Digital euro
The Eurosystem is preparing for the potential issuance of a digital euro to complement physical cash.
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN
13 April 2026
A digital shift in EU capital markets
Our latest Macroprudential Bulletin shows how new, digital ways of issuing and trading financial assets could make EU capital markets more efficient and accessible. It also explains how policies need to adapt to keep markets safe and resilient.
Read the latest issue
THE ECB BLOG
13 April 2026
Why monetary policy hits harder after big shocks
During the latest tightening episode, interest rate hikes were especially effective. This ECB Blog finds a strong policy transmission to inflation during 2022 and 2023, a forceful response to supply-driven shocks and a low “sacrifice ratio”.
Read The ECB Blog
EVENT
10 April 2026
Media seminar: apply by 8 May!
Our next media seminar takes place on 11-12 June. The seminar will allow you to discuss topics related to monetary policy, the economic outlook, banking supervision and payments – including banknotes and the digital euro – off the record and meet policymakers at the ECB.
Register by 8 May- 9 April 2026
- WEEKLY FINANCIAL STATEMENTEnglishOTHER LANGUAGES (22) +Annexes
- 9 April 2026
- WEEKLY FINANCIAL STATEMENT - COMMENTARY
- 9 April 2026
- EURO AREA ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENTS BY INSTITUTIONAL SECTOR (EARLY)
- 9 April 2026
- BALANCE OF PAYMENTS (QUARTERLY)
- 1 April 2026
- MFI INTEREST RATE STATISTICS
- 31 March 2026
- WEEKLY FINANCIAL STATEMENTEnglishOTHER LANGUAGES (22) +Annexes
- 31 March 2026
- WEEKLY FINANCIAL STATEMENT - COMMENTARY
- 1 April 2026
- Public lecture by Piero Cipollone, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at an event hosted by the Stockholm School of Economics in Riga and Latvijas Banka
- 27 March 2026
- Slides by Isabel Schnabel, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at Department of Economics at University of Zurich in Zurich, Switzerland
- 26 March 2026
- Speech by Luis de Guindos, Vice-President of the ECB, at the Ragnar Nurkse Memorial Lecture organised by Eesti Pank
- 25 March 2026
- Slides by Philip R. Lane, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at The ECB and Its Watchers XXVI, in Frankfurt, Germany
- 25 March 2026
- Keynote speech by Christine Lagarde, President of the ECB, at “The ECB and Its Watchers” conference organised by the Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability at Goethe University Frankfurt
- 23 March 2026
- Interview with Luis de Guindos, Vice-President of the ECB, conducted by Carlos Segovia on 20 March 2026
- 8 March 2026
- Interview with Christine Lagarde, President of the ECB, conducted by Benedetta Poletti on 12 February 2026
- 3 March 2026
- Interview with Philip R. Lane, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, conducted by Olaf Storbeck on 26 February 2026
- 21 February 2026
- Interview with Christine Lagarde, President of the ECB, conducted by Emma Tucker, Chelsey Dulaney, Greg Ip, Nick Timiraos, Daniel Colarusso and Amol Sharma on 19 February 2026
- 19 February 2026
- Interview with Frank Elderson, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB and Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board of the ECB, conducted by Laura Noonan and Nick Comfort on 17 February 2026
- 13 April 2026
- During the latest tightening episode, interest rate hikes were especially effective. This ECB Blog finds a strong policy transmission to inflation during 2022 and 2023, a forceful response to supply-driven shocks and a low “sacrifice ratio”.Details
- JEL Code
- E50 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→General
E31 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Price Level, Inflation, Deflation
- 9 April 2026
- Many Bulgarians feared large price increases when the euro replaced the lev. However, preliminary evidence shows that the changeover in Bulgaria has so far had a limited impact on consumer prices and on perceptions of inflation.Details
- JEL Code
- E31 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Price Level, Inflation, Deflation
E42 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Monetary Systems, Standards, Regimes, Government and the Monetary System, Payment Systems
Related - 7 April 2026
- Europe’s energy dependence increasingly complicates the task of maintaining price stability. Meeting the continent’s clean‑energy targets would weaken the link between volatile global markets and domestic prices. Crucially, the tools to make this transition are already within reach.Details
- JEL Code
- E50 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→General
Q40 : Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics, Environmental and Ecological Economics→Energy→General
Q50 : Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics, Environmental and Ecological Economics→Environmental Economics→General
- 2 April 2026
- As the Eurosystem normalises its balance sheet, central bank reserves – banks’ most liquid asset – keep declining. This post examines how banks adapt to lower levels of reserves and explains why take-up in the Eurosystem’s standard refinancing operations is expected to increase.Details
- JEL Code
- E50 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→General
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 31 March 2026
- Inflation expectations are crucial for monetary policy as they shape economic decisions and feed through to inflation. While expectation surveys provide insights, they come with blind spots. We use a model to transform infrequent survey data into a dense grid of expectations.Details
- JEL Code
- C53 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric Modeling→Forecasting and Prediction Methods, Simulation Methods
E50 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→General
- 13 April 2026
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 3218Details
- Abstract
- Policymakers often cite the risk that inflation expectations might “de-anchor” as a key reason for responding forcefully to inflationary shocks. We develop a model to analyze this trade-off and to quantify the benefits of stable long-run inflation expectations. In our framework, households and firms are imperfectly informed about the central bank’s objective and learn from its policy choices. Recognizing this interaction, the central bank raises interest rates more aggressively after adverse supply shocks and accepts short-run output costs to secure more stable inflation expectations. The strength of this reputation channel depends on how sensitive long-run inflation expectations are to surprises in interest rates. Using high-frequency identification, we estimate these elasticities for emerging and advanced economies and find large negative values for Brazil. We fit our model to these findings and use it to quantify how reputation building motives affect monetary policy decisions, and the role of central bank’s credibility in promoting macroeconomic stability.
- JEL Code
- E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
- 13 April 2026
- MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 33Details
- Abstract
- Stablecoins denominated in US dollars have attracted considerable attention in the context of their growing influence in US Treasury markets. However, the potential effects of euro-denominated stablecoins on euro area sovereign debt markets have been less explored, partly owing to their currently limited market presence. This article explores how the growth of euro-denominated stablecoins could affect demand for euro area sovereign bonds. By determining the pass-through rate of stablecoin demand to sovereign bond holdings by way of several illustrative examples, we demonstrate how the effect varies based on whether stablecoins are issued by banks or e-money institutions (EMIs), on the composition of stablecoin reserve assets, and on the liquidity management preferences of banks and EMIs. Moreover, the net effect hinges on the sectoral origins of stablecoin inflows, which vary according to what stablecoins are, and will be, used for. We also argue that on the one hand, the deposit requirement for EMIs set out in the European Union’s Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCAR) can act as a liquidity buffer during periods of stress, reducing the likelihood of immediate sales of other reserve assets, on the other hand it could also transmit stress arising from a stablecoin run to the banking system.
- JEL Code
- E42 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Monetary Systems, Standards, Regimes, Government and the Monetary System, Payment Systems
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 13 April 2026
- MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 33Details
- Abstract
- The market for tokenised money market funds (TMMFs) – money market funds (MMFs) whose shares are issued as tokens on distributed ledgers – remains small but is expanding rapidly. This article explores the specific design features of TMMFs, including the tokenisation of their underlying assets, liabilities and operational processes. It analyses key economic differences between TMMFs and traditional MMFs, with a particular focus on their implications for financial stability. Tokenisation has the potential to enhance efficiency by enabling faster settlement together with near-24/7 availability and programmability, while unlocking new use cases, such as employing TMMF tokens as collateral. However, TMMFs could also amplify risks related to liquidity mismatches and operational fragilities. A dedicated box in this article compares TMMFs with stablecoins, assessing their financial stability implications and interlinkages. Ultimately, the net financial stability impact of TMMFs will depend on how the market evolves, how it will affect prevailing business models and how it will integrate and interact with traditional financial markets.
- JEL Code
- G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
G32 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Capital and Ownership Structure, Value of Firms, Goodwill
O33 : Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth→Technological Change, Research and Development, Intellectual Property Rights→Technological Change: Choices and Consequences, Diffusion Processes
- 13 April 2026
- MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 33Details
- Abstract
- This article describes the current landscape of tokenised assets, illustrating the potential benefits across the entire asset value chain – from issuance to distribution and sales. As the Eurosystem is working towards enabling the settlement of distributed ledger technology (DLT) transactions using central bank money with a pilot by the end of the third quarter of 2026, we examine key enablers and barriers to unlocking the benefits of tokenisation for a digital capital market in Europe while safeguarding financial stability. These include the need for on-chain secondary market liquidity to enable scaling, as well as adaptations and harmonisation of the regulatory framework. Based on these findings, this article highlights how tokenisation, if it scales more widely, could contribute to the savings and investments union (SIU) agenda in two major ways. First, it offers an opportunity to create a European digital asset ecosystem from the early stages, in contrast to the fragmented market for traditional financial instruments, which developed from national markets. Second, it has the potential to improve market liquidity and efficiency, which can ultimately increase the scalability and development of capital markets in Europe. In turn, this could facilitate a more efficient allocation of capital within the economy. Lastly, developing a DLT ecosystem relying on European governance and based on assets denominated in euro is essential to maintaining monetary sovereignty and strategic autonomy. Finally, this article discusses the role of public authorities – including central banks, in providing the conditions for innovation to develop in a safe and resilient manner.
- JEL Code
- F36 : International Economics→International Finance→Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
G10 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→General
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
O33 : Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth→Technological Change, Research and Development, Intellectual Property Rights→Technological Change: Choices and Consequences, Diffusion Processes
- 13 April 2026
- MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 33Details
- Abstract
- Tokenisation holds the promise to automate the issuance process for bonds, reduce settlement times and enable more efficient and cheaper processes for conducting transactions. Given the transformative potential of tokenisation and distributed ledger technology (DLT) for capital markets and for the savings and investments union, this article investigates empirically whether the tokenisation of bonds – while still at an early stage – improves bond issuance efficiency and market liquidity. The tokenised bond market is currently still small but has seen an uptick in issuance over the past two years. To overcome the challenge presented by the limited availability of data on tokenisation, we construct a unique dataset for our analysis, primarily composed of financial and non-financial corporate bonds issued predominantly in Europe. Employing a matching procedure at the issuer-bond level, we ensure that tokenised and conventional bonds are comparable before assessing whether tokenisation has the potential to boost issuance efficiency, for example by automating processes, and to improve market liquidity by lowering entry and transaction barriers. We find that tokenised bonds reduce borrowing costs and improve market liquidity, but with no visible reduction in operational costs (all relative to the group of matched conventional bonds). Given that the market is still in its infancy, our results indicate that there may be greater benefits as the market grows. However, the future impact of tokenisation and the realisation of its potential benefits in terms of efficiency and liquidity will hinge on the underlying infrastructure and the possibility for the market to scale. Central banks initiatives – such as the Eurosystem’s explorations on the acceptance of DLT-based collateral and initiatives to improve and modernise market infrastructures - serve as key enablers that could support a scaling up of the market.
- JEL Code
- G10 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→General
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
G32 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Capital and Ownership Structure, Value of Firms, Goodwill
O33 : Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth→Technological Change, Research and Development, Intellectual Property Rights→Technological Change: Choices and Consequences, Diffusion Processes
- 13 April 2026
- MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 33Details
- Abstract
- This overview of the [33rd] Macroprudential Bulletin explores how the different articles in this issue speak to the opportunities and challenges presented by Europe’s rapidly evolving digital financial ecosystem. In particular, the overview explains how tokenisation – and DLT more specifically – can support deeper, more integrated and more efficient EU capital markets, noting that its benefits will only be realised safely if European policy action keeps pace in key areas.
- JEL Code
- F36 : International Economics→International Finance→Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
G10 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→General
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
O33 : Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth→Technological Change, Research and Development, Intellectual Property Rights→Technological Change: Choices and Consequences, Diffusion Processes
- 13 April 2026
- SURVEY OF MONETARY ANALYSTS
- 10 April 2026
- LEGAL ACT
- 10 April 2026
- THE EXCHANGE OF BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT POSITION STATISTICS – BPM6 - BOOKLETAnnexes
- 10 April 2026
- THE EXCHANGE OF BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT POSITION STATISTICS – BPM6 - BOOKLET
- 10 April 2026
- THE EXCHANGE OF BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT POSITION STATISTICS – BPM6 - BOOKLET
- 10 April 2026
- THE EXCHANGE OF BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT POSITION STATISTICS – BPM6 - BOOKLET
- 9 April 2026
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 3217Details
- Abstract
- We revisit the credit channel of monetary policy when firms face multiple financing constraints, a common feature of corporate financing we document empirically. Our theory shows that the multiplicity of constraints dampens the transmission of expansionary policy to firm borrowing and investment notably but amplifies the transmission of policy tightening. This asymmetry arises because, when policy tightens (eases), the most (least) responsive constraint binds. Using U.S. firm-level data and exploiting a quasi-natural experiment, we find strong support for these predictions and for our proposed channel. Embedding the mechanism into a New Keynesian framework, we find that the drop in investment after contractionary shocks is twice as large as its increase following equally-sized expansionary shocks, thus providing an explanation for why monetary policy tightenings have stronger effects than easings, a longstanding puzzle in monetary economics. Moreover, our analysis implies that the effectiveness of monetary policy is strongly determined by the distribution of financial constraints across firms and that similar asymmetries likely characterize the transmission of other macroeconomic shocks.
- JEL Code
- D22 : Microeconomics→Production and Organizations→Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
D25 : Microeconomics→Production and Organizations
E22 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Consumption, Saving, Production, Investment, Labor Markets, and Informal Economy→Capital, Investment, Capacity
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy - Network
- Challenges for Monetary Policy Transmission in a Changing World Network (ChaMP)
- 9 April 2026
- OTHER PUBLICATION
- 8 April 2026
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 3216Details
- Abstract
- We use a comprehensive Swedish credit register to document that firms across the size distribution have access to substantial borrowing capacity via credit lines. However, most firms choose not to use all available credit, even though interest rates are low compared to their return on equity. The low utilization of credit is consistent with a theoretical model in which utilization rates decrease with both real and financial uncertainty. We estimate the model structurally at the firm level and find that financial uncertainty driven by liquidity shocks is much more important than real uncertainty driven by cash flow shocks for explaining the low utilization of credit.
- JEL Code
- D22 : Microeconomics→Production and Organizations→Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G32 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Capital and Ownership Structure, Value of Firms, Goodwill
- 7 April 2026
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 3215Details
- Abstract
- Using a survey of 39,507 adults in 17 euro-area countries, I find that crypto-asset owners and the niche subgroup of payers have distinct profiles. Owners – typically younger, male, and financially active – exhibit mixed preferences, valuing both cash-like privacy and card-like speed. Crypto payers display a cash-centric profile, seeking to replicate physical cash’s privacy and ease of use in digital form. While standard specifications show that holding cash reserves is positively associated with owning crypto – challenging the view that early adopters reject cash –, a multiple-instrument IV strategy exploiting pandemic-related payment shocks reveals a causal sign reversal: for compliers, building precautionary cash buffers reduces the probability of crypto ownership under uncertainty. These findings (1) explain the ownership-payment wedge as driven by user profiles beyond merchant-acceptance frictions, (2) show crypto and cash act as portfolio complements but substitutes under stress, and (3) may inform crypto regulation and CBDC design.
- JEL Code
- E41 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Demand for Money
E42 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Monetary Systems, Standards, Regimes, Government and the Monetary System, Payment Systems
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G11 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Portfolio Choice, Investment Decisions
O33 : Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth→Technological Change, Research and Development, Intellectual Property Rights→Technological Change: Choices and Consequences, Diffusion Processes
- 7 April 2026
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 385Details
- Abstract
- This article provides a novel insight into whether earnings manipulation signals are reflected in banks’ internal credit risk estimates, as measured by the probability of default (PD) estimates, and whether such manipulation has an impact on credit risk (point in time or deferred). The hypothesis is that firms engaging in manipulation may be exposed to increased credit risk over time, which should be reflected in higher PD values. Using AnaCredit – a granular dataset covering credit exposures from European banks between 2019 and 2022 – and financial statement data from Orbis, we constructed a sample of 4,649 publicly traded corporations, for which we computed the Beneish M-Scores that are used to detect potential earnings manipulation. This allowed us to determine the interrelation with PDs. Our results reveal a weak and negative correlation between M-Scores and PDs, suggesting that earnings manipulation signals are not fully absorbed by banks’ internal models. Further analysis shows that these results are driven by the high prevalence of firms with no earnings manipulation signals. Firms for which the M-Score effectively indicates potential earnings manipulation (8.9% of the sample) are observed to have higher PDs, which also increase further as the M-Score worsens. These findings support the hypothesis that earnings manipulation signals are not fully reflected in credit risk estimates over time, indicating that their impact – when it occurs – is deferred instead of being captured immediately in internal models. Our results indicate that the relationship between potential earnings manipulation and banks’ internal credit risk estimates is highly context-dependent and non-linear. Cross-sectional analyses by country and industry show consistent patterns linking default risk to M-Scores in selected countries and sectors. [...]
- JEL Code
- G32 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Capital and Ownership Structure, Value of Firms, Goodwill
M41 : Business Administration and Business Economics, Marketing, Accounting→Accounting and Auditing→Accounting
M42 : Business Administration and Business Economics, Marketing, Accounting→Accounting and Auditing→Auditing
C33 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models, Multiple Variables→Panel Data Models, Spatio-temporal Models
- 2 April 2026
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 3214Details
- Abstract
- Repo markets clear either bilaterally over the counter (OTC) or through central counterparties (CCPs), which differ in how counterparty risk is priced. In bilateral markets, repo rates reflect borrower-specific risk, while CCP clearing pools counterparties and applies a common pricing rule. We develop a model of security-driven repo in which repo rates are non-linear in borrower risk. As a result, averaging borrower-specific OTC prices yields more negative rates than pricing the pooled borrower in CCP markets. The model predicts that the CCP–OTC specialness gap compresses during periods of counterparty uncertainty and varies with borrower and collateral characteristics. Using transaction-level data from the euro-area interbank repo market around the March 2020 COVID-19 shock, we find evidence consistent with these predictions. Our results show that central clearing dampens specialness in normal times but stabilizes repo pricing during stress.
- JEL Code
- D47 : Microeconomics→Market Structure and Pricing→Market Design
D82 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty→Asymmetric and Private Information, Mechanism Design
G14 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Information and Market Efficiency, Event Studies, Insider Trading
G15 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→International Financial Markets
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 2 April 2026
- ECONOMIC BULLETINEnglishOTHER LANGUAGES (20) +
- 2 April 2026
- ECONOMIC BULLETIN - BOXEconomic Bulletin Issue 2, 2026Details
- Abstract
- This box describes the Eurosystem liquidity conditions and monetary policy operations in the seventh and eighth reserve maintenance periods of 2025, from 5 November 2025 to 10 February 2026.
- JEL Code
- E40 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→General
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
- 2 April 2026
- ECONOMIC BULLETIN - BOXEconomic Bulletin Issue 2, 2026Details
- Abstract
- The rise in very long-term yields over the past year has steepened the slopes between 30-year and ten-year yields in several advanced economies, including the euro area as a whole. This box explores the implications of this steepening for financial markets and intermediaries and also considers the broader macroeconomic outcomes. While higher very long-term yields are expected to have only a limited effect on government funding costs, the yield curve steepening is translating into higher rates on mortgages with long fixation periods. However, financial conditions indices that summarise asset prices with macroeconomic relevance remain essentially unaffected by the inclusion of very long-term maturities. In addition, empirical estimates suggest that the steepening of the long-end yield curve is having only a modest effect on euro area inflation and real GDP, with the impact being significantly smaller than that of changes in short-term rates. Overall, the findings indicate that while the steepening is affecting funding costs and financial intermediaries, its implications for broader financial conditions and macroeconomic dynamics remain contained.
- JEL Code
- E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
- 2 April 2026
- ECONOMIC BULLETIN - BOXEconomic Bulletin Issue 2, 2026Details
- Abstract
- Over recent years we have observed that different oil market states can significantly influence how oil prices respond to shocks. Using a non-linear local projections framework, we find that oil prices react more strongly to oil supply shocks when key state variables – namely, investment fund positions, supply-demand imbalances and oil inventories – are at extreme levels, regardless of the sign of the shock. Further distinguishing between the sign of the shock and whether a state variable is unusually high or low provides additional insights. Upside risks to oil prices are most critical when oil supply is tight relative to demand, and investors hold very long positions at the time of an oil price surge. Conversely, downside risks are most pronounced when oil prices start to decrease in an environment of ample supply, and investors hold very short positions, leading to particularly large declines in oil prices.
- JEL Code
- E31 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Price Level, Inflation, Deflation
Q41 : Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics, Environmental and Ecological Economics→Energy→Demand and Supply, Prices
Q43 : Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics, Environmental and Ecological Economics→Energy→Energy and the Macroeconomy
- 2 April 2026
- ECONOMIC BULLETIN - BOXEconomic Bulletin Issue 2, 2026Details
- Abstract
- Cross-border payments are often slow and costly and, in some cases, may not be available. In line with the G20 Roadmap, several countries and regions, including the euro area, are working to interlink their domestic fast payment systems to improve speed, cost and transparency. Econometric evidence suggests that countries with interlinked systems trade about 4% more with each other – around half of the effect of a trade agreement and a quarter of the effect of a common currency. The gains of interlinking fast payment systems are larger in regions with high cross-border payment costs and for systems that allow the settlement of wholesale transactions.
- JEL Code
- E42 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Monetary Systems, Standards, Regimes, Government and the Monetary System, Payment Systems
F15 : International Economics→Trade→Economic Integration
F30 : International Economics→International Finance→General
Interest rates
| Deposit facility | 2.00 % |
| Main refinancing operations (fixed rate) | 2.15 % |
| Marginal lending facility | 2.40 % |
Inflation rate
More on inflationExchange rates
| USD | US dollar | 1.1684 | |
| JPY | Japanese yen | 186.75 | |
| GBP | Pound sterling | 0.87058 | |
| CHF | Swiss franc | 0.9242 |
Financial stability
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