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Makram El-Shagi

26 August 2013
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1579
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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to examine whether Chairman Greenspan influenced the Reserve Bank Presidents. This question is interesting, because it has been argued that their preferences would be more persistent compared to those of the Governors. We estimate individual Taylor-type reaction functions for the Federal Reserve Districts using their voiced interest rate preferences during the policy go-around as well as real-time economic information on the inflation and unemployment gap. A bootstrap analysis exploits information contained in these reaction functions and constructs counterfactual distributions of disagreement among the Federal Reserve Districts, assuming the absence of factors that could have enforced consensus. We compare these simulated distributions with the observed disagreement during the committee deliberations and find empirical evidence in favour of coordination. This detected coordination helped to bring the preferences of the Federal Reserve Districts more in line with Chairman Greenspan
JEL Code
C15 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General→Statistical Simulation Methods: General
C53 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric Modeling→Forecasting and Prediction Methods, Simulation Methods
D72 : Microeconomics→Analysis of Collective Decision-Making→Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
18 February 2014
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1635
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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to assess whether the findings of Romer and Romer (2000) on the superiority of staff forecasts are still valid today. The paper uses both latest available econometric techniques as well as conventional tests. Several tests for forecast rationality show that a necessary condition for good forecast performance is satisfied both for Greenbook and private forecasts, as measured by the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). Tests for forecast accuracy and the encompassing test confirm the superiority of Greenbook forecasts for inflation and output using an extended sample (1968 to 2006). The relative forecast performance is, however, not robust in the presence of large macroeconomic shocks such as the Great Moderation and oil price shocks. Other econometric tests show that a relative better forecast performance by staff is observed when there is increased uncertainty. Staff
JEL Code
C53 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric Modeling→Forecasting and Prediction Methods, Simulation Methods
E37 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
15 June 2015
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1808
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Abstract
This paper examines whether the minutes of the Bank of England
JEL Code
C34 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models, Multiple Variables→Truncated and Censored Models, Switching Regression Models
D78 : Microeconomics→Analysis of Collective Decision-Making→Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies