Filippos Petroulakis
Economics
- Division
-
Supply Side, Labour and Surveillance
- Current Position
-
Economist
- Fields of interest
-
Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics,International Economics,Labour Economics
- Education
- 2009-2015
PhD in Economics, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA
- 2007-2009
MSc in Economics (Two Year), London School of Economics, London, UK
- 2003-2006
BSc in Economics and Politics, University of Bristol, Bristol, UK
- Professional experience
- 2016-
DG Economics, Supply Side, Labour and Surveillance Division, European Central Bank
- 2015-2016
DG Market Operations, Market Operations Analysis Division, European Central Bank
- 2015
Economist, Nomura Holdings, London
- 2015
Visiting Scholar, International Monetary Fund
- 2010-2014
Research and Teaching Assistant, University of Maryland
- 2012
Fund Internship Programme, International Monetary Fund
- 2008-2009
Research Assistant, STICERD, London School of Economics
- Awards
- 2009
Graduate Fellowship, University of Maryland
- Teaching experience
- 2010-2014
Public Finance, Econometrics, Money and Banking, Intermediate Microeconomics, Principles of Macroeconomics - University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA
- 28 April 2017
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2049Details
- Abstract
- This paper studies export adjustment to negative shocks in currency unions. I consider the hitherto ignored role of trade costs and taxes in internal devaluations, which have been brought to the fore of international policy during the recent euro periphery crisis. Trade costs can limit the pass-through of internal devaluation on export prices. Using data on export prices ”on the dock”, I document that higher trade costs are associated with a lower reduction of export prices relative to domestic prices in the euro periphery. Furthermore, VAT (in theory trade neutral, but in practice much higher on tradables) hikes prevent the required shift of resources towards tradables. I show that the real exchange rate (RER) adjustment was heavily affected by indirect tax hikes, by comparing headline RER and tax-adjusted RER. I then build a standard New Keynesian small open economy model with sticky wages and prices, incorporating trade costs and indirect taxes (allowing for VAT imperfections), and show that both these frictions, but especially trade costs, can be quantitatively crucial in affecting export growth, more so than either product markups or wage rigidity. I apply the model to data for Greece, the least successful of the euro periphery fiscal devaluation programs, and show that it can account for the most salient features of the data; trade costs explain the failure to substantially raise exports, and taxes the initial small fall in exports.
- JEL Code
- F32 : International Economics→International Finance→Current Account Adjustment, Short-Term Capital Movements
F33 : International Economics→International Finance→International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
F41 : International Economics→Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance→Open Economy Macroeconomics
F45 : International Economics→Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance
- 14 November 2017
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 200Details
- Abstract
- Since 2008, excess liquidity – defined as the sum of holdings of central bank reserves in excess of reserve requirements and holdings of equivalent central bank deposits – has tended to accumulate in specific euro area countries and in a small, slowly changing group of credit institutions. Despite the stability of the concentration of excess liquidity in specific countries over time, the relevance of individual drivers has changed. First, risk aversion has played a much smaller role in explaining the concentration since 2013 than it did at the time of “flight-to-quality” phenomena in the period 2010-12. Second, the location of the relevant market infrastructures (i.e. central securities depositories, securities settlement systems and TARGET2 accounts) used by counterparties that sold assets to the Eurosystem has been a more important driver directing flows in the period 2015-16. In addition, the more recent concentration of excess liquidity is explained by the combination of a number of factors, such as banks following strict internal credit limits, investment incentives created by yield differences across the euro area and the “home bias” in euro area government bond holdings. Overall, the net cross-border flows of liquidity that resulted also determined TARGET2 balances. At the individual bank level, when controlling for banks’ capital, non-performing loans, credit risk and profitability, excess liquidity holdings in relation to total assets are found to be higher for smaller and better-capitalised banks, and for banking groups with liquidity centralised at the head institution. In addition, participation in Eurosystem longer-term refinancing operations and deposit inflows are associated with liquidity accumulation. Finally, new regulatory initiatives such as the liquidity coverage ratio are explained to be creating incentives to hold or not to distribute liquidity, thereby affecting its distribution.
