- 1 April 2005
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 27Details
- This paper reviews current discussions on reforming the European Union (EU) budgetary procedure and assesses the main reform proposals that have been suggested thus far. It argues that prospects for reforms are presently hampered by the complex interplay between supranational and intergovernmental decision modes and the requirement of any budgetary procedure to strike a balance between efficiency and legitimacy. The paper reviews the main criticisms of the present budgetary procedure and the related reform proposals, which are assessed on the basis of relevant theoretical literature as well as brief comparisons with the federal budget of the United States. The paper argues that the current EU budgetary procedure maximises efficiency and legitimacy, given the present state of political integration in the EU. Significant modifications to the budgetary procedure would depart from that equilibrium.
- JEL Code
- D78 : Microeconomics→Analysis of Collective Decision-Making→Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
H77 : Public Economics→State and Local Government, Intergovernmental Relations→Intergovernmental Relations, Federalism, Secession
H87 : Public Economics→Miscellaneous Issues→International Fiscal Issues, International Public Goods
- 28 February 2018
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2135Details
- For centuries, defaulting governments were immune from legal action by foreign creditors. This paper shows that this is no longer the case. Building a dataset covering four decades, we find that creditor lawsuits have become an increasingly common feature of sovereign debt markets. The legal developments have strengthened the hands of creditors and raised the cost of default for debtors. We show that legal disputes in the US and the UK disrupt government access to international capital markets, as foreign courts can impose a financial embargo on sovereigns. The findings are consistent with theoretical models with creditor sanctions and suggest that sovereign debt is becoming more enforceable. We discuss how the threat of litigation affects debt management, government willingness to pay, and the resolution of debt crises.
- JEL Code
- F34 : International Economics→International Finance→International Lending and Debt Problems
G15 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→International Financial Markets
H63 : Public Economics→National Budget, Deficit, and Debt→Debt, Debt Management, Sovereign Debt
K22 : Law and Economics→Regulation and Business Law→Business and Securities Law