Macroprudential Bulletin

JEL Classification

Click here to enter text. : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods

JEL Classification

E32 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Business Fluctuations, Cycles

E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy

E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy

E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies

G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages

Abstract

Had authorities built up larger countercyclical buffers before the pandemic, it would have been easier to release capital in response to the crisis. The “lower for longer” interest rate environment reinforces the case for building up releasable buffers in good times. The article shows that enhancing countercyclical capacity can improve the policy mix available to achieve macro-financial stabilisation.

JEL Classification

G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises

G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages

G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation

C58 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric Modeling→Financial Econometrics

Abstract

This article discusses how market pressure can impede the usability of regulatory buffers. The capital relief measures in the euro area since the outbreak of the COVID-19 crisis had so far mixed effects on banks’ target CET1 ratio, suggesting an impeded pass-through. Market pressure can be a key explanatory factor, with pressure from credit and, critically, equity investors.

JEL Classification

G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises

G17 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Financial Forecasting and Simulation

C22 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Single Equation Models, Single Variables→Time-Series Models, Dynamic Quantile Regressions, Dynamic Treatment Effect Models &bull Diffusion Processes

C54 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric Modeling→Quantitative Policy Modeling

G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages

Abstract

This article analyses the role of capital buffers in containing the reduction of lending to the real economy during the COVID-19 crisis. Our results show that banks’ use of capital buffers leads to better economic outcomes, without a negative impact on their resilience. Banks’ willingness to use capital buffers is reflected in higher lending, with positive effects on GDP and lower credit losses, while the resilience of the banking system is not compromised.

JEL Classification

G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises

G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages

G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation

Abstract

This article discusses capital buffer usability in the Basel III framework. Although buffers are intended to be used in a crisis, a number of factors can prevent banks from drawing them down in case of need, with potentially adverse effects for the economy. The article reviews the functioning of the framework in the COVID-19 crisis and outlines possible implications for future policy design.

JEL Classification

E42 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Monetary Systems, Standards, Regimes, Government and the Monetary System, Payment Systems

G15 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→International Financial Markets

G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation

Abstract

Stablecoins provide an alternative to volatile crypto-assets. Depending on their asset management function, they may fall under different regulatory regimes or – with certain design features – under none at all. Given their potential size, global stablecoins could pose risks to financial stability. Such arrangements need a robust regulatory framework.

JEL Classification

G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises

G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation

G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages

G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation

Abstract

The post-crisis regulatory framework introduced multiple requirements on banks’ capital and liquidity positions, sparking a discussion among policymakers and academics on how the various requirements interact with one another. This article contributes to the discussion on the interaction of different regulatory metrics by empirically examining the interaction between the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) for banks in the euro area. The findings suggest that the two liquidity requirements are complementary and constrain different types of banks in different ways, similarly to the risk-based and leverage ratio requirements in the capital framework. This dispels claims that the LCR and the NSFR are redundant and underlines the need for a faithful and consistent implementation of both measures (and the entire Basel III package more broadly) across all major jurisdictions, to maintain a level playing field at the global level and to ensure that the post-crisis regulatory framework delivers on its objectives.

JEL Classification

G10 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→General

G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors

G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation

Abstract

Initial margin (IM) reduces counterparty credit risk in derivative markets. Notwithstanding efforts to limit potential procyclical effects of IM-setting practices, there is an ongoing debate about whether the current framework sufficiently addresses this concern, in particular when Value-at-Risk (VaR) models are used for setting IM. This article provides further insights into this issue. First, using EMIR data, we provide an overview of outstanding IM in the euro area derivative market and identify the most relevant sectors for the exchange of IM. Second, using a VaR IM model in line with industry practice, we show that aggregate IM can potentially vary substantially over a long-term horizon. Finally, we show that an IM floor based on a standardised IM model could be an effective tool for reducing IM procyclicality.

JEL Classification

G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises

G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors

G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation

Abstract

A recent ECB study shows that leverage is an important driver in investors’ redemption decisions. Regulatory changes to the UCITS framework facilitated the use of derivatives, increasing leverage for some European mutual funds which amplified investors' responsiveness to negative returns in a procyclical manner.

