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Alexander Jung

Monetary Policy

Division

Monetary Analysis

Current Position

Principal Economist

Fields of interest

Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics,International Economics,Financial Economics

Email

Alexander.Jung@ecb.int

Education
1990-1992

Ph.D. in Economics, University of St. Gallen, Switzerland

1989-1990

Advanced Studies Certificate in International Economic Policy Research, Institute of World Economics, Kiel, Germany

1984-1988

Master, Economics, University of Munich, Germany

1983-1984

Bachelor, Economics, University of Munich, Germany

Professional experience
1999-

European Central Bank, Frankfurt, Germany

1997-1998

European Monetary Institute, Frankfurt, Germany

1992-1997

Deutsche Bundesbank, Frankfurt, Germany

1991-1992

Swiss Institute for Foreign Economics, St. Gallen, Switzerland

22 January 2008
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 79
Details
Abstract
The ECB's monetary policy has received considerable attention in recent years. This is less the case, however, for its regular monetary policy preparation and decision-making process. This paper reviews how the factors usually considered as critical for the success of a central banking system and the federal nature of the Eurosystem are intertwined with its overall design and the functioning of its committee architecture. In particular, it examines the procedures for preparing monetary policy decisions and the role of the decision-making bodies and the committees therein. We suggest that technical committees, involving all national central banks (NCBs), usefully contribute to the regular processing of a vast amount of economic, financial and monetary data, as well as to the consensus building at the level of the Governing Council. A federal organisational structure, including a two-tier committee structure with the Executive Board taking the lead in preparing the monetary policy decisions and the Governing Council in charge of the decisions with collective responsibility for them, as well as committee work at the various hierarchical levels, contributes to the efficiency of the ECB's monetary policy decision-making, and thereby facilitates the maintenance of price stability in the euro area. A fully-fledged committee structure has also contributed to the smooth integration of non-euro area Member States into the Eurosystem's monetary policy decision-making process.
JEL Code
E42 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Monetary Systems, Standards, Regimes, Government and the Monetary System, Payment Systems
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
F33 : International Economics→International Finance→International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
F42 : International Economics→Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance→International Policy Coordination and Transmission
4 October 2011
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1383
Details
Abstract
This paper provides new empirical evidence on policy-makers
JEL Code
C23 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Single Equation Models, Single Variables→Panel Data Models, Spatio-temporal Models
D72 : Microeconomics→Analysis of Collective Decision-Making→Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D83 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty→Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge, Communication, Belief
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
26 August 2013
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1579
Details
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to examine whether Chairman Greenspan influenced the Reserve Bank Presidents. This question is interesting, because it has been argued that their preferences would be more persistent compared to those of the Governors. We estimate individual Taylor-type reaction functions for the Federal Reserve Districts using their voiced interest rate preferences during the policy go-around as well as real-time economic information on the inflation and unemployment gap. A bootstrap analysis exploits information contained in these reaction functions and constructs counterfactual distributions of disagreement among the Federal Reserve Districts, assuming the absence of factors that could have enforced consensus. We compare these simulated distributions with the observed disagreement during the committee deliberations and find empirical evidence in favour of coordination. This detected coordination helped to bring the preferences of the Federal Reserve Districts more in line with Chairman Greenspan
JEL Code
C15 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General→Statistical Simulation Methods: General
C53 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric Modeling→Forecasting and Prediction Methods, Simulation Methods
D72 : Microeconomics→Analysis of Collective Decision-Making→Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
18 February 2014
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1635
Details
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to assess whether the findings of Romer and Romer (2000) on the superiority of staff forecasts are still valid today. The paper uses both latest available econometric techniques as well as conventional tests. Several tests for forecast rationality show that a necessary condition for good forecast performance is satisfied both for Greenbook and private forecasts, as measured by the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). Tests for forecast accuracy and the encompassing test confirm the superiority of Greenbook forecasts for inflation and output using an extended sample (1968 to 2006). The relative forecast performance is, however, not robust in the presence of large macroeconomic shocks such as the Great Moderation and oil price shocks. Other econometric tests show that a relative better forecast performance by staff is observed when there is increased uncertainty. Staff
JEL Code
C53 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric Modeling→Forecasting and Prediction Methods, Simulation Methods
E37 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
10 September 2014
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1731
Details
Abstract
This paper examines whether the interest rate preferences of Federal Reserve Bank Presidents are subject to a regional bias. In order to evaluate the regional bias hypothesis, we augment individual Taylor rules for the Federal Reserve Bank Presidents (sample 1989 to 2006) with regional variables and test for their influence on the Presidents
JEL Code
C12 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General→Hypothesis Testing: General
C30 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models, Multiple Variables→General
D72 : Microeconomics→Analysis of Collective Decision-Making→Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
15 June 2015
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1808
Details
Abstract
This paper examines whether the minutes of the Bank of England
JEL Code
C34 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models, Multiple Variables→Truncated and Censored Models, Switching Regression Models
D78 : Microeconomics→Analysis of Collective Decision-Making→Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
1 July 2016
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1926
Details
Abstract
This paper examines whether monetary data releases by the European Central Bank (ECB) have provided markets with additional clues about the future course of its monetary policy. It conducts a novel econometric approach based on a combination of an Ordered Probit model explaining future policy rate changes (sample 2000 to 2014) and the Vuong test for model selection. Overall, our results suggest that information contained in press releases on monetary developments for the euro area has helped markets in forming their expectations on the next monetary policy decision.
JEL Code
C34 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models, Multiple Variables→Truncated and Censored Models, Switching Regression Models
D78 : Microeconomics→Analysis of Collective Decision-Making→Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
5 July 2016
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1929
Details
Abstract
The aim of the paper is to reassess the issue of money demand stability by estimating a portfolio demand approach for broad money M3 in the euro area covering the sample 1999 to 2013. The question is relevant, since in view of the massive shocks observed since the start of the financial crisis in 2007 relationships may have changed. Overall, the paper finds that the main components of euro area M3 are largely stable and can be explained by fundamental factors such as a transaction variable and opportunity costs. Nevertheless, the analysis detects some instabilities originating from the demand for currency in circulation linked to the euro cash changeover and for marketable instruments in an environment of very low interest rates.
JEL Code
C22 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Single Equation Models, Single Variables→Time-Series Models, Dynamic Quantile Regressions, Dynamic Treatment Effect Models &bull Diffusion Processes
C52 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric Modeling→Model Evaluation, Validation, and Selection
E41 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Demand for Money
14 September 2016
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1961
Details
Abstract
This paper examines whether the release of minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has provided markets with systematic clues about its future policy rates. We explain the future fed funds rate changes using Ordered Probit models (sample 1996 to 2008). We find that timely FOMC meeting minutes have provided assurance to markets about the most likely path of future interest rates. Though, their release did not cause markets to fundamentally revise their expectations on future policy decisions. The paper also discusses lessons from the Fed experience for the ECB and other central banks.
JEL Code
C34 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models, Multiple Variables→Truncated and Censored Models, Switching Regression Models
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
31 July 2019
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2303
Details
Abstract
