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Julien Reynaud

14 December 2005
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 560
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Abstract
This paper explains why domestic debt composition in emerging economies is risky. It carries out an analysis of the determinants of
JEL Code
F34 : International Economics→International Finance→International Lending and Debt Problems
F41 : International Economics→Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance→Open Economy Macroeconomics
G15 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→International Financial Markets
23 October 2007
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 819
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Abstract
Voting power methodology offers insights to understand coalition building in collective decision making. Using cooperative game theory, Banzhaf (1965) developed an index to capture the numerical importance of voters in coalition building. This voting power index is still widely used today in applications to international politics. Yet, it assumes that voters are symmetric and focuses on particular voters only. This paper proposes a new measure of voting power which account for the numerical proximity between voters by capturing how often they appear in winning coalitions together. The index is also developed to account for the relative importance of coalitions and the relative linkages among coalition participants. We present an application to the governance structure of the International Monetary Fund, with linkages being represented by bilateral trade between voters. The results are able to explain several important features of the functioning of this particular voting body, and may be useful for other applications of international politics.
JEL Code
C71 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Game Theory and Bargaining Theory→Cooperative Games
F33 : International Economics→International Finance→International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
14 November 2008
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 965
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Abstract
There is growing awareness that the distribution of IMF facilities may not be influenced only by the economic needs of the borrowers. This paper focuses on the fact that the IMF may favour geopolitically important countries in the distribution of IMF loans, differentiating between concessional and nonconcessional facilities. To carry out the empirical analysis, we construct a new database that compiles proxies for geopolitical importance for 107 IMF countries over 1990-2003, focusing on emerging and developing economies. We use a factor analysis to capture the common underlying characteristic of countries' geopolitical importance as well as a potential analysis since we also want to account for the geographical situation of the loan recipients. While controlling for economic and political determinants, our results show that geopolitical factors influence notably lending decisions when loans are nonconcessional, whereas results are less robust and in opposite direction for concessional loans. This study provides empirical support to the view that geopolitical considerations are an important factor in shaping IMF lending decisions, potentially affecting the institution's effectiveness and credibility.
JEL Code
F33 : International Economics→International Finance→International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
H77 : Public Economics→State and Local Government, Intergovernmental Relations→Intergovernmental Relations, Federalism, Secession
O19 : Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth→Economic Development→International Linkages to Development, Role of International Organizations