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Stefan Gebauer

12 September 2017
This paper investigates the link between corporate debt and investment for a group of fi ve peripheral euro area countries. Using firm-level data from 2005-2014, we postulate a non-linear corporate leverage-investment relationship and derive thresholds beyond which leverage has a negative and signi ficant impact on investment. The investment sensitivity of debt increased after 2008 when financial distress intensifi ed and fi rms had a lower capacity to finance investment from internal sources of funds. Our results also suggest that even moderate levels of debt can exert a negative influence on investment for smaller firms or when pro fitability is low.
JEL Code
E22 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Consumption, Saving, Production, Investment, Labor Markets, and Informal Economy→Capital, Investment, Capacity
F34 : International Economics→International Finance→International Lending and Debt Problems
G31 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Capital Budgeting, Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies, Capacity
G32 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Capital and Ownership Structure, Value of Firms, Goodwill
13 May 2020
Macroprudential policies are often aimed at the commercial banking sector, while a host of other non-bank financial institutions, or shadow banks, may not fall under their jurisdiction. We study the effects of tightening commercial bank regulation on the shadow banking sector. We develop a DSGE model that differentiates between regulated, monopolistic competitive commercial banks and a shadow banking system that relies on funding in a perfectly competitive market for investments. After estimating the model using euro area data from 1999 – 2014 including information on shadow banks, we find that tighter capital requirements on commercial banks increase shadow bank lending, which may have adverse financial stability effects. Coordinating macroprudential tightening with monetary easing can limit this leakage mechanism, while still bringing about the desired reduction in aggregate lending. In a counterfactual analysis, we compare how macroprudential policy implemented before the crisis would have dampened the business and lending cycles.
JEL Code
E32 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Business Fluctuations, Cycles
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
Research Task Force (RTF)