JEL Classification

G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages

G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation

Abstract

This article aims to contribute to the ongoing discussion about the long-term strategy for stress testing in the euro area. In particular, it highlights some of the strengths and weaknesses of the constrained bottom-up approach, which is currently used in the EU‑wide stress-testing exercise. Under this approach, banks use their own models to generate stress test projections on the basis of a common macroeconomic scenario and under the constraints imposed by the European Banking Authority methodology. This set-up provides banks with some scope to underestimate their vulnerabilities in order to appear more resilient than their peers. This article confirms previous empirical evidence showing that such behaviour may indeed be practised by banks. This, in turn, requires a robust quality assurance of banks’ stress test projections by the competent authorities (including the European Central Bank), to enforce more realistic results. Against this background, the article presents a novel empirical analysis providing indicative evidence that the “supervisory scrutiny” relating to the quality assurance may be having a disciplining effect on banks’ risk-taking.

JEL Classification

G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises

G17 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Financial Forecasting and Simulation

C22 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Single Equation Models, Single Variables→Time-Series Models, Dynamic Quantile Regressions, Dynamic Treatment Effect Models &bull Diffusion Processes

C54 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric Modeling→Quantitative Policy Modeling

G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages

Abstract

Cyclical systemic risk tends to build up well ahead of financial crises and is measured best by credit and asset price dynamics. This article shows that high levels of cyclical systemic risk lead to large downside risks to the bank-level return on assets three to five years ahead. Hence, exuberant credit and asset price dynamics tend to increase considerably the likelihood of large future bank losses. Given the tight link between bank losses and reductions in bank capital, the results presented in this article can be used to quantify the level of “Bank capital-at-risk” (BCaR) for a banking system. BCaR is a useful tool for macroprudential policy makers as it helps to quantify how much additional bank resilience could be needed if imbalances unwind and systemic risk materialises.

JEL Classification

C11 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General→Bayesian Analysis: General

E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies

G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages

Abstract

How do changes in bank capital requirements affect bank lending, lending spreads and the broader macroeconomy? The answer to this question is important for calibrating and assessing macroprudential policies. There is, however, relatively little empirical evidence to answer this question in the case of the euro area countries. This article contributes to filling this gap by studying the effects of changes in economic bank capital buffers in the four largest euro area countries. We use bank-level data and macroeconomic information to estimate a bank-internal, target level of economic capital ratio, i.e. the capital ratio that a bank would like to hold considering its own characteristics (size, profitability, risk aversion of its creditors, risk exposure, etc.) and macroeconomic conditions (expected GDP growth, etc.). Economic bank capital buffers are then computed as the difference between the current and the target economic capital ratio. However, due to adjustment costs, banks cannot adjust the actual capital ratio to the target level instantaneously. As a result, a change in the target capital ratio will result in an instantaneous change in the economic capital buffer. These buffers are aggregated at the country level and included in a panel Bayesian vector auto regressive (VAR) model. With the VAR, it is then possible to compute the response of macroeconomic and banking variables to a change in the buffer. The idea is that changes in economic capital buffers mimic the effects a change in regulatory capital requirements would have on the economy. We find that a negative economic capital buffer shock, i.e. a decline in actual capital ratios below the target level, leads to a modest decline in output and prices and to a larger decline in bank lending growth. By affecting the difference between actual and target economic capital ratios, these findings suggest that countercyclical capital-based macroprudential policy measures can be useful to dampen the financial cycle.

JEL Classification

C68 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Mathematical Methods, Programming Models, Mathematical and Simulation Modeling→Computable General Equilibrium Models

E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies

G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages

G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation

Abstract

The expansion of the EU macroprudential toolkit to also include capital buffers applied at sectoral level may require the cross-border recognition of these instruments. This article explores the relevance of sectoral cross-border credit provided via foreign branches or direct cross-border lending in the SSM area and analyses the effects of the implementation of mandatory reciprocity arrangements. Our findings provide some evidence supporting the introduction of mandatory reciprocity arrangements for sectoral capital buffers where exposures are material in order to ensure a level playing field and pre-empt future leakages. This is important to foster the effectiveness of macroprudential policies because financial services provided via foreign branches or direct cross-border exposures would otherwise not be subject to a macroprudential measure taken in a host Member State.

