Magyar nyelven nem elérhető
Claudio Bassi
Macro Prud Policy&Financial Stability
- Current Position
-
Financial Stability Analyst
- 16 May 2024
- FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - BOXFinancial stability risks from basis trades in the US Treasury and euro area government bond marketsFinancial Stability Review Issue 1, 2024Details
- Abstract
- Basis trades are arbitrage strategies which exploit mispricing between the spot price and the futures price of a given security. They improve market functioning but are also subject to funding and liquidity risks, especially when excessively leveraged. Hedge funds have built up leveraged exposures in the US Treasury market, giving rise to financial stability concerns. While risks are partly mitigated by already elevated margin requirements in the futures market, disruptions in the repo market could still force some entities to unwind their basis trades. Given the role of US Treasury bonds as global risk-free assets, dislocations resulting from widespread unwinding of basis trades could spill over into other jurisdictions and asset classes. Furthermore, a build-up of hedge fund exposures has also been observed in the euro area government bond market, but the size of basis trade activity seems contained.
- JEL Code
- G10 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→General
G11 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Portfolio Choice, Investment Decisions
G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates
G13 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Contingent Pricing, Futures Pricing
G15 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→International Financial Markets
- 2 May 2024
- THE ECB BLOGDetails
- JEL Code
- G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 27 February 2024
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 342Details
- Abstract
- The introduction of the Securities Financing Transactions Regulation into EU law provides a unique opportunity to obtain an in-depth understanding of repo markets. Based on the transaction-level data reported under the regulation, this paper presents an overview and key facts about the euro area repo market. We start by providing a description of the dataset, including its regulatory background, as well as highlighting some of its advantages for financial stability analysis. We then go on to present three sets of findings that are highly relevant to financial stability and focus on the dimensions of the different market segments, counterparties, and collateral, including haircut practices. Finally, we outline how the data reported under the regulation can support the policy work of central banks and supervisory authorities. We demonstrate that these data can be used to make several important contributions to enhancing our understanding of the repo market from a financial stability perspective, ultimately assisting international efforts to increase repo market resilience.
- JEL Code
- G10 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→General
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
- 3 February 2023
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2771Details
- Abstract
- This paper investigates both the magnitude and the drivers of bank window dressing behaviour in euro-denominated repo markets. Using a confidential transaction-level data set, our analysis illustrates that banks engineer an economically sizeable contraction in their repo transactions around regulatory reporting dates. We establish a causal link between these reductions and banks’ incentives to window dress and document the role of the leverage ratio and the G-SIB framework as the most relevant drivers of window dressing behaviour. Our findings suggest that regulatory action is warranted to limit banks’ ability to window dress.
- JEL Code
- C23 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Single Equation Models, Single Variables→Panel Data Models, Spatio-temporal Models
G14 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Information and Market Efficiency, Event Studies, Insider Trading
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation