European Central Bank - eurosystem
Search Options
Home Publication Explainers Statistics Payments Career Monetary Policy
Suggestions
Sort by
Níl an t-ábhar seo ar fáil i nGaeilge.

Sujit Chakravorti

30 December 2009
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1137
Details
Abstract
We study the effect of government encouraged or mandated interchange fee ceilings on consumer and merchant adoption and usage of payment cards in an economy where card acceptance is far from complete. We believe that we are the first to use bank-level data to study the impact of interchange fee regulation. We find that consumer and merchant welfare improved because of increased consumer and merchant adoption leading to greater usage of payment cards. We also find that bank revenues increased when interchange fees were reduced although these results are critically dependent on merchant acceptance being far from complete at the beginning and during the implementation of interchange fee ceilings. In addition, there is most likely a threshold interchange fee below which social welfare decreases although our data currently does not allow us to quantify it.
JEL Code
L11 : Industrial Organization→Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance→Production, Pricing, and Market Structure, Size Distribution of Firms
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
D53 : Microeconomics→General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium→Financial Markets
Network
Retail payments: integration & innovation