European Central Bank - eurosystem
Search Options
Home Media Explainers Research & Publications Statistics Monetary Policy The €uro Payments & Markets Careers
Suggestions
Sort by

Jens Tapking

11 May 2023
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 272
Details
Abstract
Since the European Central Bank’s (ECB’s) 2003 strategy review, the importance of macro-financial amplification channels for monetary policy has increasingly gained recognition. This paper takes stock of this evolution and discusses the desirability of further incremental enhancements in the role of financial stability considerations in the ECB’s monetary policy strategy. The paper starts with the premise that macroprudential policy, along with microprudential supervision, is the first line of defence against the build-up of financial imbalances. It also recognises that the pursuit of price stability through monetary policy, and of financial stability through macroprudential policy, are to a large extent complementary. Nevertheless, macroprudential policy may not be able to ensure financial stability independently of monetary policy, because of spillovers originating from the common transmission channels through which the two policies produce their effects. For example, a low interest rate environment can create incentives to engage in more risk-taking, or can adversely impact the profitability of financial intermediaries and hence their capacity to absorb shocks. The paper argues that the existence of such spillovers creates a conceptual case for monetary policy to take financial stability considerations into account. It then goes on to discuss what this conclusion might imply in practice for the ECB. One option would be to exploit the flexible length of the medium-term horizon over which price stability is to be achieved. Longer deviations from price stability could occasionally be tolerated, if they resulted in materially lower risks for financial stability and, ultimately, for future price stability. However, model-based quantitative analysis suggests that this approach may require impractically drawn-out periods of deviation from price stability and potentially result in a de-anchoring of inflation expectations. ...
JEL Code
E3 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
14 June 2022
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2668
Details
Abstract
When a bank receives credit from the central bank, its Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) changes. In most cases, the LCR increases. We investigate how this LCR boost from central bank credit affects banks’ behaviour, looking at the euro area during the Corona year 2020. Our theoretical and empirical analyses suggest that banks that get strong LCR boosts from central bank credit tend to take actions that reduce their LCRs. In this sense, banks consume their LCR boosts. In terms of policy conclusions, our analysis suggests that central bank credit operations can provide strong incentives for banks to take actions that reduce their LCRs. Such actions, which could include the provision of additional credit and a shortening of the maturity structure of the liabilities of the banks, plausibly have an impact on the real economy. As such, our analysis reveals what may be called a “LCR channel” of monetary policy transmission.
JEL Code
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
21 September 2021
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 278
Details
Abstract
This paper summarises the work done by Eurosystem staff in the context of the Strategy Review Seminar on Monetary Policy Instruments. More specifically, it focuses on the efficacy, efficiency and potential side effects of the key monetary policy instruments employed by the European Central Bank since 2014. The following main findings emerge from the analysis. First, instruments have been effective in easing financing conditions and supporting economic growth, employment and inflation. Second, considering the effective lower bound on policy rates, a combination of instruments is generally more efficient than relying on a single tool. Third, side effects have been generally contained so far, but they are found to vary over time and need to be closely monitored on an ongoing basis. Fourth, the monetary policy toolkit needs to remain innovative, diversified, and flexible, i.e. reviewed regularly to ensure that it remains fit for purpose against the backdrop of evolving financial and macroeconomic conditions.
JEL Code
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E47 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
17 May 2019
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 223
Details
Abstract
This paper summarises the outcomes of the analysis of the ECB Crypto-Assets Task Force. First, it proposes a characterisation of crypto-assets in the absence of a common definition and as a basis for the consistent analysis of this phenomenon. Second, it analyses recent developments in the crypto-assets market and unfolding links with financial markets and the economy. Finally, it assesses the potential impact of crypto-assets on monetary policy, payments and market infrastructures, and financial stability. The analysis shows that, in the current market, crypto-assets’ risks or potential implications are limited and/or manageable on the basis of the existing regulatory and oversight frameworks. However, this assessment is subject to change and should not prevent the ECB from continuing to monitor crypto-assets, raise awareness and develop preparedness.
JEL Code
E42 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Monetary Systems, Standards, Regimes, Government and the Monetary System, Payment Systems
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
O33 : Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth→Technological Change, Research and Development, Intellectual Property Rights→Technological Change: Choices and Consequences, Diffusion Processes
14 January 2011
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 122
Details
Abstract
This paper provides an assessment of the impact of the covered bond purchase programme (hereafter referred to as the CBPP) relative to its policy objectives. The analysis presented on the impact of the CBPP on both the primary and secondary bond markets indicates that the Programme has been an effective policy instrument. It has contributed to: (i) a decline in money market term rates, (ii) an easing of funding conditions for credit institutions and enterprises, (iii) encouraging credit institutions to maintain and expand their lending to clients, and (iv) improving market liquidity in important segments of the private debt securities market. The paper also provides an overview of the investment strategy of the the Eurosystem with regard to the CBPP portfolio.
JEL Code
E22 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Consumption, Saving, Production, Investment, Labor Markets, and Informal Economy→Capital, Investment, Capacity
L63 : Industrial Organization→Industry Studies: Manufacturing→Microelectronics, Computers, Communications Equipment
L86 : Industrial Organization→Industry Studies: Services→Information and Internet Services, Computer Software
O3 : Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth→Technological Change, Research and Development, Intellectual Property Rights
O47 : Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth→Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity→Measurement of Economic Growth, Aggregate Productivity, Cross-Country Output Convergence
6 March 2009
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1025
Details
Abstract
Unsecured interbank money market rates such as the Euribor increased strongly with the start of the financial market turbulences in August 2007. There is clear evidence that these rates reached levels that cannot be explained alone by higher credit risk. This article presents this evidence and provides a theoretical explanation which refers to the funding liquidity risk of lenders in unsecured term money markets.
JEL Code
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G10 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→General
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
23 June 2008
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 909
Details
Abstract
A standard repurchase agreement between two counterparties is considered to examine the endogenous choice of collateral assets, the feasibility of secured lending, and welfare implications of the central bank's collateral framework. As an important innovation, we allow for two-sided counterparty risk. Our findings relate to empirical characteristics of repo transactions and have an immediate bearing on market developments since August 2007.
JEL Code
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G32 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Capital and Ownership Structure, Value of Firms, Goodwill
E51 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Money Supply, Credit, Money Multipliers
16 January 2007
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 710
Details
Abstract
This paper tries to contribute to the discussion on the role of securities settlement infrastructures for financial integration in Europe. It presents a model that can explain a well-known stylized fact of securities settlement, the surprisingly high fees charged by central securities depositories (CSDs) for settlement through links between CSDs. As the model turns out to provide a robust explanation for this stylized fact, it is then used to analyzes an important policy question, the welfare effects of mergers of CSDs.
JEL Code
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G15 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→International Financial Markets
L13 : Industrial Organization→Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance→Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
27 August 2004
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 387
Details
Abstract
This paper addresses a very European issue, the consolidation of securities trading and settlement infrastructures. In a two-country model, we analyze welfare implications of different types of consolidation. We find that horizontal integration of settlement systems is better than vertical integration of exchanges and settlement systems, but vertical integration is still better than no consolidation. These findings have clear policy implications with regards to the highly fragmented European securities infrastructure.
JEL Code
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G15 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→International Financial Markets
L13 : Industrial Organization→Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance→Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
23 July 2004
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 376
Details
Abstract
The competition between a central securities depository (CSD) and a custodian bank is analysed in a Stackelberg model. The CSD sets its prices first, the custodian bank follows. There are many investor banks each of which has to decide whether to use the service of the CSD or of the custodian bank. This decision depends on the prices and the investor bank's preferences for the inhomogeneous services of the two service providers. Since the custodian bank uses services provided by the CSD as input, the CSD can raise its rival's costs. However, due to network externalities, the CSD's equilibrium market share is not necessarily higher than socially optimal. This result has important policy implications that are related to a discussion currently taking place in the securities settlement industry.
JEL Code
G10 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→General
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
L14 : Industrial Organization→Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance→Transactional Relationships, Contracts and Reputation, Networks
Network
ECB-CFS Research Network on "Capital Markets and Financial Integration in Europe"