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Lara Coulier
- 27 May 2026
- FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - ARTICLEFinancial Stability Review Issue 1, 2026Details
- Abstract
- Corporate bankruptcies in the euro area have been on the rise, but the aggregate asset quality of banks’ corporate lending has remained broadly stable. This special feature analyses this divergence and its implications for financial stability. It shows that rising bankruptcies may partly be explained by the normalisation of firm turnover since the COVID-19 pandemic, albeit with marked cross-country unevenness. At the same time, firm-level evidence suggests that balance sheet and profitability challenges are concentrated in a vulnerable tail of firms, but have remained stable for the average euro area company. Structural changes in corporate financing, including a declining reliance on bank loans and a larger role for equity, debt securities and non-bank lending, imply that a greater share of corporate risk might be outside the banking system. The analysis also shows that broadly stable aggregate asset quality reflects diverging trends in loan performance across countries and firm sizes, as well as banks’ proactive management of non-performing loans. Overall, it does not find any systematic evidence for banks delaying the recognition of non-performing loans in their loan books. Instead, the analysis indicates that weaker firm fundamentals result in a higher probability of bank exposures being reclassified from performing to non-performing.
- JEL Code
- E32 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Business Fluctuations, Cycles
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G32 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Capital and Ownership Structure, Value of Firms, Goodwill
G33 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Bankruptcy, Liquidation
- 3 November 2025
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 3140Details
- Abstract
- How do banks manage the behavioural maturity of non-maturing deposits (NMDs)? Using a rich and confidential dataset, we investigate how banks model deposit maturities based on internal assumptions. Although NMDs are contractually floating-rate liabilities with zero maturity, banks reallocate them across different maturity buckets using models that reflect past customer behaviour. Notably, only 20% of NMDs are treated as having zero maturity, while about 10% are assigned maturities beyond seven years. We assess whether these modelling assumptions align with banks’ deposit structures. Results show that banks with more volatile, interest rate-sensitive, and digitalised deposit bases tend to assign shorter maturities, appropriately reflecting underlying risks. However, during the recent monetary policy tightening, banks with more sensitive NMDs did not shorten assumed maturities or update models. These findings underscore the critical importance of timely and accurate calibration of NMD assumptions to support effective asset-liability management and preserve financial stability.
- JEL Code
- E51 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Money Supply, Credit, Money Multipliers
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 9 July 2024
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2950Details
- Abstract
- We match granular supervisory and credit register data to assess the implications of banks’ exposure to interest rate risk on the monetary policy transmission to bank lending supply in the euro area. We exploit the largest and swiftest increase in interest rates since the creation of the euro and find that banks with a higher exposure to interest rate risk, i.e., with a larger duration gap after accounting for hedging, curtailed corporate lending more than their peers. Ceteris paribus, greater interest rate risk entails closer supervisory scrutiny and potential capital surcharges in the short term, and lower expected profitability and capital accumulation in the medium to long term. We then proceed to dissect banks’ credit allocation and find that banks with higher net duration reshuffled their loan portfolio away from long-term loans in an attempt to limit the increase in interest rate risk and targetedtheir lending contraction to small and micro firms. Firms exposed to banks with a larger exposure to interest rate risk were unable to fully rebalance their borrowing needs with other lenders, thus experiencing a relatively larger decrease in total borrowing during the monetary tightening episode.
- JEL Code
- E51 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Money Supply, Credit, Money Multipliers
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 22 November 2023
- FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - ARTICLEFinancial Stability Review Issue 2, 2023Details
- Abstract
- This special feature builds on the concept of maturity gap as a metric of banks’ maturity mismatch to shed light on how banks’ engagement in maturity transformation differs across euro area countries and bank types. Banks can mitigate the interest rate risk stemming from their maturity mismatch by using derivatives for hedging purposes. Euro area banks increased their positions in interest rate derivatives over the last two years in anticipation of the start of monetary policy normalisation. Significant institutions rely more than cooperative and savings banks on interest rate derivatives and have a more diversified positioning. A box within the special feature finds that this greater reliance on derivatives was not sufficient to compensate for the material increase in interest rate risk. The extent of banks’ maturity mismatch determines the sensitivity of their net interest income to changes in interest rates and the slope of the yield curve. This special feature provides empirical evidence that the more banks engage in maturity transformation, the more their net interest margin benefits from a steepening of the yield curve, boosting bank profits. This effect might dissipate going forward, especially for banks in countries where variable-rate lending predominates.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G32 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Capital and Ownership Structure, Value of Firms, Goodwill