affected by accounting, profit distribution and loss coverage rules. Second, in respect of financial stability, the accounting frameworks applied by commercial banks can not only affect their behaviour, but also that of financial markets. Indeed, there is evidence that accounting frameworks amplified pro-cyclicality during the recent crisis, and thus posed risks to the stability of the financial system. This being so, the accounting frameworks of credit institutions have obvious implications for central banks
JEL Code
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
M41 : Business Administration and Business Economics, Marketing, Accounting→Accounting and Auditing→Accounting
M48 : Business Administration and Business Economics, Marketing, Accounting→Accounting and Auditing→Government Policy and Regulation
5 April 2016
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 169
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Abstract
The issue of central bank profit distribution is both complex and often politically controversial. Based on the replies of 57 central banks worldwide to an ECB questionnaire, this paper analyses how profit distribution rules can affect the amounts distributed and the financial strength of central banks. The paper also investigates the link between profit distribution, accounting rules and financial strength. Research shows that central banks apply divergent rules as regards profit distribution and loss coverage. While they are not a measure of central bank performance, in the long run profits strengthen the credibility of central banks and contribute to their financial independence, whereas profit distribution rules that do not allow central banks to set up adequate reserves might have the opposite effect. The interaction of profit distribution rules and accounting rules also plays an important role in central banks achieving financial strength. Accounting frameworks can materially influence central banks
JEL Code
E37 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
M48 : Business Administration and Business Economics, Marketing, Accounting→Accounting and Auditing→Government Policy and Regulation