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Ixart Miquel-Flores

On-site & Internal Model Inspections

Division

Non-Financial Risk Inspections

Current Position

Supervision Analyst

Fields of interest

Financial Economics,Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics,Microeconomics

Email

ixart.miquel_flores@ecb.europa.eu

Other current responsibilities
2021

Member - European Banking Institute Young Researchers Group (Central Banking and Macroprudential Policies)

Education
2023

Visiting Ph.D. Student, University of Virginia Darden School of Business

2022

Visiting Ph.D. Student, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business

2020

Ph.D. Candidate in Finance, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management

2013-2015

M.Sc. in Finance, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management

Professional experience
2023

Supervision Analyst - Stress Test Experts / Market Risk, European Central Bank

2020-2023

Supervision Analyst - On-Site & Internal Model Inspections / IT & Operational Risk, European Central Bank

2018-2020

Supervision Analyst - On-Site & Internal Model Inspections / Capital Markets & Treasury , European Central Bank

2017-2018

Supervision Analyst - Crisis Management, European Central Bank

2016-2017

Trainee - Economics, Monetary Policy- Capital Markets and Financial Structure, European Central Bank

Awards
2018

Best Paper Award - ECMI Annual Conference 2018, European Capital Markets Institute

2018

Young Economist Best Academic Paper Award - 6th Macro Banking and Finance Workshop, Unicredit Foundation

13 March 2024
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2916
Details
Abstract
This study investigates the underlying reasons for banks’ continued support of fossil fuel-based firms and examines the role of public guaranteed loans (PGLs) in redirecting resources towards greener economic activities, thereby facilitating the climate transition process. Using a unique pan-European credit register dataset, we combine supervisory bank data with firm-level greenhouse gas emission data and financial information. Our analysis yields three main findings. Firstly, European banks perceive lending to green companies as riskier compared to their brown counterparts, a phenomenon we term as the “green-transition risk.” Secondly, we provide evidence that during the COVID-19 pandemic, European banks have strategically leveraged PGLs to channel resources towards environmentally sustainable activities, thereby augmenting the proportion of green loans in their portfolios and partially shifting the inherent “green-transition risk” to European governments and citizens. Lastly, our investigation reveals a banking preference for awarding PGLs to financially robust green firms over less profitable, highly indebted green firms, which could pose significant challenges for green businesses requiring financial support during the COVID-19 crisis.
JEL Code
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
29 April 2019
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2274
Details
Abstract
This paper investigates the behaviour of credit rating agencies (CRAs) using a natural experiment in monetary policy. Specifically, we exploit the corporate QE of the Eurosystem and its rating-based specific design which generates exogenous variation in the probability for a bond of becoming eligible for outright purchases. We show that after the launch of the policy, rating upgrades were mostly noticeable for bonds initially located below, but close to, the eligibility frontier. In line with the theory, rating activity is concentrated precisely on the territory where the incentives of market participants are expected to be more sensitive to the policy design. Complementing the evidence on the effectiveness of non-standard measures, our findings contribute to better assessing the consequences of the explicit (but not exclusive) reliance on CRAs ratings by central banks when designing monetary policy.
JEL Code
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G24 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Investment Banking, Venture Capital, Brokerage, Ratings and Ratings Agencies
G30 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→General
18 April 2018
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2145
Details
Abstract
On March 10, 2016, the European Central Bank (ECB) announced the Corporate Sector Purchase Programme (CSPP) – commonly known as corporate quantitative easing (QE) – to improve the financing conditions of the Eurozone’s real economy and strengthen the pass-through of unconventional monetary interventions. Using a regression discontinuity design framework that exploits the rating wedge between the ECB and market participants, we show that: (i) bond yield spreads decline by around 15 basis points at the announcement of the programme, (ii) the impact is mostly noticeable in the sample of CSPP-eligible bonds that are perceived as high yield from the viewpoint of market participants and, (iii) the CSPP seems to have stimulated new issuance of corporate bonds. Overall, our results are consistent with the explanation that highlights the portfolio rebalancing mechanism and the liquidity channel.
JEL Code
E50 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→General
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
G11 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Portfolio Choice, Investment Decisions
G30 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→General
G32 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Capital and Ownership Structure, Value of Firms, Goodwill
2024
Springer International, 2024
Why Do Banks Fail and What to Do About It. The Role of Risk Management, Governance, Accounting, and More
  • Abidi, N., Buchetti, B. and Crosetti, S.
2023
International Review of Financial Analysis
  • Abidi, N. and Falagiarda, M.
2022
Digitalisation, Sustainability and the Banking and Capital Markets Union. Book series: EBI Studies in Banking and Capital Markets Law
Too Tech to Fail?
  • Abidi, N.
2021
50 Years of Central Banking in Kenya: Regional and Global Perspectives
Remarks on the Evolution of Central Banking
  • Mongelli, F.P. and Branca, F.