Muokkaa hakua
Pääsivu Media Oheistietoa Tutkimus ja julkaisut Tilastot Rahapolitiikka Euro Maksut ja markkinat Ura EKP:sssä
Hakuehdotuksia
Järjestä tulokset
Ei saatavilla suomeksi

Ieke van den Burg

23 July 2012
ADVISORY SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE REPORT - No. 1
Details
Abstract
The report discusses a variety of issues involving difficulties in the banking sector, with a view to ascertaining the appropriate institutional infrastructure in the context of the European Union and the euro area. Forbearance on the part of banks dealing with delinquent borrowers is problematic if it is designed as a way to game creditors and supervisors. Supervisors should not tolerate excessive forbearance; failure to intervene early tends to increase the costs of the crisis. Macro-prudential concerns should not induce the authorities to delay clean-ups of banks in difficulties. To minimise the macroeconomic fallout from banking problems and to reduce the temptation for authorities to delay and hide problems in banking, it is necessary to have a viable resolution regime that leaves room for authorities to reduce the systemic fallout from resolution. The Advisory Scientific Committee calls for the establishment of strong European bodies responsible for banking supervision and bank resolution. A European competence is necessary to ensure that cross-border concerns are given appropriate weight in supervision and resolution.
JEL Code
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
G33 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Bankruptcy, Liquidation
17 September 2013
ADVISORY SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE REPORT - No. 3
Details
Abstract
The European macro-prudential policy framework operates at two levels. First, the ESRB has a legal responsibility for macro-prudential oversight in the EU. Second, various national and EU authorities have responsibility for the implementation of macro-prudential policy. The creation of a European banking union is an important innovation within this two-level structure. In response to this innovation, this paper makes two key points. First, the ECB should be in charge of macro-prudential policies conferred by the Capital Requirements Regulation and Directive. Within the ECB, macro-prudential decisions should be taken entirely by the Governing Council, while micro-prudential decisions should be prepared by the Supervisory Board. Second, the ESRB remains the only EU-wide body in charge of macro-prudential supervision, responsible for all financial activities. The ESRB's effectiveness could be strengthened by creating a post of Managing Director, who would carry out the policy determined by the General Board and would be responsible to the General Board for the management of the ESRB.
JEL Code
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
2 June 2014
ADVISORY SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE REPORT - No. 4
Details
Abstract
Banking has grown too much in Europe - in three senses. First, the European banking system has reached a size where its contribution to real economic growth is likely to be nil or negative. Second, the European financial structure is biased towards banks (rather than securities markets), which results in excessively volatile credit creation and lower economic growth. Third, large universal banks - which perform a wide range of banking services, and are peculiarly common in Europe - contribute more to systemic risk than small and narrowly focused banks. To deal with these problems, policymakers should consider new measures such as aggressive anti-trust policy, structural reform of the banking sector, and a capital markets union to address Europe's overbanking problem.
JEL Code
G10 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→General
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General