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Barbara Jeanne Attinger

21 December 2011
LEGAL WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 13
Details
Abstract
Crisis management in the financial sector is currently at the top of the reform agenda at national, European and international level. Well-designed bank resolution regimes are essential not only to meet the acute need of a credit institution in crisis but also to ensure that proper incentive structures operate in the market prior to any crisis. Existing regimes are inadequate and incentive structures have proven to be fundamentally destructive. The lack of workable crisis resolution tools has had an adverse effect on crisis prevention and imposed enormous costs on the taxpayer. Effective crisis management demands the ability to manage. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, two leading EU Member States (the United Kingdom and Germany) adopted special resolution regimes, providing for tools and powers to manage the resolution of banks. The paper assesses and compares these two approaches. In addition, the paper analyses the emerging response at European and international level, focusing in particular on bail-ins, the suspension of netting and other rights, treatment of groups and systemically important financial institutions. At the international level, the Financial Stability Board's recently published
JEL Code
K : Law and Economics