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Dominik Supera
- 19 October 2022
- THE ECB BLOGThe ECB Blog investigates how change in the policy rate affects wages very differently depending on characteristics of employees and firms, such as firms’ size and their access to credit. Results show that the effects are symmetric during times of easing and tightening.Details
- JEL Code
- E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
D22 : Microeconomics→Production and Organizations→Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
D31 : Microeconomics→Distribution→Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
Related- 28 July 2022
- THE ECB BLOG
- 8 February 2021
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2521Details
- Abstract
- We show that a reduction in lender of last resort (LOLR) policy uncertainty positively affects bank lending and propagates to investment and employment. We exploit a unique policy that reduced uncertainty regarding the availability of future LOLR funding for banks as a quasi-natural experiment. Using micro-level data on banks, firms and loans in Portugal, we generate cross-sectional variation in banks’ exposure to uncertainty and find that the size of the haircut subsidy - the gap between private market and central bank security valuations - plays a key role in the propagation of the shock to lending and the real economy.
- JEL Code
- E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G32 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Capital and Ownership Structure, Value of Firms, Goodwill - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 27 January 2021
- RESEARCH BULLETIN - No. 80Details
- Abstract
- Episodes such as the current coronavirus (COVID-19) crisis might lead to a significant rise in borrower defaults and, consequently, weakness in the banking sector. Having well-capitalised banks makes the financial system more resilient to such episodes. We assess how much capital would be optimal for banks to hold, taking into consideration the risk of banking crises driven by borrower defaults (which we term “twin default crises”).
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 25 May 2020
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2414Details
- Abstract
- We examine optimal capital requirements in a quantitative general equilibrium model with banks exposed to non-diversifiable borrower default risk. Contrary to standard models of bank default risk, our framework captures the limited upside but significant downside risk of loan portfolio returns (Nagel and Purnanandam, 2020). This helps to reproduce the frequency and severity of twin defaults: simultaneously high firm and bank failures. Hence, the optimal bank capital requirement, which trades off a lower frequency of twin defaults against restricting credit provision, is 5pp higher than under standard default risk models which underestimate the impact of borrower default on bank solvency.
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
- 24 May 2019
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2286Details
- Abstract
- How far should capital requirements be raised in order to ensure a strong and resilient banking system without imposing undue costs on the real economy? Capital requirement increases make banks safer and are beneficial in the long run but also entail transition costs because their imposition reduces credit supply and aggregate demand on impact. In the baseline scenario of a quantitative macro-banking model, 25% of the long-run welfare gains are lost due to transitional costs. The strength of monetary policy accommodation and the degree of bank riskiness are key determinants of the trade-off between the short-run costs and long-run benefits from changes in capital requirements.
- JEL Code
- E3 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 27 November 2014
- FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - ARTICLEFinancial Stability Review Issue 2, 2014Details
- Abstract
- This special feature studies the effects of fire-sale externalities in the euro area banking sector. Using individual bank balance sheet data and a framework developed by Greenwood et al. (forthcoming), an indicator is constructed to quantify the effects of fire-sale spillovers in terms of losses in equity capital in the banking system. For some countries, loans to monetary financial institutions are the most systemic assets, while for others loans to households can pose systemic risks. Thanks to the fine granularity of the background data and monthly updates, the index can be used as an early warning indicator and a measure of systemic risk.
- JEL Code
- G00 : Financial Economics→General→General