Ei saatavilla suomeksi
- 14 March 2017
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2035Details
- We survey the emerging literature on safe assets. The recent evidence on a time-varying safety premium suggests a demand for safety quite distinct from liquidity and classic money demand, offering insight on a strong segmentation between safe savings and speculative investment markets. A related theoretical literature studies the private creation of (quasi) safe assets by intermediaries, shedding new light on bank intermediation and financial stability. Novel concepts such as maturity races, information sensitivity, risk-intolerant debt and induced runs reinforce the liquidity risk externality associated with banking, and have significant implications for research on credit cycles as well as for prudential policy.
- JEL Code
- E41 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Demand for Money
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 15 May 2019
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 93Details
- We analyze the strategic interaction between undercapitalized banks and a supervisor who may intervene by preventive recapitalization. Supervisory forbearance emerges because of a commitment problem, reinforced by fiscal costs and constrained capacity. Private incentives to comply are lower when supervisors have lower credibility, especially for highly levered banks. Less credible supervisors (facing higher cost of intervention) end up intervening more banks, yet producing higher forbearance and systemic costs of bank distress. Importantly, when public intervention capacity is constrained, private recapitalization decisions become strategic complements, leading to equilibria with extremely high forbearance and high systemic costs of bank failure.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation