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Algirdas Prapiestis

24 September 2020
ECONOMIC BULLETIN - BOX
Economic Bulletin Issue 6, 2020
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Abstract
Firms’ demand for bank loans has been at a record-high level since March 2020 as firms have scrambled to bridge liquidity gaps originating from the COVID-19 shock. To help banks accommodate the surge in loan demand at favourable conditions, most euro area governments have implemented schemes of public guarantees on bank loans. These transfer some of the arising credit risk and eventual credit losses from banks to governments, thereby mitigating the costs for banks. The features of the loan guarantee schemes’ vary across countries as well as their actual use, with higher take-ups being reported in Spain and France, while lower amounts have been taken up in Italy and Germany. Moreover, SMEs in the sectors most affected by the crisis (e.g. trade, tourism, transport) seem to have benefited the most from these programmes. Overall, public loan guarantee schemes have played a key role in supporting corporate lending dynamics since April and preserving favourable lending conditions. The phasing out of these schemes needs to be carefully aligned with corporate financing needs in the months ahead, while their potential side-effects warrant monitoring.
JEL Code
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E51 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Money Supply, Credit, Money Multipliers
E62 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Fiscal Policy
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
H81 : Public Economics→Miscellaneous Issues→Governmental Loans, Loan Guarantees, Credits, Grants, Bailouts
24 November 2020
FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - ARTICLE
Financial Stability Review Issue 2, 2020
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Abstract
Fiscal, prudential and monetary authorities have responded to the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic by providing unprecedented support to the real economy. Importantly, the combination of policy actions has done more to limit the materialisation of risks to households and firms than each policy individually. Exploiting complementarities and ensuring the most effective combination of policies will, however, be equally important when authorities start to phase out the various related relief measures. The fact that in particular the enacted fiscal and labour market measures, as well as their phase-out schedules, differ substantially across the largest euro area economies further complicates the challenge of obtaining the most effective policy combination. Along with the reduction in support to the real economy, the phasing-out of policy measures could adversely affect banks’ balance sheets and capitalisation. Resulting cliff effects in policy support are relevant for prudential authorities in the context of their future decisions on the replenishment of capital buffers. The results of the analysis suggest there are substantial risks associated with the early withdrawal of policy support, although the analysis does not account for the medium-term risks of protracted policy support.
JEL Code
C68 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Mathematical Methods, Programming Models, Mathematical and Simulation Modeling→Computable General Equilibrium Models
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
E62 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Fiscal Policy
E63 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy, Stabilization, Treasury Policy
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
H81 : Public Economics→Miscellaneous Issues→Governmental Loans, Loan Guarantees, Credits, Grants, Bailouts
18 May 2021
FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - BOX
Financial Stability Review Issue 1, 2021
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Abstract
Public loan guarantee schemes have been crucial in mitigating financial stability risks during the pandemic. At the same time, these schemes constitute sizeable and novel contingent liabilities for governments in most euro area countries, adding to the stock of both existing government guarantees and other implicit contingent liabilities, which reinforces concerns about the emergence of an adverse sovereign-bank-corporate nexus. More conventional materialisations of contingent liabilities related to implicit commitments towards large corporates and state-owned enterprises have occurred more frequently and have also entailed higher costs in the past and may still occur going forward. This would pose a larger tail risk for sovereigns than their direct exposure through guarantees would suggest. Against this backdrop, this box presents historical evidence from contingent liability materialisations, investigates their commonalities and differences with the situation under the current pandemic-induced shock and assesses the ensuing risk for sovereigns.
JEL Code
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
H81 : Public Economics→Miscellaneous Issues→Governmental Loans, Loan Guarantees, Credits, Grants, Bailouts