- 13 May 2008
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 896Details
- The EMU accession countries are obliged to fulfill the Maastricht convergence criteria prior to entering the EMU. This paper uses a DSGE model of a two-sector small open economy, to address the following question: How do the Maastricht convergence criteria modify optimal monetary policy in an economy facing domestic and external shocks? First, we derive the micro founded loss function that represents the objective function of the optimal monetary policy not constrained to satisfy the criteria. We find that the optimal monetary policy should not only target inflation rates in the domestic sectors and aggregate output fluctuations but also domestic and international terms of trade. Second, we show how the loss function changes when the monetary policy is constrained to satisfy the Maastricht criteria. The loss function of such a constrained policy is characterized by additional elements penalizing fluctuations of the CPI inflation rate, the nominal interest rate and the nominal exchange rate around the new targets which are potentially different from the steady state of the unconstrained optimal monetary policy. Under the chosen parameterization, the unconstrained optimal monetary policy violates two criteria: concerning the CPI inflation rate and the nominal interest rate. The constrained optimal policy results in targeting the CPI inflation rate and the nominal interest rate that are 0.7% lower (in annual terms) than the CPI inflation rate and the nominal interest rate in the countries taken as a reference. The welfare costs associated with these constraints need to be offset against credibility gains and other benefits related to the compliance with the Maastricht criteria that are not modelled.
- JEL Code
- F41 : International Economics→Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance→Open Economy Macroeconomics
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
E61 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Policy Objectives, Policy Designs and Consistency, Policy Coordination
- 14 October 2009
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1097Details
- In recent years a number of European countries have shifted their tax structure more strongly towards indirect taxes, motivated, inter alia, by the intention to foster competitiveness. Against this background, this paper develops a tractable two-country model of a monetary union, characterised by national fiscal and supranational monetary policy, with price-setting firms and endogenously determined terms of trade. The paper discusses a number of monetary and fiscal policy questions which emerge if one of the countries shifts its tax structure more strongly towards indirect taxes. Qualitatively, it is shown that the long-run effects of such a unilateral policy shift on output and consumption within and between the two countries depend sensitively on whether indirect tax revenues are used to lower direct taxes or to finance additional government expenditures. Moreover, short-run dynamics are shown to depend significantly on the speed at which fiscal adjustments take place, on the choice of the inflation index stabilised by the central bank, and on whether the tax shift is anticipated or not. Quantitatively, the calibrated model version indicates that only if the additional indirect tax revenues are used to finance a cut in direct taxes there is some, though limited scope for non-negligible spillovers between countries.
- JEL Code
- E61 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Policy Objectives, Policy Designs and Consistency, Policy Coordination
E63 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy, Stabilization, Treasury Policy
F42 : International Economics→Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance→International Policy Coordination and Transmission