Based on high frequency identification and other econometric tools, we find that monetary policy shocks had a significant impact on the health of euro area banks. Information effects, which made the private sector more pessimistic about future prospects of the economy and the profitability of the banking sector, were strongly present in the post-crisis period. We show that ECB communications at the press conference were crucial for the market response and that bank health benefitted from surprises, which steepened the yield curve. We find that the effects of monetary policy shocks on banks displayed some persistence. Other bank characteristics, in particular bank size, leverage and NPL ratios, amplified the impact of monetary policy shocks on banks. After the OMT announcement, we detect that the response of bank stocks to monetary policy shocks normalised. We discover that, in the post-crisis episode, Fed monetary policy shocks influenced euro area bank stock valuations.
JEL Code
E40 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→General
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
G14 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Information and Market Efficiency, Event Studies, Insider Trading
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
Network
Research Task Force (RTF)
17 July 2020
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2443
Details
Abstract
Based on ordered Probit models and twenty years of euro area data, we estimate empirical reaction functions for the ECB´s monetary policy and augment them with communication indicators. First, we find that the ECB responded to risks to price stability in line with its primary objective, and that the account of post-meeting communications about risks to price stability and to growth significantly enhances the modelling of its reaction function. Second, we detect that the ECB also responded to the evolution of the federal funds rate, thereby confirming the importance of international interest rate linkages or the global cycle that it reflects. Third, while confirming Gerlach’s (2007) finding on the relevance of M3 growth for explaining future interest rate changes, we show that this result only holds for the period before the global financial crisis.
JEL Code
E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
C22 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Single Equation Models, Single Variables→Time-Series Models, Dynamic Quantile Regressions, Dynamic Treatment Effect Models &bull Diffusion Processes
C25 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Single Equation Models, Single Variables→Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models, Discrete Regressors, Proportions
10 May 2021
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2547
Details
Abstract
This paper examines whether central bank communication stabilises euro area inflation expectations through the information and news channel. A novelty of the study is its use of data from Google Analytics on ECB website traffic as proxy for visitors’ attention to its communication. We conduct several econometric tests with daily data to measure the impact of ECB communication on the information demand of the public and ultimately on inflation expectations. Overall, this study shows that website attention, as captured by search volumes of visitors, influences euro area inflation expectations. We find that increased website attention contributes to narrowing the gap between market-based forecasts and (the mean of) longer-term professional inflation expectations. Our findings add to the theoretical evidence on the existence of an information and news channel.
JEL Code
C20 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Single Equation Models, Single Variables→General
D80 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty→General
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G14 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Information and Market Efficiency, Event Studies, Insider Trading
2021
European Journal of Political Economy
  • Philippine Cour-Thimann, Alexander Jung
2021
Scottish Journal of Political Economy
  • Alexander Jung, Patrick Kuehl
2020
International Review of Economics & Finance
  • Alexander Jung
2020
The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance
  • Alexander Jung, Hector Carcel Villanova
2018
The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance
  • Alexander Jung
2018
Scottish Journal of Political Economy
  • Alexander Jung
2017
The North American Journal of Economics and Finance
  • Alexander Jung
2016
Banks and Bank Systems
  • Alexander Jung, Francesco Mongelli
2016
The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance
  • Alexander Jung
2016
International Journal of Forecasting
  • Makram El-Shagi, Sebastian Giesen, Alexander Jung
2016
Journal of Macroeconomics
  • Alexander Jung
2015
European Journal of Political Economy
  • Alexander Jung, Sophia Latsos
2015
Journal of Macroeconomics
  • Makram El-Shagi, Alexander Jung
2015
Economics Bulletin
  • Alexander Jung
2015
European Journal of Political Economy
  • Makram El-Shagi, Alexander Jung
2013
International Journal of Central Banking
  • Alexander Jung
2012
European Journal of Political Economy
  • Alexander Jung, Gergely Kiss
2012
CESifo DICE Report
  • Juergen Stark, Alexander Jung, Francesco Mongelli
2010
Journal of Common Market Studies
  • Alexander Jung, Francesco Mongelli, Philippe Moutot
2002
Revue D'Economie Financiere
  • Philippe Moutot, Alexander Jung
2000
Review of World Economics
  • Alessandro Calza, Alexander Jung, Livio Stracca
1996
Intereconomics
  • Alexander Jung
1990
Review of World Economics
  • Alexander Jung, Volker Wieland
1992
Verlag Ruegger
European Monetary Systems
  • Alexander Jung