JEL Classification

C68 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Mathematical Methods, Programming Models, Mathematical and Simulation Modeling→Computable General Equilibrium Models

E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies

G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises

G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages

G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation

Abstract

As discussions progress on the potential design of sectoral capital buffers both at the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and European levels, this article discusses the advantages and shortcomings of the sectoral application of the countercyclical capital buffer for addressing sectoral systemic risks. A dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DGSE) model is used to explore and compare the transmission channels of the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) and the sectoral countercyclical capital buffer (SCCyB), as well as their role in enhancing the resilience of banks and taming the procyclicality of credit. The model-based policy exercise indicates that, if risks are confined to one particular credit sector, a SCCyB could prove more effective than the CCyB in strengthening bank resilience to the target sector and in mitigating sectoral credit imbalances.

JEL Classification

G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises

G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages

G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation

Abstract

This study analyses whether the ability of the euro area banking system to withstand potential shocks while minimising taxpayers’ costs has changed in the ten years since the financial crisis as a consequence of the impact of post-crisis reforms on bank capital and loss-absorbing capacity. The results show that the average probability of default of banks decreased from 3.5% in 2007 to 1.1% in 2017, less than a third of its pre-crisis value. In addition, under conservative assumptions on the scope of liabilities affected by the bail-in tool, banks’ loss-absorbing capacity has increased from 7.2% to 12.0% of total assets owing to the introduction of larger capital buffers and the new resolution framework, which enhances banks’ loss-absorbing capacity via the bail-in tool. Finally, the potential intervention of the Single Resolution Fund has further increased the loss-absorbing capacity of the system to 16.9% of total assets. Considering all these three factors, the ability of the banking system to absorb losses while minimising costs to taxpayers has increased more than 3-fold over the last ten years. When considering a broader scope for the bail-in tool, the system’s loss-absorbing capacity has increased to 55.5% of total assets, which corresponds to an overall 12-fold increase in its ability to absorb losses while minimising taxpayers’ costs.

JEL Classification

E37 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications

E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies

G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages

G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation

Abstract

The macroprudential stress test of the euro area banking system examines the effects of the baseline and adverse scenarios on the 91 largest euro area credit institutions across 19 countries. The analysis looks at the financial system as a whole and acknowledges the interdependencies between banks and the real economy. In particular, it takes into account banks’ reaction to changing economic conditions and to deterioration in their balance sheets. The results indicate substantial resilience of the euro area banking system at the current juncture. The macroprudential stress test predicts a lower negative impact on capital ratios, though higher capital depletion, in billions of euro, than a static balance-sheet stress test. It also shows that banks’ deleveraging tied to deteriorating capitalisation and asset quality leads to further deterioration in economic conditions in an adverse scenario.

JEL Classification

G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises

G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages

G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation

R30 : Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics→Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location→General

Abstract

This article presents the ECB framework for assessing financial stability risks stemming from residential real estate markets and for designing macroprudential policy responses. It reviews recent developments in residential real estate markets and policy initiatives to address risks.

JEL Classification

G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages

G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation

E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies

F42 : International Economics→Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance→International Policy Coordination and Transmission

Abstract

When living by the ocean, instead of trying to calm the waves and tides, building a levee or a breakwater is the safest option. This article reviews the country-specific strategic choices and decisions regarding timing and calibration of the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) in countries participating in the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). It identifies commonalities across countries and country specificities that influence decisions by national designated authorities. In so doing, it summarises the limitations encountered with the credit-to-GDP gap and the role of other indicators and factors in calibrating the appropriate CCyB rate on the basis of “guided discretion”. Ultimately, assessing risks across euro area countries consistently, while taking into account country-specific factors, supports the effective use of the CCyB as a macroprudential instrument and ensures that similar risk exposures are subject to the same set of macroprudential requirements.

