European Central Bank - eurosystem
Opciones de búsqueda
Home Medios El BCE explicado Estudios y publicaciones Estadísticas Política monetaria El euro Pagos y mercados Empleo
Sugerencias
Ordenar por
No disponible en español

Alberto Giovannini

23 July 2012
ADVISORY SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE REPORT - No. 1
Details
Abstract
The report discusses a variety of issues involving difficulties in the banking sector, with a view to ascertaining the appropriate institutional infrastructure in the context of the European Union and the euro area. Forbearance on the part of banks dealing with delinquent borrowers is problematic if it is designed as a way to game creditors and supervisors. Supervisors should not tolerate excessive forbearance; failure to intervene early tends to increase the costs of the crisis. Macro-prudential concerns should not induce the authorities to delay clean-ups of banks in difficulties. To minimise the macroeconomic fallout from banking problems and to reduce the temptation for authorities to delay and hide problems in banking, it is necessary to have a viable resolution regime that leaves room for authorities to reduce the systemic fallout from resolution. The Advisory Scientific Committee calls for the establishment of strong European bodies responsible for banking supervision and bank resolution. A European competence is necessary to ensure that cross-border concerns are given appropriate weight in supervision and resolution.
JEL Code
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
G33 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Bankruptcy, Liquidation
17 September 2013
ADVISORY SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE REPORT - No. 3
Details
Abstract
The European macro-prudential policy framework operates at two levels. First, the ESRB has a legal responsibility for macro-prudential oversight in the EU. Second, various national and EU authorities have responsibility for the implementation of macro-prudential policy. The creation of a European banking union is an important innovation within this two-level structure. In response to this innovation, this paper makes two key points. First, the ECB should be in charge of macro-prudential policies conferred by the Capital Requirements Regulation and Directive. Within the ECB, macro-prudential decisions should be taken entirely by the Governing Council, while micro-prudential decisions should be prepared by the Supervisory Board. Second, the ESRB remains the only EU-wide body in charge of macro-prudential supervision, responsible for all financial activities. The ESRB's effectiveness could be strengthened by creating a post of Managing Director, who would carry out the policy determined by the General Board and would be responsible to the General Board for the management of the ESRB.
JEL Code
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
26 January 2016
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 9
Details
Abstract
An epidemiologist calculating the risk of a localised epidemic becoming a global pandemic would investigate every possible channel of contagion from the infected region to the rest of the world. Focusing on, say, the incidence of close human contact would underestimate the pandemic risk if the disease could also spread through the air. Likewise, calculating the quantity of financial system risk requires practitioners to understand all of the channels through which small and local shocks can become big and global. Much of the empirical finance literature has focused only on “direct” contagion arising from firms’ contractual obligations. Direct contagion occurs if one firm’s default on its contractual obligations triggers distress (such as illiquidity or insolvency) at a counterparty firm. But contractual obligations are not the only means by which financial distress can spread, just as close human contact is not the only way that many infectious diseases are transmitted. Focusing only on direct contagion underestimates the risk of financial crisis given that other important channels exist. This paper represents an attempt to move systemic risk analysis closer to the holism of epidemiology. In doing so, we begin by identifying the fundamental channels of indirect contagion, which manifest even in the absence of direct contractual links. The first is the market price channel, in which scarce funding liquidity and low market liquidity reinforce each other, generating a vicious spiral. The second is information spillovers, in which bad news can adversely affect a broad range of financial firms and markets. Indirect contagion spreads market failure through these two channels. In the case of illiquidity spirals, firms do not internalise the negative externality of holding low levels of funding liquidity or of fire-selling assets into a thin market. Lack of information and information asymmetries can cause markets to unravel, even following a relatively small piece of bad news. In both cases, market players act in ways that are privately optimal but socially harmful. The spreading of market failure by indirect contagion motivates policy intervention. Substantial progress has been made in legislating for policies that will improve systemic resilience to indirect contagion. But more tools might be needed to achieve a fully effective and efficient macroprudential policy framework. This paper aims to frame a high-level policy discussion on three policy tools that could be effective and efficient in ensuring systemic resilience to indirect contagion – namely macroprudential liquidity regulation; restrictions on margins and haircuts; and information disclosure.
JEL Code
G15 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→International Financial Markets
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation