Joseph G. Pearlman
- 27 April 2004
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 340Details
- Abstract
- We examine the performance of forward-looking inflation-forecast-based rules in open economies. In a New Keynesian two-bloc model, a methodology first employed by Batini and Pearlman (2002) is used to obtain analytically the feedback parameters/horizon pairs associated with unique and stable equilibria. Three key findings emerge: first, indeterminacy occurs for any value of the feedback parameter on inflation if the forecast horizon lies too far into the future. Second, the problem of indeterminacy is intrinsically more serious in the open economy. Third, the problem is compounded further in the open economy when central banks respond to expected consumer, rather than producer price inflation.
- JEL Code
- E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E37 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies - Network
- International research forum on monetary policy
- 16 March 2005
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 455Details
- Abstract
- We investigate the role of economic transparency within the framework of one of Townsend's models of 'forecasting the forecasts of others'. The equilibrium has the property that 'higher order beliefs' are coordinated into a finite-dimensional setup that is amenable to address monetary policy issues. We focus here on the role of public information about the money supply, and find that it should be fully revealing.
- JEL Code
- D82 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty→Asymmetric and Private Information, Mechanism Design
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
- 26 June 2006
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 643Details
- Abstract
- We examine an interesting puzzle in monetary economics between what monetary authorities claim (namely to be forward-looking and pre-emptive) and the poor stabilization properties routinely reported for forecast-based rules. Our resolution is that central banks should be viewed as following 'Calvo-type' inflation-forecast-based (IFB) interest rate rules which depend on a discounted sum of current and future rates of inflation. Such rules might be regarded as both within the legal frameworks, and potentially mimicking central bankers' practice. We find that Calvo-type IFB interest rate rules are first: less prone to indeterminacy than standard rules with a finite forward horizon. Second, for such rules in difference form, the indeterminacy problem disappears altogether. Third, optimized forms have good stabilization properties as they become more forward-looking, a property that sharply contrasts that of standard IFB rules. Fourth, they appear data coherent when incorporated into a well-known estimated DSGE model of the Euro-area.
- JEL Code
- E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E37 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
- 16 January 2007
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 709Details
- Abstract
- The objectives of this paper are: first, to quantify the stabilization welfare gains from commitment; second, to examine how commitment to an optimal rule can be sustained as an equilibrium and third, to find a simple interest rate rule that closely approximates the optimal commitment one. We utilize an influential empirical micro-founded DSGE model, the euro area model of Smets and Wouters (2003), and a quadratic approximation of the representative household's utility as the welfare criterion. Importantly, we impose the effect of a nominal interest rate zero lower bound. In contrast with previous studies, we find significant stabilization gains from commitment: our central estimate is a 0.4
- JEL Code
- E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E37 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
- 13 June 2007
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 759Details
- Abstract
- We examine the linear-quadratic (LQ) approximation of non-linear stochastic dynamic optimization problems in macroeconomics, in particular for monetary policy. We make four main contributions: first, we draw attention to a general Hamiltonian framework for LQ approximation due to Magill (1977). We show that the procedure for the 'large distortions' case of Benigno and Woodford (2003, 2005) is equivalent to the Hamiltonian approach, but the latter is far easier to implement. Second, we apply the Hamiltonian approach to a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model with external habit in consumption. Third, we introduce the concept of target-implementability which fits in with the general notion of targeting rules proposed by Svensson (2003, 2005). We derive sufficient conditions for the LQ approximation to have this property in the vicinity of a zero-inflation steady state. Finally, we extend the Hamiltonian approach to a non-cooperative equilibrium in a two-country model.
- JEL Code
- E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E37 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
- 29 February 2008
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 870Details
- Abstract
- Recent interest in 'Risk Management' has highlighted the relevance of Bayesian analysis for robust monetary- policy making. This paper sets out a comprehensive methodology for designing policy rules inspired by such considerations. We design rules that are robust with respect to model uncertainty facing both the policy-maker and private sector. We apply our methodology to three simple interest-rate rules: inflation-forecast- based (IFB) rules with a discrete forward horizon, one targeting a discounted sum of forward inflation, and a current wage inflation rule. We use an estimated DSGE model of the euro area and estimated measures of structured exogenous and parameter uncertainty for the exercise. We find that IFB rules with a long horizon perform poorly with or without robust design. Our discounted future targeting rule performs much better, indicating that policy can be highly forward-looking without compromising stabilization. The wage inflation rule dominates whether it is designed to have good robust properties or not.
- JEL Code
- E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E37 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies