Agnese Leonello
Research
- Division
-
Financial Research
- Current Position
-
Economist
- Fields of interest
-
Financial Economics
- Education
- 2007-2011
PhD Economics, European University Institute, Florence, Italy
- 2005-2007
MA Economics, University of Naples "Federico II", Italy
- 2002-2005
BA Economics, University of Naples "Federico II", Italy
- Professional experience
- 2014-
Economist - Financial Research Division, Directorate General Research, European Central Bank
- 2011-2014
Post-Doctoral Fellow - Financial Institutions Center, The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA
- Awards
- 2012
Best PhD Thesis on Financial Stability, Fondation Banque Centrale du Luxembourg
- 2010
Fourth Year completion grant, European University Institute, Florence, Italy
- 1 October 2021
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2593Details
- Abstract
- This paper develops a simple analytical framework to study the impact of central bank policy-rate changes on banks’ credit supply and risk-taking incentives. Unobservable expost bank monitoring of loans creates an external-financing constraint, which determines bank leverage. Unobservable, costly ex-ante screening of borrowers determines the level of bank risk-taking. More risk-taking tightens the external-financing constraint. The policy rate affects the external-financing constraint because it affects both the return on outside investors’ alternative investments and loan rates. In a low rate environment, a policy-rate cut reduces bank funding costs less because of a zero lower bound (ZLB) on retail deposit rates. Bank risk-taking is a necessary but not sufficient for a policy-rate cut to become contractionary ("reversal"). Reversal can occur even though banks’ net-interest margins increase. Credit market competition plays an important role for the interplay of monetary policy and financing stability. When banks have market power, a policy-rate cut can increase lending and still lead to risk-taking. We use our analytical framework to discuss the literature on how monetary policy affects the credit supply of banks, with special emphasis on low and negative rates.
- JEL Code
- E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 22 September 2021
- RESEARCH BULLETIN - No. 87.2Details
- Abstract
- The effect of policy rate cuts on bank lending and risk-taking depends on how the low interest rate environment affects banks’ ability to raise external financing. When interest rates are low, easing monetary policy relaxes banks’ external financing constraint less than when interest rates are high. This reduces the stimulus to bank lending and induces banks to take more risk. There are indeed side effects of monetary stimulus at the zero-lower bound (ZLB).
- JEL Code
- E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 27 May 2019
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2287Details
- Abstract
- The architecture of supervision – how we define the allocation of supervisory powers to different policy institutions – can have implications for policy conduct and for the economic and financial environment in which these policies are implemented. Theoretically, an integrated structure for monetary policy and supervision brings important benefits arising from better information flow and policy coordination. Aggregate supervisory information may significantly improve the conduct of monetary policy and the effectiveness of the lender of last resort function. As long as the process towards an integrated structure does not shrink the set of available tools, monetary policy and supervision are no less effective in pursuing their objectives than a separated structure. Additionally, an integrated structure does not seem to be correlated with more price and/or financial instability, as suggested by analysing a large global set of countries with different supervisory set-ups. A centralised structure for supervision entails significant benefits in terms of fewer opportunities for supervisory arbitrage by banks and less informational asymmetry. A large central supervisor can take advantage of economies of scale and scope in supervision and gain a broader perspective on the stability of the entire banking sector, which should result in improved financial stability. Potential drawbacks of a centralised supervisory structure are the possible lack of specialisation relative to local supervisors and the increased distance between the supervisor and the supervised institutions. We discuss the implications of our findings in the euro area context and in relation to the design of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM).
- JEL Code
- E5 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G38 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Government Policy and Regulation - Network
- Discussion papers
- 12 June 2017
- RESEARCH BULLETIN - No. 35Details
- Abstract
- The recent financial and sovereign debt crises showed that providing public guarantees to banks may pose serious threats to sovereign solvency, despite their short-term beneficial effects on financial stability. This article analyses the role that public guarantees to banks play in the bank-sovereign nexus and offers a more nuanced assessment of their implications for sovereign debt crises. Depending on the nature of the banking crisis and the specific characteristics of the economy, guarantees may improve financial stability without undermining sovereign solvency, thus generating a positive feedback loop between bank and sovereign stability.
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
H63 : Public Economics→National Budget, Deficit, and Debt→Debt, Debt Management, Sovereign Debt
- 22 May 2017
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2067Details
- Abstract
- This paper studies the effects of government guarantees on the interconnection between banking and sovereign debt crises in a framework where both the banks and the government are fragile and the credibility and feasibility of the guarantees are determined endogenously. The analysis delivers some new results on the role of guarantees in the bank-sovereign nexus. First, guarantees emerge as a key channel linking banks’and sovereign stability, even in the absence of banks’holdings of sovereign bonds. Second, depending on the specific characteristics of the economy and the nature of banking crises, an increase in the size of guarantees may be beneficial for the bank-sovereign nexus, in that it enhances …financial stability without undermining sovereign solvency.
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
H63 : Public Economics→National Budget, Deficit, and Debt→Debt, Debt Management, Sovereign Debt
- 28 February 2017
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2032Details
- Abstract
- Banks are intrinsically fragile because of their role as liquidity providers. This results in underprovision of liquidity. We analyze the effect of government guarantees on the interconnection between banks' liquidity creation and likelihood of runs in a model of global games, where banks' and depositors' behavior are endogenous and affected by the amount and form of guarantee. The main insight of our analysis is that guarantees are welfare improving because they induce banks to improve liquidity provision although in a way that sometimes increases the likelihood of runs or creates distortions in banks' behavior.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 7 July 2016
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1932Details
- Abstract
- We develop a model where banks invest in reserves and loans, and trade loans on the interbank market to deal with liquidity shocks. Two types of equilibria emerge, depending on the degree of credit market competition and the level of aggregate liquidity risk. In one equilibrium, all banks keep enough reserves and remain solvent. In the other, some banks default with positive probability. The latter equilibrium exists when competition is not too intense and high liquidity shocks are not too likely. The model delivers several implications concerning the severity of crises and credit availability along the business cycle.
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 2018
- Journal of Economic TheoryGovernment Guarantees and Financial Stability
- 2018
- Journal of Financial EconomicsGovernment Guarantees and the Two-way Feedback between Banking and Sovereign Debt Crises
- 2017
- Review of FinanceCredit Market Competition and Liquidity Crises
- 2015
- Journal of Financial RegulationMoral Hazard and Government Guarantees in the Banking Industry
- 2011
- Oxford Review of Economic PolicyDeposit Insurance and Risk-Taking
- 2017
- Achieving Financial Stability: Challenges to Prudential Regulation, eds. Evanoff, D.D., Kaufman, G., Leonello, A., and Manganelli, S., Chicago Fed International Banking Conference proceedingsGovernment Guarantees to Financial Institutions: Banks’ Incentives and Fiscal Sustainability
- 2016
- Handbook of European Banking, eds. Casu, B., and Beck, T., Palgrave Macmillan UKRegulatory reforms in the European banking sector