European Central Bank - eurosystem
Možnosti iskanja
Domov Mediji Pojasnjujemo Raziskave in publikacije Statistika Denarna politika Euro Plačila in trgi Zaposlitve
Predlogi
Razvrsti po
Ni na voljo v slovenščini.

Nicolò Fraccaroli

10 August 2022
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2705
Details
Abstract
Parliamentary hearings are a fundamental tool to hold independent central banks accountable. However, it is not clear what type of information central banks provide when they communicate with parliaments compared to other existing information channels. In this article, we address this question by comparing the communication of the European Central Bank (ECB) in parliamentary hearings to its communication in the regular press conferences that follow monetary policy decisions. Using text analysis on the ECB President’s introductory statements in parliamentary hearings and press conferences from 1998 to 2021, we show that the ECB uses parliamentary hearings to discuss topics that are less covered in press conferences. We also find that the ECB’s policy stance in the hearings tends to reflect the stance in press conferences, and that the degree of language complexity is similar in the two fora. These findings support the view that the ECB mainly uses parliamentary hearings to further explain policy decisions first presented at press conferences but also to put them in a broader context.
JEL Code
E02 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→General→Institutions and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
Network
Discussion papers
14 March 2022
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2655
Details
Abstract
We investigate whether ideology drives the sentiments of parliamentarians when they speak to the central bank they hold accountable. To this end, we collect textual data on the quarterly hearings of the ECB President before the European Parliament from 1999 to 2019. We apply sentiment analysis to more than 1,900 speeches of individual Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from 128 parties. We find robust evidence that MEPs’ sentiments toward the ECB are correlated with the ideological stance predominantly on a pro-/anti-European dimension rather than on a left-right dimension.
JEL Code
E02 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→General→Institutions and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
8 July 2020
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2442
Details
Abstract
As the role of central banks expanded, demand for public scrutiny of their actions increased. This paper investigates whether parliamentary hearings, the main tool to hold central banks accountable, are fit for this purpose. Using text analysis, it detects the topics and sentiments in parliamentary hearings of the Bank of England, the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve from 1999 to 2019. It shows that, while central bank objectives play the most relevant role in determining the topic, unemployment is negatively associated with the focus of hearings on price stability. Sentiments are more negative when uncertainty is higher and when inflation is more distant from the central bank’s inflation aim. These findings suggest that parliamentarians use hearings to scrutinise the performance of central banks in line with their objectives and economic developments, but also that uncertainty is associated with a higher perceived risk of under-performance of central banks.
JEL Code
E02 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→General→Institutions and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
9 August 2018
ECONOMIC BULLETIN - ARTICLE
Economic Bulletin Issue 5, 2018
Details
Abstract
This article examines the evolution of the ECB’s accountability practices during the financial crisis. After describing the challenges stemming from the crisis and changes resulting from the conferral of new supervisory tasks on the ECB, it provides evidence on how the strengthening of the ECB’s accountability has taken shape in the context of its relationship with the European Parliament in line with the latter’s key role as provided for in the Treaties. The ECB and the European Parliament, building on the accountability framework enshrined in primary law, have increased the frequency of their interactions, made innovations regarding the format and sharpened the focus of their exchanges, allowing increased scrutiny of the ECB’s policies. This has provided the ECB with more opportunities to explain its decisions and demonstrate that it is acting in accordance with its democratic mandate, which is a fundamental pillar of its legitimacy.
JEL Code
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies