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Koen van der Veer

8 August 2013
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 151
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Abstract
This report analyses and reviews the corporate finance structure of non-financial corporations (NFCs) in the euro area, including how they interact with the macroeconomic environment. Special emphasis is placed on the crisis that began in 2007-08, thus underlining the relevance of financing and credit conditions to investment and economic activity in turbulent times. When approaching such a broad topic, a number of key questions arise. How did the corporate sector
JEL Code
E0 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→General
E5 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
24 May 2016
FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - ARTICLE
Financial Stability Review Issue 1, 2016
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Abstract
Financial institutions can build up leverage via the use of derivatives and securities financing transactions (SFTs). In order to limit the build-up of excessive leverage and the associated liquidity risks, as well as the pro-cyclical effects of margin and haircut setting practices, the macro-prudential toolkit needs to be extended. This special feature presents the general case for setting macro-prudential margins and haircuts using theoretical and empirical evidence on the effectiveness of various design options. Furthermore, it addresses implementation and governance issues that warrant attention when developing a macro-prudential framework for margins and haircuts. It concludes by recommending a way forward that is intended to inform the ongoing policy discussions at the European and international levels.
JEL Code
G00 : Financial Economics→General→General
24 November 2016
FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - ARTICLE
Financial Stability Review Issue 2, 2016
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Abstract
Alternative investment funds (AIFs) in Europe operate without regulatory leverage limits. Competent authorities within the EU have the legal power to impose macroprudential leverage limits on AIFs, but no authority has implemented this tool so far. This joint European Central Bank-De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) special feature (i) presents a macroprudential case for limiting the use of leverage by investment funds, (ii) develops a framework to inform the design and calibration of macroprudential leverage limits to contain the build-up of leverage-related systemic risks by AIFs, and (iii) discusses different design and calibration options. By way of example, it uses supervisory information on AIFs managed by asset managers based in the Netherlands. The article concludes by recommending a way forward to develop an EU-level framework for a harmonised implementation of macroprudential leverage limits for AIFs, which forms a key part of the agenda of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) to develop macroprudential policy beyond banking.
JEL Code
G00 : Financial Economics→General→General
30 November 2017
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 202
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Abstract
This joint ECB-DNB Occasional Paper aims to inform the ongoing discussions about an EU-level framework for operationalising macroprudential leverage limits for alternative investment funds (AIFs). It builds on, and extends, the analysis of an ECB-DNB special feature article published in the ECB’s Financial Stability Review in November 2016. First, this Occasional Paper presents new EU-level evidence suggesting that leveraged funds exhibit stronger sensitivity of investor outflows to bad past performance than unleveraged funds, which has the potential to exacerbate systemic risk. Second, it devises a framework for assessing financial stability risks from leverage in investment funds. This is applied to leveraged AIFs managed by asset managers in the Netherlands using Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD) data for the two-year period from the first quarter of 2015 to the fourth quarter of 2016. Third, it discusses the potential effectiveness and efficiency of various designs for macroprudential leverage limits. To this end, it builds on the findings for the Dutch AIF sector and suggests design options for further exploration at EU level. Beyond assessing financial stability risks from leverage in the Dutch AIF sector, the case study aims to show how equivalent information on AIFs at the European level – which will be made available to the European Securities Markets Authority (ESMA) and the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) in the coming years – could be used when developing an EU-level framework for operationalising macroprudential leverage limits.
JEL Code
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
E61 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Policy Objectives, Policy Designs and Consistency, Policy Coordination