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23 July 2012
ADVISORY SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE REPORT - No. 1
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Abstract
The report discusses a variety of issues involving difficulties in the banking sector, with a view to ascertaining the appropriate institutional infrastructure in the context of the European Union and the euro area. Forbearance on the part of banks dealing with delinquent borrowers is problematic if it is designed as a way to game creditors and supervisors. Supervisors should not tolerate excessive forbearance; failure to intervene early tends to increase the costs of the crisis. Macro-prudential concerns should not induce the authorities to delay clean-ups of banks in difficulties. To minimise the macroeconomic fallout from banking problems and to reduce the temptation for authorities to delay and hide problems in banking, it is necessary to have a viable resolution regime that leaves room for authorities to reduce the systemic fallout from resolution. The Advisory Scientific Committee calls for the establishment of strong European bodies responsible for banking supervision and bank resolution. A European competence is necessary to ensure that cross-border concerns are given appropriate weight in supervision and resolution.
JEL Code
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
G33 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Bankruptcy, Liquidation
4 October 2012
ADVISORY SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE REPORT - No. 2
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Abstract
A European banking union is necessary to ensure the stability of the European financial system. This paper assesses the EU Commission's proposals for legislation to create a banking union in Europe. The EU Commission's proposal for a regulation creating a single supervisory mechanism is strongly supported. At the same time, a European resolution authority is essential for the credibility of the single supervisory mechanism.
JEL Code
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
17 September 2013
ADVISORY SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE REPORT - No. 3
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Abstract
The European macro-prudential policy framework operates at two levels. First, the ESRB has a legal responsibility for macro-prudential oversight in the EU. Second, various national and EU authorities have responsibility for the implementation of macro-prudential policy. The creation of a European banking union is an important innovation within this two-level structure. In response to this innovation, this paper makes two key points. First, the ECB should be in charge of macro-prudential policies conferred by the Capital Requirements Regulation and Directive. Within the ECB, macro-prudential decisions should be taken entirely by the Governing Council, while micro-prudential decisions should be prepared by the Supervisory Board. Second, the ESRB remains the only EU-wide body in charge of macro-prudential supervision, responsible for all financial activities. The ESRB's effectiveness could be strengthened by creating a post of Managing Director, who would carry out the policy determined by the General Board and would be responsible to the General Board for the management of the ESRB.
JEL Code
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
2 June 2014
ADVISORY SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE REPORT - No. 4
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Abstract
Banking has grown too much in Europe - in three senses. First, the European banking system has reached a size where its contribution to real economic growth is likely to be nil or negative. Second, the European financial structure is biased towards banks (rather than securities markets), which results in excessively volatile credit creation and lower economic growth. Third, large universal banks - which perform a wide range of banking services, and are peculiarly common in Europe - contribute more to systemic risk than small and narrowly focused banks. To deal with these problems, policymakers should consider new measures such as aggressive anti-trust policy, structural reform of the banking sector, and a capital markets union to address Europe's overbanking problem.
JEL Code
G10 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→General
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
5 November 2014
ADVISORY SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE REPORT - No. 5
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Abstract
Monetary, macro-prudential and micro-prudential policies are intimately linked. The macroprudential authority should be allocated to the body where the overall balance of synergies (between policy objectives) over conflicts and the required expertise are the largest. This report reviews the pros and cons of the four institutional models for the allocation of macro-prudential powers: (1) the government, (2) the central bank, (3) the financial authority and (4) a committee with representatives from these three bodies.
