Għażliet għat-Tiftix
Home Midja Spjegazzjonijiet Riċerka u Pubblikazzjonijiet Statistika Politika monetarja L-euro Pagamenti u swieq Karrieri
Suġġerimenti
Issortja skont
Mhux disponibbli bil-Malti

Alessandro Scopelliti

22 May 2019
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2284
Details
Abstract
Prior to the financial crisis, prudential regulation in the EU was implemented non-uniformly across countries, as options and discretions allowed national authorities to apply a more favorable regulatory treatment. We exploit the national implementation of the CRD and derive a country measure of regulatory flexibility (for all banks in a country) and of supervisory discretion (on a case-by-case basis). Overall, we find that banks established in countries with a less stringent prudential framework were more likely to require public support during the crisis. We instrument some characteristics of bank balance sheets with these prudential indicators to investigate how they affect bank resilience. The share of non-interest income explained by the prudential environment is always associated with an increase in the likelihood of financial distress during the crisis. Prudential frameworks also explain banks’ liquidity buffers even in absence of a specific liquidity regulation, which points to possible spillovers across regulatory instruments.
JEL Code
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
Network
Research Task Force (RTF)
23 May 2019
RESEARCH BULLETIN - No. 58
Details
Abstract
What role does prudential regulation play in the prevention of banking crises? Before the financial crisis there were important national differences in the implementation of the EU framework for capital regulation. This article suggests that these differences had important implications for the resilience of banks during the crisis and that, generally, banks that were subject to less stringent prudential regulation before the crisis were more likely to require some form of public support when the crisis came.
JEL Code
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
Network
Research Task Force (RTF)
18 December 2020
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2508
Details
Abstract
We study the effects of the diversification of funding sources on the financing conditions for firms. We exploit a regulatory reform which took place in Italy in 2012, i.e., the introduction of “minibonds”, which opened a new market-based funding opportunity for unlisted firms. Using the Italian Credit Register, we investigate the impact of minibond issuance on bank credit conditions for issuer firms, both at the firm-bank and firm level. We compare new loans granted to issuer firms with new loans concurrently granted to similar non-issuer firms. We find that issuer firms obtain lower interest rates on bank loans of the same maturity than non-issuer firms, suggesting an improvement in their bargaining power with banks. In addition, issuer firms reduce the amount of used bank credit but increase the overall amount of available external funds, pointing to a substitution with bank credit and to a diversification of corporate funding sources. Studying their ex-post performance, we find that issuer firms expand their total assets and fixed assets, and also raise their leverage.
JEL Code
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G32 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Capital and Ownership Structure, Value of Firms, Goodwill
G38 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Government Policy and Regulation