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Jean-Francois Jamet

Counsel to the Executive Board

Current Position

Counsellor to the Executive Board

Fields of interest

Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics,International Economics,Other Special Topics

Email

Jean-Francois.Jamet@ecb.europa.eu

Other current responsibilities
2022-

Member, French National Productivity Council

Education
2006-2009

Corps des mines programme, Mines ParisTech, Paris, France

2005-2006

Visiting student in the Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, United States

2003-2005

Master in Economics, Paris School of Economics and Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris, France

2003-2005

Master of Public Affairs, Sciences Po, Paris, France

Professional experience
2020-

Counsellor to the Executive Board, European Central Bank

2015-2020

Principal Economist / Senior Team Lead Economist, DG International and European Relations, European Central Bank

2013-2015

Economist, DG International and European Relations, European Central Bank

2009-2012

Economist, DG Competition, European Commission, Brussels, Belgium

2007-2008

Consultant, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, Europe and Central Asia Region, The World Bank, Washington DC, United States

Awards
2022

Chevalier de l'Ordre national du Mérite

2006

Harvard/ENS Fellowship

Teaching experience
2012-2016

European and international economic policy, Sciences Po, Paris, France

2009-2012

Political Economy of the European Union, Sciences Po, Paris, France

10 August 2022
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2705
Details
Abstract
Parliamentary hearings are a fundamental tool to hold independent central banks accountable. However, it is not clear what type of information central banks provide when they communicate with parliaments compared to other existing information channels. In this article, we address this question by comparing the communication of the European Central Bank (ECB) in parliamentary hearings to its communication in the regular press conferences that follow monetary policy decisions. Using text analysis on the ECB President’s introductory statements in parliamentary hearings and press conferences from 1998 to 2021, we show that the ECB uses parliamentary hearings to discuss topics that are less covered in press conferences. We also find that the ECB’s policy stance in the hearings tends to reflect the stance in press conferences, and that the degree of language complexity is similar in the two fora. These findings support the view that the ECB mainly uses parliamentary hearings to further explain policy decisions first presented at press conferences but also to put them in a broader context.
JEL Code
E02 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→General→Institutions and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
14 March 2022
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2655
Details
Abstract
We investigate whether ideology drives the sentiments of parliamentarians when they speak to the central bank they hold accountable. To this end, we collect textual data on the quarterly hearings of the ECB President before the European Parliament from 1999 to 2019. We apply sentiment analysis to more than 1,900 speeches of individual Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from 128 parties. We find robust evidence that MEPs’ sentiments toward the ECB are correlated with the ideological stance predominantly on a pro-/anti-European dimension rather than on a left-right dimension.
JEL Code
E02 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→General→Institutions and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
8 July 2020
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2442
Details
Abstract
As the role of central banks expanded, demand for public scrutiny of their actions increased. This paper investigates whether parliamentary hearings, the main tool to hold central banks accountable, are fit for this purpose. Using text analysis, it detects the topics and sentiments in parliamentary hearings of the Bank of England, the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve from 1999 to 2019. It shows that, while central bank objectives play the most relevant role in determining the topic, unemployment is negatively associated with the focus of hearings on price stability. Sentiments are more negative when uncertainty is higher and when inflation is more distant from the central bank’s inflation aim. These findings suggest that parliamentarians use hearings to scrutinise the performance of central banks in line with their objectives and economic developments, but also that uncertainty is associated with a higher perceived risk of under-performance of central banks.
JEL Code
E02 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→General→Institutions and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
15 June 2020
ECONOMIC BULLETIN - ARTICLE
Economic Bulletin Issue 4, 2020
Details
Abstract
