Não disponível em português
Giacomo Calzolari
- 31 January 2005
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 431Details
- Abstract
- This paper examines prudential regulation of a multinational bank (MNB hereafter) and shows how regulatory intervention depends on the liability structure and insurance arrangements for non local depositors (i.e. on the representation form for foreign units). Shared liability among the MNB's units gives higher incentives for regulatory intervention than when units are legally separate entities. Cross-border deposit insurance provides lower incentives to intervene than when the regulator only has to compensate local depositors. We study the impact of shared liability and deposit insurance arrangements on regulators' incentives to monitor and acquire information on MNB's activities. Furthermore, by describing regulatory intervention and monitoring we also draw implications on the MNB's preferences over the form representation for foreign units, and discuss the effects of regulators' behavior on both MNB's lobbying and international resources shifting.
- JEL Code
- L51 : Industrial Organization→Regulation and Industrial Policy→Economics of Regulation
F23 : International Economics→International Factor Movements and International Business→Multinational Firms, International Business
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation - Network
- ECB-CFS Research Network on "Capital Markets and Financial Integration in Europe"