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Rodolfo Dall’Orto Mas

International & European Relations

Current Position

Senior Economist

Fields of interest

Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics,International Economics,Public Economics

Email

Rodolfo.DallOrto_Mas@ecb.europa.eu

Other current responsibilities
2017

Senior Board Operations Officer, International Monetary Fund

Education
2004-2005

MA in Fiscal Advisory and Taxation, CEF Centro de Estudios Financieros, Spain

2003

Specialist in Stock-Exchange Analysis and Portfolio Management, IEB Instituto de Estudios Bursátiles, Spain

1997-2001

BA in Economics, Universidad del Pacífico, Peru

Professional experience
2017

Senior Board Operations Officer - Operations Division, Secretary's Department, International Monetary Fund, United States of America

2015-2017

Desk economist for Brunei Darussalam, Asia and Pacific Department, International Monetary Fund, United States of America

2009-2017

Board Operations Officer - Operations Division, Secretary's Department, International Monetary Fund, United States of America

2012-2014

Desk economist for the Republic of Palau, Asia and Pacific Department, International Monetary Fund, United States of America

2005-2009

Head of Economic Research, Research Department, FocusEconomics, Spain

2002-2003

Chief of Economic Research, Asociación de Exportadores ADEX, Peru

Awards
2017

Capacity Development Technology Challenge (Third Place), International Monetary Fund

2013

Fundwide Award in Operational Excellence, International Monetary Fund

6 October 2020
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 248
Details
Abstract
This Occasional Paper analyses how significant expansions in central banks’ mandates, roles and instruments can result in challenges to the independence of monetary policy. The paper reviews, in particular, some of the key challenges to central bank independence brought about by the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007 and assesses their impact on the de jure and de facto independence of selected central banks around the world in the past few years. It finds that although the level of de jure (legal) central bank independence did not deteriorate, the level of de facto (actual) independence of the central banks of some of the largest economies in the world may have weakened. The paper presents counterarguments to the key critiques raised against central banks due to their policy response during the GFC, and concludes that the case for central bank independence is as strong as ever.
JEL Code
B1 : History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches→History of Economic Thought through 1925
B2 : History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches→History of Economic Thought since 1925
C4 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics
E3 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles
E4 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates
E5 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
E6 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
K3 : Law and Economics→Other Substantive Areas of Law
N1 : Economic History→Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics, Industrial Structure, Growth, Fluctuations
N2 : Economic History→Financial Markets and Institutions
2014
Country Report No. 14/111
Achieving long-term fiscal sustainability in Palau
  • Dall'Orto, R.
2009
Revista Punto de Equilibrio No. 101
  • Dall'Orto Mas, R.
2000
Revista Punto de Equilibrio No. 69
Hacia una nueva arquitectura financiera: no 1, 2, 3 Vietnam pero sí 1, 2, o más uniones monetarias
  • Lust, J., Loveday, J. and Dall'Orto Mas, R.