- JEL Code
- E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E50 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→General
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
D39 : Microeconomics→Distribution→Other
E41 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Demand for Money
- 14 February 2019
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2240Details
- Abstract
- This paper explores the connection between ”zombie” firms (firms that would typically exit in a competitive market) and bank health and the consequences for aggregate productivity in 11 European countries. Controlling for cyclical effects, the results show that zombie firms are more likely to be connected to weak banks, suggesting that the zombie firm problem in Europe may at least partly stem from bank forbearance. The increasing survival of zombie firms congests markets and constrains the growth of more productive firms, to the detriment of aggregate productivity growth. Our results suggest that around one-third of the impact of zombie congestion on capital misallocation can be directly attributed to bank health and additional analysis suggests that this may partly be due to reduced availability of credit to healthy firms. Finally, improvements in bank health are more likely to be associated with a reduction in the prevalence of zombie firms in countries where insolvency regimes do not unduly inhibit corporate restructuring. Thus, leveraging the important complementarities between bank strengthening efforts and insolvency regime reform would contribute to breaking the shackles on potential growth in Europe.
- JEL Code
- D24 : Microeconomics→Production and Organizations→Production, Cost, Capital, Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity, Capacity
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
L25 : Industrial Organization→Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior→Firm Performance: Size, Diversification, and Scope
O47 : Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth→Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity→Measurement of Economic Growth, Aggregate Productivity, Cross-Country Output Convergence
- 25 March 2019
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2253Details
- Abstract
- We examine the degree of market power in the big four countries of the euro area using macro and firm-micro data. We focus on three main indicators of market power in and across countries: namely, the concentration ratios, the markup and the degree of economic dynamism. For the macro database we use the sectoral data of KLEMs and for the micro data we use a combination of Orbis and iBACH (dating from 2006 onwards). We find that, in contrast to the situation in the US, market power metrics have been relatively stable over recent years and – in terms of the markup specifically – marginally trending down since the late 1990s, driven largely by Manufacturing. In terms of the debate as to the merits of market concentration, we find (relying on results for Manufacturing) that firms in sectors which exhibit high concentration, but are categorized as ‘high tech’ users, generally have higher TFP growth rates. By contrast, markups tend to display a bi-modal distribution when looked at through the lens of high concentration and high tech usage. These results would tend to confirm that the rise in market power documented for other economies is not obviously a euro area phenomenon and that welfare and policy analysis of market concentration is inevitably complex.
- JEL Code
- D2 : Microeconomics→Production and Organizations
D4 : Microeconomics→Market Structure and Pricing
N1 : Economic History→Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics, Industrial Structure, Growth, Fluctuations
O3 : Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth→Technological Change, Research and Development, Intellectual Property Rights - Network
- Discussion papers
- 13 June 2019
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 224Details
- Abstract
- Well-functioning economic structures are key for resilient and prospering euro area economies. The global financial and sovereign debt crises exposed the limited resilience of the euro area’s economic structures. Economic growth was masking underlying weaknesses in several euro area countries. With the inception of the crises, significant efforts have been undertaken by Member States individually and collectively to strengthen resilience of economic structures and the smooth functioning of the euro area. National fiscal policies were consolidated to keep the increase in government debt contained and structural reform momentum increased notably in the second decade, particularly in those countries most hit by the crisis. The strengthened national economic structures were supported by a reformed EU crisis and economic governance framework. However, overall economic structures in euro area countries are still not fully commensurate with the requirements of a monetary union. Moreover, remaining challenges, such as population ageing, low productivity and the implications of digitalisation, will need to be addressed to increase economic resilience and long-term growth.
- JEL Code
- E31 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Price Level, Inflation, Deflation
E32 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Business Fluctuations, Cycles
E60 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→General
E62 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Fiscal Policy
F10 : International Economics→Trade→General
J11 : Labor and Demographic Economics→Demographic Economics→Demographic Trends, Macroeconomic Effects, and Forecasts
O43 : Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth→Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity→Institutions and Growth
- 31 October 2019
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2324Details
- Abstract
- We investigate the relationship between hours per worker and employment polarisation. Our core question is whether hours per worker follow the same polarisation patterns as previously observed for employment, measured by either heads or total hours. Using the occupational task index measures of Acemoglu and Autor (2011), we find large relative declines in hours per worker in routine manual jobs – precisely the occupations most negatively affected by employment polarisation from routine-biased technical change. We also find a lower relative decline in hours per worker for non-routine cognitive analytical jobs, which are growing through polarisation. At the same time, hours per worker declined significantly more than the trend for non-routine manual physical occupations. Instead of a polarisation pattern, we find that hours per worker have been declining more in manual jobs (routine manual and non-routine manual physical). These patterns are observed across age, gender and education groups, with few exceptions and changes in intensity. The decline in hours per worker occurred mostly within sectors. Using a wage ranking of occupations instead of occupational task indices, the decline in hours per worker is monotonically related to wages. The results are specific to the European countries and the same patterns are not found using data for the United States.
- JEL Code
- J23 : Labor and Demographic Economics→Demand and Supply of Labor→Labor Demand
J24 : Labor and Demographic Economics→Demand and Supply of Labor→Human Capital, Skills, Occupational Choice, Labor Productivity
O33 : Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth→Technological Change, Research and Development, Intellectual Property Rights→Technological Change: Choices and Consequences, Diffusion Processes
- 29 June 2020
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 244Details
- Abstract
- Digitalisation can be viewed as a major supply/technology shock affecting macroeconomic aggregates that are important for monetary policy, such as output, productivity, investment, employment and prices. This paper takes stock of developments in the digital economy and their possible impacts across the euro area and European Union (EU) economies. It also compares how these economies fare relative to other major economies such as that of the United States. The paper concludes that: (i) there is significant country heterogeneity across the EU in terms of the adoption of digital technologies, and most EU countries are falling behind competitors, particularly the United States; (ii) digitalisation is affecting the economy through a number of channels, including productivity, employment, competition and prices; (iii) digitalisation raises productivity and lowers prices, similarly to other supply/technology shocks; (iv) this has implications for monetary policy and its transmission; and (v) structural and other policies may need to be adapted for the euro area and EU countries to fully reap the potential gains from digitalisation, while maintaining inclusiveness.
- JEL Code
- E22 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Consumption, Saving, Production, Investment, Labor Markets, and Informal Economy→Capital, Investment, Capacity
E24 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Consumption, Saving, Production, Investment, Labor Markets, and Informal Economy→Employment, Unemployment, Wages, Intergenerational Income Distribution, Aggregate Human Capital
E31 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Price Level, Inflation, Deflation
E32 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Business Fluctuations, Cycles
O33 : Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth→Technological Change, Research and Development, Intellectual Property Rights→Technological Change: Choices and Consequences, Diffusion Processes
O52 : Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth→Economywide Country Studies→Europe
- 6 January 2021
- ECONOMIC BULLETIN - ARTICLEEconomic Bulletin Issue 8, 2020Details
- Abstract
- Digitalisation – the diffusion of digital technologies, leading to a digital economy is “virtually everywhere”. It transforms economies, making it an important issue from a central banking perspective. Some of the key effects of digitalisation relevant to monetary policy relate to output and productivity, labour markets, wages and prices. This article summarises and updates the evidence on the euro area and the EU digital economy. This article also takes a closer look at the impact of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic on the digital economy, both in the short term and beyond.
- JEL Code
- E22 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Consumption, Saving, Production, Investment, Labor Markets, and Informal Economy→Capital, Investment, Capacity
E24 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Consumption, Saving, Production, Investment, Labor Markets, and Informal Economy→Employment, Unemployment, Wages, Intergenerational Income Distribution, Aggregate Human Capital
E31 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Price Level, Inflation, Deflation
E32 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Business Fluctuations, Cycles
O33 : Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth→Technological Change, Research and Development, Intellectual Property Rights→Technological Change: Choices and Consequences, Diffusion Processes
O52 : Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth→Economywide Country Studies→Europe