Building on the literature on trust in institutions, this article looks at the state, evolution and sociodemographic breakdown of citizens’ trust in the ECB and support for the euro. Drawing on a novel typology of attitudes towards Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and using microdata from Eurobarometer surveys since the introduction of the single currency, the analysis tracks the prevalence of supporters and sceptics of EMU over time and across euro area countries. It further explores the sociodemographic characteristics, economic perceptions and, more broadly, European sentiments within these groups. In this way, it provides insights into the factors shaping citizens’ attitudes towards the ECB, the euro and EMU, and helps identify possible avenues for enhancing trust. The analysis indicates that popular support for EMU – in particular, trust in the ECB – hinges to a large extent on citizens’ perceptions of their personal situation and the overall economic context, as well as their broader attitudes towards the European Union, while other sociodemographic indicators seem to be less relevant.
JEL Code
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G53 : Financial Economics
R10 : Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics→General Regional Economics→General
Z13 : Other Special Topics→Cultural Economics, Economic Sociology, Economic Anthropology→Economic Sociology, Economic Anthropology, Social and Economic Stratification
9 August 2018
ECONOMIC BULLETIN - ARTICLE
Economic Bulletin Issue 5, 2018
Details
Abstract
This article examines the evolution of the ECB’s accountability practices during the financial crisis. After describing the challenges stemming from the crisis and changes resulting from the conferral of new supervisory tasks on the ECB, it provides evidence on how the strengthening of the ECB’s accountability has taken shape in the context of its relationship with the European Parliament in line with the latter’s key role as provided for in the Treaties. The ECB and the European Parliament, building on the accountability framework enshrined in primary law, have increased the frequency of their interactions, made innovations regarding the format and sharpened the focus of their exchanges, allowing increased scrutiny of the ECB’s policies. This has provided the ECB with more opportunities to explain its decisions and demonstrate that it is acting in accordance with its democratic mandate, which is a fundamental pillar of its legitimacy.
JEL Code
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
19 June 2015
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1815
Details
Abstract
During the crisis, support for the EU has declined noticeably in many European Union member states. While previous research on European public opinion has mainly focused on the impact of domestic country- and individual-level factors on public attitudes towards the EU, this paper argues that developments in other EU member states can also have a significant impact on domestic euroscepticism. Specifically, deteriorating economic and fiscal conditions in other member states can lead to concerns in domestic publics about possible negative spillovers on the domestic economy and the ability of the EU to deliver positive economic outcomes. This in turn may lead to rising euroscepticism at the domestic level. The analysis of a panel data set for the EU as a whole and the euro area countries lends support to these arguments by showing that higher unemployment rates and government debt levels in other European countries are systematically related to lower levels of trust in the EU domestically.
JEL Code
D72 : Microeconomics→Analysis of Collective Decision-Making→Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
E02 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→General→Institutions and the Macroeconomy
F15 : International Economics→Trade→Economic Integration
H63 : Public Economics→National Budget, Deficit, and Debt→Debt, Debt Management, Sovereign Debt
J64 : Labor and Demographic Economics→Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers→Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
2023
International Journal of Central Banking
  • Fraccaroli, N., Giovannini, A., Jamet, J-F. and Persson, E.
2022
European Journal of Political Economy
  • Fraccaroli, N., A. Giovannini, Jamet, J.F. and Persson, E.
2022
Journal of Legislative Studies
  • Fraccaroli, N., A. Giovannini, Jamet, J.F. and Persson, E.
2022
VoxEU
  • Jamet, J-F., Mehl, A., Neumann, C.M., Panetta, F.
2020
Journal of European Public Policy
  • Bergbauer, S., Hernborg, N., Jamet, J-F and Persson, E.
2019
VoxEU
  • Bergbauer S., Jamet, J-F., Schölermann, H., Stracca, L., Stubenrauch, C.
2018
VoxEU
  • Fraccaroli, N., Giovannini, A. and Jamet, J-F.
2017
Schuman Report on Europe - State of the Union 2017
  • Giovannini, A., Jamet, J-F. and F. Mongelli
2013
From Reform to Growth: Managing the Economic Crisis in Europe
  • Jamet, J-F.
2013
Die Konsenswerkstatt: Deutschfranzosische Kommunikations- und Entscheidungsprozesse in der Europapolitik
  • Jamet, J-F., Lirzin, F., Schild, J. and Schwarzer, D.
2012
Lignes de Repères
L'Europe d'après
  • Chopin, T., Jamet, JF-. and Lequesne C.
2012
La Documentation francaise
L'Europe peut-elle se passer d'un gouvernement économique ?
  • Jamet, J-F.
2011
JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies
  • Jamet, J-F.
2009
Eurostudia: Transatlantic Journal for European Studies
  • Jamet, J-F.
2008
Revue d’Economie Financière
  • Jamet, J-F.