JEL Classification

G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises

G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages

G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation

Abstract

This article summarises the key findings from a counterfactual exercise where the effect of removing repo assets from the leverage ratio on banks’ default probabilities is considered. The findings suggest that granting such an exemption may have adverse effects on the stability of the financial system, even when measures are introduced to compensate for the decline in capital required by the leverage ratio framework. Increases in probabilities of default are mainly seen for larger banks which are more active in the repo market. Moreover, it is observed that the predictive power of the model improves when repo assets are included. Overall, the analysis in this article does not support a more lenient treatment of repo assets in the leverage ratio framework, e.g. by exempting them or allowing for more netting with repo liabilities or against high-quality government bonds.

JEL Classification

G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages

G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation

G38 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Government Policy and Regulation

Abstract

This article evaluates whether the global systemically important bank (G-SIB) framework has incentivised banks to adopt window-dressing behaviour, and whether their engagement in capital market activities has facilitated it. Window-dressing behaviour could have detrimental effects on financial stability, for at least two reasons: first, it may imply an underestimation of banks’ overall systemic importance and a distortion of the relative ranking in favour of banks that engage in more window-dressing behaviour; second, overall market functioning may be adversely affected if banks reduce the provision of certain services towards the end of the year. The evidence presented in this article suggests that both G-SIBs and banks with reporting obligations have reduced their overall risk score and some of their individual risk indicators at the end of a calendar year, both in absolute terms and relative to the other banks in the sample. The results also indicate that year-end reductions in capital market activities are a main driver of the observed window-dressing behaviour.

JEL Classification

G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors

G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation

E61 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Policy Objectives, Policy Designs and Consistency, Policy Coordination

Abstract

This article aims to facilitate discussion on potential macroprudential tools for investment funds. To this end, the article puts forward an initial assessment based on the application of a conceptual framework and aims to inform the debate on the potential design aspects of macroprudential liquidity tools. In line with the ESRB’s approach to developing macroprudential instruments, the effectiveness and efficiency of various macroprudential liquidity tools for investment funds are thoroughly assessed. The article provides an overview of the various liquidity tools and assesses the suitability of these tools for containing the materialisation of systemic risks through various channels.

JEL Classification

C63 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Mathematical Methods, Programming Models, Mathematical and Simulation Modeling→Computational Techniques, Simulation Modeling

G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises

G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages

G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation

Abstract

This article presents stylised facts from the euro area network of large exposures and derives model-based interconnectedness measures of SSM significant institutions. The article has three main findings. First, the interbank network is relatively sparse and suggests a core-periphery network structure. Second, the more complex network measures on average correlate highly with the more simple size-based interconnectedness indicators, constructed following the EBA guidelines on the calibration of O-SII buffers. Third, there is nevertheless value for policymakers to take into account network-based measures in addition to the size-based interconnectedness indicators, as for some individual banks those measures can deviate considerably.

JEL Classification

G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages

G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors

G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation

Abstract

The rapid growth of the asset management sector over recent years has raised questions about the interaction between traditional banks and investment funds, as well as the drivers behind this trend. Our analysis contributes to this debate by shedding light on the implications of increased competition between the two sectors. We first examine how competition between banks and investment funds drives the risk profiles and market shares of these two sectors. In a second step, we assess whether and how capital requirements for banks influence the relative market shares of the two sectors, contributing to both the analysis of the drivers behind the structural developments in the euro area financial sector and the work on the evaluation of the impact of post-crisis reforms.

JEL Classification

E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies

G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation

G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation

Abstract

The European Commission’s proposals for the reform of EU banking rules aim to complete the post-crisis reform agenda and to address shortcomings in the current regulatory framework, notably in the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) and the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV). Once implemented, the changes will strengthen the regulatory architecture in the European Union, thereby contributing to the reduction of risks in the banking sector and paving the way for commensurate progress in completing the banking union. This article outlines and explains the ECB’s key messages concerning these proposals that are of particular importance for macroprudential regulation and policy. In particular, the ECB considers that the ongoing discussions on the CRR/CRD IV package provide the opportunity to make targeted changes to the macroprudential toolkit to make it more efficient and consistent. In the medium term, a comprehensive review of the macroprudential toolkit is still necessary to streamline procedures within the framework and to complement it with tools to address risks in the real estate and non-banking sectors.