JEL Code
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
28 May 2015
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1797
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Abstract
Europe
JEL Code
G1 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets
G2 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services
11 February 2016
ADVISORY SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE REPORT - No. 6
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Abstract
Keeping global warming below 2°C will require substantial reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions over the next few decades. To reduce emissions, economies must reduce their carbon intensity; given current technology, this implies a decisive shift away from fossil-fuel energy and related physical capital. In an adverse scenario, the transition to a low-carbon economy occurs late and abruptly. Belated awareness about the importance of controlling emissions could result in an abrupt implementation of quantity constraints on the use of carbon-intensive energy sources. The costs of the transition will be correspondingly higher. This adverse scenario could affect systemic risk via three main channels. First, a sudden transition away from fossil-fuel energy could harm GDP, as alternative sources of energy would be restricted in supply and more expensive at the margin. Second, there could be a sudden repricing of carbon-intensive assets, which are financed in large part by debt. Third, there could be a concomitant rise in the incidence of natural catastrophes related to climate change, raising general insurers' and reinsurers' liabilities. To quantify the importance of these channels, policymakers could aim for enhanced disclosure of the carbon intensity of non-financial firms. The related exposures of financial firms could then be stress-tested under the adverse scenario of a late and sudden transition. In the short-term, joint research efforts of energy experts and macroeconomists could help to better quantify macroeconomic risks and inform the design of scenarios for stress testing. In the medium-term, the availability of granular data and dedicated low-frequency stress tests will provide information about the impact of the adverse scenario on the financial system.
JEL Code
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
2 May 2016
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 11
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Abstract
Using novel monthly data for 226 euro-area banks from 2007 to 2015, we investigate the causes and effects of banks’ sovereign exposures during and after the euro crisis. First, in the vulnerable countries, the publicly owned, recently bailed out and less strongly capitalized banks reacted to sovereign stress by increasing their domestic sovereign holdings more than other banks, suggesting that their choices were affected both by moral suasion and by yield-seeking. Second, their exposures significantly amplified the transmission of risk from the sovereign and its impact on lending. This amplification of the impact on lending cannot be ascribed to spurious correlation or reverse causality.
JEL Code
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
F30 : International Economics→International Finance→General
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
H63 : Public Economics→National Budget, Deficit, and Debt→Debt, Debt Management, Sovereign Debt
19 September 2016
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 21
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Abstract
The euro crisis was fueled by the diabolic loop between sovereign risk and bank risk, coupled with cross-border flight-to-safety capital flows. European Safe Bonds (ESBies), a union-wide safe asset without joint liability, would help to resolve these problems. We make three contributions. First, numerical simulations show that ESBies would be at least as safe as German bunds and approximately double the supply of euro safe assets when protected by a 30%-thick junior tranche. Second, a model shows how, when and why the two features of ESBies—diversification and seniority—can weaken the diabolic loop and its diffusion across countries. Third, we propose a step-by-step guide on how to create ESBies, starting with limited issuance by public or private-sector entities.
JEL Code
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
4 October 2016
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1969
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Abstract
Using novel monthly data for 226 euro-area banks from 2007 to 2015, we investigate the determinants of changes in banks
JEL Code
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
F3 : International Economics→International Finance
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
H63 : Public Economics→National Budget, Deficit, and Debt→Debt, Debt Management, Sovereign Debt
16 January 2018
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 64
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Abstract
In both the subprime crisis and the eurozone crisis, regulators imposed bans on short sales, aimed mainly at preventing stock price turbulence from destabilizing financial institutions. Contrary to the regulators’ intentions, financial institutions whose stocks were banned experienced greater increases in the probability of default and volatility than unbanned ones, and these increases were larger for more vulnerable financial institutions. To take into account the endogeneity of short sales bans, we match banned financial institutions with unbanned ones of similar size and riskiness, and instrument the 2011 ban decisions with regulators’ propensity to impose a ban in the 2008 crisis.
JEL Code
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates
G14 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Information and Market Efficiency, Event Studies, Insider Trading
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
17 June 2019
ADVISORY SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE REPORT - No. 9
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Abstract
Exchange-traded funds (ETFs) are hybrid investment vehicles that track an index or a basket of assets, combine features of open-end and closed-end mutual funds, and are continuously traded on liquid markets. They are one of the most popular financial innovations in recent decades: ETFs have grown greatly in size, diversity, scope, complexity and market significance. Drawing on the growing literature in this area, this report assesses possible channels through which ETFs may affect systemic risk. The increasing availability of ETFs can affect investors’ behaviour, by allowing them to pursue new strategies to seek return, manage risk and access new asset classes. Such changes in investors’ behaviour may in turn impact the functioning of financial markets, particularly in times of market stress. Empirical research has so far identified three effects.
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